TUTORS UNTO CHRIST

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF RELIGIONS

BY

ALFRED E. GARVIE

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PREFACE

THERE are many books on the subjects dealt with in this volume, and if it were only a reproduction of their contents, it would not have been written. My own experience in lecturing to students preparing for the mission-field, and my conversations with those who are interested in missionary education have forced on me the conviction that there is need and so room for a book written from the special standpoint and for the distinctive purpose of this volume. The danger of the students I have in view is that in their study, to use a homely phrase, 'they may not see the wood for the trees': they may lose their way among details, and miss essentials. They need a guide; and a guide for the course which will lead them to the goal they seek. No other book I know does exactly what I have at least tried to do, with what measure of failure or success it is for others to judge. I have written as one who believes, heart and soul, in the foreign mission enterprise, and gives it such help as he can; but I trust I have put down nothing in prejudice or partiality, although nothing with indifference.

The purpose of the volume necessarily determines the treatment. I trust the volume is not unscholarly;

but it is not written for scholars. In the books to which reference is made I have purposely restricted myself, as far as possible, to a few accessible to the student; as nothing seems to me to be so likely to discourage as an array of books which the student sees no chance of ever consulting. Needless to say, a very much wider range of reading lies behind the book.

In the appendix I have added a pamphlet which I prepared for the London Missionary Society in a series 'The Lessons of Edinburgh'. Even although there may be slight repetition, this addition seemed to me worth making.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

New College,
22 *Sept.*, 1919.

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I

THE METHODS OF STUDY

(1) It has often been maintained that the treatment of any subject must begin with a definition of it; but this is in many cases a quite mistaken view. A definition must be the result of an investigation, and not an assumption made at the beginning of it. We must of course have some conception, even if vague, of what is the reality with which we are concerned, if we are to distinguish it from other things, and to give a special direction to our inquiry; but the conception need not be so precise to begin with that we can venture on a definition. Even those who would find themselves quite bewildered, if asked to state in words what they understand by *religion*, have enough knowledge of what it is to be able to distinguish religious beliefs, rites, customs, institutions from the mass of other human interests and activities. More important than a definition to start with is an understanding of the methods by which the subject for inquiry is to be studied. With these we must begin.

(2) What we are concerned with as the *data* of our inquiry is everything to which the descriptive epithet *religious* can be applied. We must select from what we know about the ways and works of men all that

can be so described. Our knowledge of man is obtained mainly in three ways.

(*a*) When we are concerned with savage tribes or peoples, who have no history and no literature, *anthropology*, which may be described, at least in part, as 'the science of human origins'[1], must be our guide. As we shall afterwards more fully discuss the question whether we can regard savage man as representing primitive man, we need not now offer a judgement; but in so far as we are entitled to regard the savage man as retaining some of the features of the primitive man which the civilized man has lost, it is to *anthropology* we must look for an answer to some of our questions about the earlier stages of the development of religion in the race. Anthropology is *comparative* as well as *descriptive*, but in so far as we are simply collecting the data for study, it is only as descriptive that we use it as a source of information. Travellers and missionaries, as well as anthropologists proper, in their writings give us the help we need.

(*b*) We are concerned also with civilizations that are dead, and have left behind them records not in books, but monuments, tablets, inscriptions, &c., and these have to be recovered by explorations amid the ruins they have left buried in the earth. It is *archaeology* that has restored to our knowledge the religions of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon. Here there is both history and literature, but the form of preservation is

[1] *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, by E. O. James, p. vii.

so different from what has remained to us from classic antiquity, that we may recognize a separate department of inquiry.

(*c*) When civilized peoples have maintained the continuity of their life, and so have preserved their past in a history and literature still accessible, we may claim to possess a history of religion in the strict sense of the word, with the literature as the main source of our knowledge. It was only during last century that scholarship generally began to concern itself with the Sacred Scriptures of other religions than the Christian; and great advances have been made in recent years in the translation and interpretation of the literature. What must not be forgotten, however, is this, that the study of the literature must be supplemented and assisted by the observation of the religion as it is in life, if it is thus still accessible to us. Even when it is not, we must always remember in the study of the literature the need of recognizing this distinction.

(*d*) Supplementary to these three methods are three studies deserving mention. (i) In a cultured and civilized community there often *survive* in the beliefs and customs of the common people religious ideas and practices that have been altogether left behind in the religion which is openly professed. It is the function of the study named after its subject-matter *folklore* to collect and so rescue from oblivion the remaining traces of a vanished past. (ii) One of the most

valuable inheritances of a people is its *language*. In it the knowledge and thought of the successive generations have found a permanent deposit, and have escaped the destructive power of time. This is as true of religion as of all other human interests. Hence *philology*, which in a single word can recover for us an age-long development of human belief, is of the utmost importance in providing us with some of the material we need for the adequate and accurate study of any religion. (iii) As religion varies in its forms among different peoples, the study of peoples (*ethnology*) is also a valuable auxiliary.

(3) When we have thus collected our data in the descriptive or narrative treatment of religions, our next step must be *comparison*.

(*a*) In human affairs there is not the same uniformity as there is in the processes of nature. At first sight we are bewildered by the variety of beliefs, customs, and rites in the religions of the world, but a closer scrutiny shows us that there are many resemblances, even widely spread uniformities. (i) It is one human race with which we are dealing, in which the differences due to varied conditions of development are secondary and subordinate to the common human nature. It is the same world, even although the climatic and other physical features may be unlike, in which that one race finds itself. The reaction of the one race on the same world will be uniform in religion as in other interests and activities. (ii) When-

ever close resemblances between one religion and another were observed it was at one time usual to assume borrowing; and that there may have been contacts of tribes and peoples now remote from one another of which no historical record has been preserved may be conceded, and the similarity may sometimes even be so striking as to warrant the inference of dependence on one side or another, especially if the similarity be in some quite subordinate, or accidental feature; but resemblance as such does not prove any contact or dependence; what it proves is the uniformity of human nature under similar conditions. (iii) These resemblances are likely to be closer among savage than civilized peoples where the conditions are more varied. But the contact of civilized peoples on the other hand tends to counteract the greater variability. We may expect and do find an increasing convergence in ideas and ideals, as a common culture and civilization spreads among men.

(*b*) The branch of knowledge which is concerned with this comparison is often spoken of as *Comparative Religion*, a most objectionable combination. When we speak of comparative anatomy, psychology, or philology we are using names of sciences, and not of the subjects of these sciences. Religion is not the name of a science: it may be made the subject of one. To speak of comparative morality would be just as inaccurate, but fortunately we have the name of the science of morality to fall back on and so can speak

quite properly of *comparative ethics*. It is true that the distinction between ethics as the science and morality as the subject dealt with is not always carefully maintained. As theology is specially concerned with the intellectual content of religion *comparative theology* might be too narrow a term; but at least we might always use the phrase, *the comparative study of religions*.

(*c*) There is a question which arises in this connexion. When we compare, it is, as a rule, that we may pronounce a judgement of value. (i) But science knows nothing of values: it is concerned only with facts, causes, and laws of resemblance or succession in facts. In so far then as we keep this study within the rigid bounds of science we must simply compare to discover resemblances and differences in order to determine under what conditions religions are like or unlike one another. We may show how the soul is conceived in different religions without any indication as to which conception appears to us correct. It is most certainly desirable that such comparisons should be made as impartially as possible, without any undue haste in expressing either appreciation or depreciation. (ii) But it is impossible altogether to forbid the judgement of value. That should be reserved, however, for the philosophy of religion, and excluded from the science. (iii) Religion, by its very nature and purpose, is not a subject on which we can remain neutral. If it is the duty of every man to be religious,

it is no less his duty to use his utmost endeavours to discover which religion has the highest claim as truest and best for his acceptance. He must be appreciative, sympathetic, and tolerant to all religions. He must deal with each with absolute candour and sincerity; even when he has made his choice he should regard it as a duty to be not only just, but even generous in his estimate of the religions he does not himself hold; but a judgement of value he can and must form. (iv) An impartiality due to indifference will not qualify, but rather will disqualify, a man from even the scientific study of religion. For it is a subject that will disclose itself not to the indifferent but to the interested. The scientific interest, apart from the personal, is insufficient. The man who cares most for his own faith, if he be a just and kindly man, will be most desirous of avoiding all unfairness in his judgement of other faiths, and is likely to do them fuller justice than the man to whom they are all superstitions.

(4) There is a goal to the comparative study of religions which must be the starting-point of another method of the study of religion, *the psychology of religion*. (*a*) The uniformities discernible in religious beliefs, rites, and customs, indicate the unity of the religious consciousness of mankind. We can then disregard the differences, and ask ourselves this question, how does the soul of man behave in religion? what are the processes of thought, feeling, willing in

religion? (i) The science of psychology is a comparatively recent science, at least as distinguished from philosophy, and as pursued by the modern methods of science. It concerns itself with all the processes of the consciousness of man. (ii) *The psychology of religion* is simply this science as applied to man's religious consciousness. As we have abandoned any assumption that in religion there is an organ or faculty exercised which is peculiar to it, the psychology of religion (a more accurate term than *religious psychology*) takes the ideas, emotions, and volitions in religion, and describes and explains them as it does the mental processes in any and every other sphere.

(*b*) In regard to the psychology of religion a caution must at the outset be uttered. A description of a process is not an explanation of its cause. (i) In dealing with the religious consciousness psychology is concerned with subjective functions; it has nothing to do with their objective reference. As a science it cannot tell us whether there are realities correspondent to the objects of religious belief at all, or how far, if there are objects, that correspondence may go. This is the task of the branch of philosophy which is now generally named *epistemology*. (ii) Psychology may even give the impression that having shown how man thinks, feels, and wills in religion, it has accounted for religion, so that any objective reference is quite unnecessary. A description of conversion from the psychological standpoint may at first sight appear to

exclude any divine factor, and to make it a merely human product. As religion is a relation to that which is above and beyond the human consciousness of self and the world, there is a special danger here of the whole process appearing illusive. Psychology should certainly be applied to religion, but always with due recognition of its necessary limitations to the subjective aspect.

(5) To correct this defect we must go beyond the province of science to the realm of philosophy.

(*a*) Philosophy is concerned with the problems of thought and life, which science as such must leave unsolved—the essential nature, the ultimate cause, the final purpose of all reality. (i) It is just with these questions that religion also is concerned, the whence, the whither, and the why of man's life. While the one, however, deals with these matters speculatively in order to answer the questions of the mind, the other handles them practically in order to meet the needs of the life. (ii) Philosophy has to take into account the entire range of man's mental activities; the sciences of nature and man, which pursue the quest for knowledge up to the limits which their methods prescribe, but cannot reach the truth which is the mind's final goal, the arts which seek to give embodiment in colour, form, sound to man's ideals of beauty, sublimity, and harmony, the morality which developing through custom, law, conscience, and ideal, determines the quality of human character and conduct in the

relation of men to one another, and last, but not least, of all religion, in which man reaches out to that which is above and beyond himself.

(*b*) There are two tasks in relation to religion which are laid upon philosophy.

(i) First of all it should relate religion to the other activities of man. An element in religion is belief, it has always some content of knowledge. How is this knowledge related to the knowledge of science? Are these two modes of knowing contradictory or complementary? Philosophy must here define frontiers; it must show where science alone is authoritative, and where religion alone can bring any satisfaction to the mind. In worship the emotion which is an element also in religion finds expression; how is that expression related to the embodiments of the sense of beauty in art? In religion again there is action to avert the displeasure or to secure the favour of the beings or Being worshipped. How does such action compare with the conduct which morality prescribes? Many religions approve what morality condemns, or morality approves what religion condemns. To what is their difference of judgement due, and how can harmony be restored? With concrete questions philosophy will deal only by way of illustration, but it must lay down the general principles on which these questions must be dealt with. In thus determining the relations to one another within the unity of human thought and life of all these activities, philosophy may be able

to show the value of religion to science, art, morality, in giving to the pursuit of the ideals of truth, beauty, goodness the support of the assurance that these ideals are not subjective human illusions unrelated to any reality except the limited range of their possible realization by man, but do correspond to an objective divine reality. But it is just faith, which is the distinctive activity of religion which offers this assurance, thus the value of religion to man as a rational, aesthetic, and moral personality may be shown. This demonstration might be regarded as the special province of *the philosophy of religion.*

(ii) But a problem still remains. Religion offers the assurance, and so has value, but is that assurance offered on adequate grounds, can the assurance of faith be transformed into certainty for the reason of man? Sometimes the solution of this problem is regarded as belonging also to the province of the philosophy of religion, but what is its distinctive character is brought out much less ambiguously in the term *philosophy of theism.* Can the belief in God which is the assurance religion offers in regard to human ideals as not illusive be demonstrated, if not with logical adequacy, yet sufficiently to justify faith as rational so far as our knowledge and thought can carry us in these matters? We must then turn again to science, art, morality, especially but not exclusively the first, and ask ourselves: does the knowledge we have of nature and man not forbid, but allow, nay

even require and indicate such a solution of the problems of thought which by its own methods science cannot solve as the belief in God offers? It is the twofold task of showing the value and proving the validity of religion that we may assign to philosophy.

(6) It would seem as if we had exhausted all the methods by which religion can be studied. There is one other, which is not usually recognized, but which deserves mention. It is indicated in *Anselm's* dictum *credo ut intelligam*, 'I believe that I may understand'. A believer in a religion may be so convinced that it is true that he desires no service from philosophy to confirm its value and validity for him; and yet he may desire to present it to himself in as intelligible a form as he can. He may exercise his reason upon it to test and to show its intellectual consistency. This may be called the *theological* study. If he assumes the truth, and seeks only to expound it, his theology is *dogmatic*. But if he recognizes any obligation to harmonize the truth, as he holds it with truth as science and philosophy present it, his theology is *apologetic*, and thus it very easily becomes merged again in the philosophy of religion or of theism.[1]

[1] I may refer the reader to my essay on *The Study of Religion* in *London Theological Studies*, pp. 285–312.

II

THE HISTORY OF OPINIONS

(1) The adequate and exact study of the religions of the world is of recent date. It is true that religion has had so prominent a place, and has proved so potent a factor in human history that it has been impossible for human thought to be indifferent to it. Every serious thinker has had to take up an attitude to it, either favourable or hostile. But most of what has been said or written belongs to what *Plato* called *opinion* rather than knowledge, judgement, truth. Nevertheless these indications of what religion has appeared to be to different minds in varying conditions may help us to discover what religion really is, even although at times the statements tell us more about the person from whom they came than the thing to which they refer.

(2) The foe of religion in ancient as in modern times has been either *scepticism* or *rationalism*. The one denies that the human mind can reach the truth about reality, and so regards the certainties of religion as illusions. The other asserts that the *reason* of man can by its own activity reach all the truth which man can require or acquire, and that accordingly

what in religious beliefs contradicts the dicta of reason must be false, and what adds thereto vain. The aim of scepticism or rationalism is to treat religion as a superstition to be discredited and rejected.

(*a*) A few examples of this treatment of religion may be given.

(i) The sophist *Critias* (died 403) derived religious customs from the craft of rulers, who, able to control outward actions only, invented and imposed on their subjects the belief in gods, who could discover and punish also the inward motives and purposes.

(ii) *Euhemerus* (about 300) professed to have discovered on an inscription in a temple the information that the gods of the mythology had come to be from the more or less intentional deification of men, who themselves claimed supernatural powers, or who were worshipped as benefactors. Such attempts to explain away the belief in the existence of gods are often referred to by the generic name of Euhemerism.

(iii) *Xenophanes* (died about 477) had called attention to the fact that all nations conceived their gods not only as human, but as possessing their own individual or national traits. The Thracians made their gods red-haired, the Ethiopians black. If oxen and asses had gods, they would conceive and represent the gods as like themselves. So regarded the belief in gods is a self-exaltation on the part of men. This may be called *psychological rationalism*.

(iv) Some Greek philosophers, especially the *Stoics*,

although Stoicism was not hostile to all religion, derived mythology from the attempt to explain natural phenomena rationally in a pictorial form for the common people. *Empedocles* gives divine names to the four elements, e. g. fire is Zeus, the air Hera. This *cosmological rationalism* was anticipated by the Sophist *Prodicus* who taught according to *Sextus Empiricus* that whatever is useful to man is regarded as a god. Thus the Egyptians regarded the Nile as a god. Bread was called Demeter and wine Dionysos, and fire Hephaestos.

(v) The rival school to the Stoics, the Epicurean, did not treat religion with even this measure of seriousness. *Epicurus* regarded it as *mostly false opinion*, and tried to assure men that the ordering of their lot was in their own hands, and that the gods did not intermeddle with it. *Lucretius* found the source of religion in fear, and regarded it as responsible for many evils. The saying 'Primus in orbe deos fecit timor' is not to be traced to him, however, but to *Petronius*. This view was revived by *Hobbes*, who defined it as fear of the invisible powers, whether imagined, or received from history. He claimed for the State the right to prescribe one form of it for all its citizens. To *Hume's* presentation of this view we must return.

(vi) In opposition to Christianity and all historical religions the *Deists* affirmed a *natural religion*, consisting of beliefs common to all mankind, to which

alone all that could be regarded as true in any historical religion must be confined.

(vii) Among philologists at the beginning of the nineteenth century there was formulated a view of mythology, which may be called *critical rationalism*. Of this view *Grote*, and in his earlier period *Renan* were adherents, and it influenced *Goethe* in his Faust. The account given of it by *Runze* may be quoted in full. 'Mythology is a theory of world and man, which differs from philosophy only by its more picture-like (*anschaulichere*, more intuitive) mode of presentation and uses poetic personifying language. The experiences of life gained and the knowledge of nature acquired are embodied by the cultured, especially the esoteric teachers of the people, the priests and the poets, in the attractive language of the myth. Partly the more easily to impart their higher knowledge, partly (as in the mysteries) to hide from the people the secret meaning not suitable for communication, one chose the picture-language of religion, the myth, as the means of representing the ideas. Nevertheless one should not seek the meaning of a myth behind it, but within it; for as it is consciously composed by thinking men, one finds in its composition exactly what its creators wanted to see put into it.'[1] In contrast to the *allegorical*, this method may be called the *homogorical*. To give some instances, Demeter means the mother-

[1] *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 48. To this book I am indebted for most of the material in this section.

love of the human mother, Ares the fury of war, and Aphrodite the grace of love. This view has some resemblance to Hegel's statement of the contrast of religion and philosophy.

(*b*) That some of these theories have caught glimpses of the truth may be admitted. (i) There is an activity of the imagination in mythology, but it is spontaneous, and not calculated as it is represented as being. Man does personify nature, and he does magnify his own being and power. But in the deification either of nature or man, what has to be accounted for is the conception of the divine, which neither nature nor man can yield. (ii) Fear is one of the religious emotions, but it is not the only one, as our psychological analysis will afterwards show. (iii) That rulers and priests have used religious beliefs for their own advantage, as when kings encouraged their own deification, and priests claimed for themselves exclusive mediation between the gods and men, may be conceded; but the religious beliefs were there to be so used, and neither rulers nor priests could have imposed beliefs for which the mind of the people was not prepared.

(iv) The error of many theories is that they are too intellectualist: they assume that an explanation of mythology is also an account of religion, whereas mythology is only one element in religion, and not the most important element or the earliest. There is the *mystic* element, the desire for and even the experience

of union with the divine, or inspiration, often conceived most crudely it is true, but still real. There is the *practical* element, the object for which men are religious, and both of these elements must be adequately recognized. (v) Religion is too varied in its forms, too universal in its range, too permanent in its influence, too deeply rooted in the common soil of human thought and life to be explained away by any such theories.

(3) We may turn now from those hostile to these favourable views of religion. (*a*) Only a few notable examples can be given. (i) For *Socrates* and *Plato* religion is belief in the divine providence; so it is also for the *Stoics*, who regard gods and men as constituting one order of the world. *Varro* is the first to distinguish natural from civil religion. *Cicero*, in a notable saying, affirms the necessity and universality of religion. 'Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis cuius mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio.'[1] ('So that moreover it appears that it should be affirmed that we believe gods exist, because no people is so savage, not one of all is so inhuman, that his mind is not imbued with the belief in the gods.') For *Plotinus* religion is the elevation of man to God.

[1] *Tusc. disp.* i. 13, § 29, quoted in Eisler's *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe und Ausdrücke*, p. 646. To this book I am indebted for most of the quotations given in this section.

(ii) *John Scotus Erigena* identified true philosophy and true religion. 'Quid est aliud de philosophia tractare, nisi verae religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa, Deus, et humiliter colitur, et rationabiliter investigatur, regulas exponere? Conficitur inde, veram esse philosophiam veram religionem conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam.'[1] ('What else is dealing with philosophy than expounding the rules of true religion, by which the highest and principal cause of all things God is both humbly worshipped and examined by the reason. Hence it follows logically that true philosophy is true religion, and that conversely true religion is true philosophy.') For *Spinoza* religion is the loving knowledge of God, the viewing of all things *sub specie aeternitatis*. A similar view is that of *Leibnitz*. 'One could not love God if one did not know his perfection, and this knowledge includes the principles of true piety. The aim of true religion must be to impress these principles on human spirits.'[2] A similarly intellectualist view is taken by *Hegel*, who defines religion as 'the consciousness of the supersensible'. 'Religion is the kind and way of consciousness, as truth is for all men and for men of each stage of development.'[3] While it is the universal, yet it is an inferior, mode of apprehending reality in comparison with philosophy. It apprehends the supersensible in images or the facts of history, and not in ideas. In thus claiming for

[1] *De praed.* cap. i, § 1. [2] *Theod.* i, Intro. § 6.
[3] *Encyc.*, Intro. 2nd ed., p. 13.

philosophy a more adequate attainment of truth, Hegel, though valuing religion, shows some affinity with rationalism.

(iii) *Wollaston* identified religion with morality. 'By religion', he said, 'I mean nothing else but an obligation to do what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought not to be done.'[1] He anticipated *Kant*, who defines religion as 'the recognition of our duties as divine commands'. 'Religion', he says, 'is that belief which finds the essential of all worship of God in the morality of man.'[2] For *Fichte* religion was the belief in a moral world-order.

(iv) In opposition to the intellectualism of Hegel, which represented religion as inferior to philosophy, and the moralism of Kant, who treated it as subordinate to morality, *Schleiermacher* vindicated for religion a sphere of its own, and related it not to mind or will but to the heart as the feeling of dependence on God. 'The Universe', he says, 'is in an unbroken activity, and reveals itself to us in every moment. Every form that it brings forth, every being, which in accordance with the fullness of life it gives an independent existence, every occurrence which it casts out of its rich and always fruitful lap, is an action of it upon us, and in these influences, and what thereby is done in us, the taking up into our life and the allowing of ourselves to be moved by each single thing, not by itself, but as a part of the whole, all that

[1] *Rel. of nat.*, p. 26. [2] Werke, vii, p. 366.

is limited not in its contrast to other things, but as a representation of the infinite – this is religion.'[1] It is cosmic emotion, in which the Universe is felt as a unity, as God, who may be conceived either personally or impersonally. These three great thinkers have thus attached religion to one of the three functions of human personality predominantly, although not to the entire exclusion of the others.

(v) A definition which recognizes an aspect of religion which has been generally ignored by the great thinkers is that given in the Middle Ages by *Agrippa of Nettesheim*. 'Est igitur religio disciplina quaedam externorum sacrorum ac caeremoniarum, per quam rerum internarum et spiritualium tanquam per signa quaedam admonemur, quae ita nobis a natura insita est, ut plus illa quam rationalitate a caeteris animalibus discernamur.' ('Therefore religion is a certain discipline of external sanctities and ceremonies, by which we are instructed as by signs of internal and spiritual things, which is so implanted in us by nature, that more by that than reason we are distinguished from other animals.')[2] Here the very important distinction is made between religious rites and dispositions, the outward expression and the inward activity of religion. Noteworthy, too, is the assertion that religion, even more than reason, is distinctive of man.

(*b*) These opinions about religion are all partial, and

[1] *Üb. d. Rel.* 2, p. 75.
[2] Quoted from Ritter by Eisler, *op. cit.*, p. 647.

not one is adequate. One feature, or one function, is thrown into undue prominence, and yet when we come to deal with the subject constructively we shall find that in each some element is emphasized, to which due recognition must be given in any complete account.

(4) In opposition to rationalism in so far as it represents religion as an artificial and arbitrary product of human thought and life, *intuitionalism* (or *nativism*) in various forms insists that the belief in and worship of God is inborn in the mind of man. (*a*) *Plato* is the great exponent of the doctrine of ideas. *Cicero* joined Platonists and Stoics in affirming that the idea of God was innate. *Descartes* championed this doctrine, and one of his proofs for the existence of God starts from the assumption that the mind has a definite conception of God given in its very constitution. (*b*) To this *Locke* opposed his *associationalism* and *Hume* his *scepticism*. The deists, while rationalists in opposing the Christian doctrine of revelation, held that man's *natural religion* included among its five articles the belief in God's existence. Not all the adherents of the Scottish or Common Sense school regarded the belief in God as innate, but some treated it as an inference from innate ideas. (*c*) What is true in intuitionalism is this, that the capacity for religion is universal. Everywhere some form of religious belief has emerged. But there is so great a variety of conceptions of the divine, and we can trace so distinctly the develop-

ment of the idea of God which intuitionalism assumes to be innate, that in its crude form we must abandon intuitionalism.[1]

(5) In all religions there is some kind of belief in God. Hence it seems an easy and almost necessary inference that God the object is also the source of the belief, in other words, that religion is due to revelation. (*a*) This view has been presented in a quite unreasoning form. It is assumed that there was a primitive revelation, of which some traces survive amid the corruption of heathenism. An early monotheism even has been affirmed. *Thomas Aquinas* and *Melanchthon* threw back into the beginnings of religion in mankind much of the content of the historical Christian revelation. *Justin Martyr* regarded the heathen religions as revelations of demons, and *Morgan* the deist traced them back to the fallen angels. Hindus and Greeks alike claimed that their knowledge of the gods had been handed down to them from their ancestors, who stood in more intimate relations with the gods, and received communications from them. *Waitz*[2] states that in various African tribes there is the belief that 'formerly heaven was nearer men than now, that the highest God and Creator had given men lessons of high wisdom, but had afterwards withdrawn himself, and

[1] Runze deals with it under the name *nativism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–5.

[2] *Anthropol. d. Naturvölker*, ii. 1860, p. 171. Quoted by Runze, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

now dwelt far from them in heaven.' (*b*) We shall afterwards examine this belief more closely; but meanwhile we are concerned only with this assumption that religion has its source in a primitive revelation. In that definite form the theory can be unhesitatingly rejected. The gradual development of the religious consciousness in dependence on, and correspondence with, the growing knowledge of self and the world can be made intelligible and credible from the standpoint of psychology, as this assumption of a communication of knowledge which the mind of man was not capable of receiving and retaining at that stage cannot.

(*c*) This, however, does not exclude a continuous activity of God in that development objectively and subjectively. God is and works in nature and history; and by His spirit in great religious personalities He has enabled men in growing measure to know and understand His presence and activity. If religion is a mutual relation of God and man, such divine activity is no less necessary to, and real in it than is the action of man. (*d*) Apart from the testimony that the Hebrew and Christian religions in their continuous history offer to such an activity of God, in many religions there are phenomena, to which we must apply the ambiguous and therefore misleading term *mystical*, which do indicate an experience by man of God. The inspiration may often be void of definite intellectual or moral content, and

yet there is an exaltation of feeling due to a sense of being possessed by the deity, which we cannot simply dismiss as nothing but illusion. (*e*) Further, if the philosophy of religion or theism can prove the objectivity of religious knowledge, the reality of God, it is made certain that God has been active in man's religious development; but we cannot begin with that assumption. This may be our goal, but cannot be our starting-point.

(6) The common defect of the views which we have been considering has been the failure to recognize adequately, if at all, that religion has developed gradually. The application of the scientific hypothesis of evolution to the religious consciousness itself is what distinguishes later from earlier views, as well as the fact that the statements now made rest on the more adequate methods of study with which the first chapter has dealt. That some of these statements will on closer scrutiny also prove defective may be taken for granted; but nevertheless the difference of method warrants our now closing what has been called the history of opinions; and our entering in the next chapter on a consideration of attempts at the scientific explanation and philosophical interpretation of what religion is, and how it comes to be at all.

III

DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

(1) ARE we now in a position to offer a definition of religion? Will the psychology, or the history, or the comparative study, or the philosophy of religion give us what we want? We may begin with the psychologists.

(i) *Volkmann* makes the following statement: 'The religious feeling has the same relation to the moral as has the artistic emotion to the aesthetic. The searching investigations of the ethnography of the present time in regard to the genesis of the lowest forms of religion have set aside the assumption that religion had originally arisen from the moral consciousness of the peoples. At the bottom of the religious emotion there everywhere lies principally the being possessed by a higher and indeed supersensible power operative behind the sensible appearances. If one wishes to call this feeling a *feeling of dependence*, no objection is to be made to this, so long as on the one hand one holds fast to the supersensible character of that ruling power, and on the other hand provisionally abstains from its personification. The old "timor deos fecit" has

so far its justification, as in fact the religious feeling in its lowest stages is nothing else than the dread before a dark overmight, which, quite apart from the circle of moral ideas, finds its first expression in quite peculiar superstitious customs.'[1] Here attention is concentrated on psychical function.

(ii) *Wundt* on the contrary lays the stress on the practical object of religion. 'The religious feeling is a form of the intellectual feelings arising out of the necessity to produce a harmony between the appearances given in outward experience and the moral impulses or the emotions of the spirit, out of which these proceed, the feeling for self and for others. This necessity is accompanied particularly at its original stages by the irresistible impulse to complete the connexion of things and occurrences by representations, in which the moral wishes and demands of the consciousness find their expression.' 'Originally turned to the outer world, inclined to subordinate the manifold appearances of nature to the beneficient or imperilling power of divine beings, it gradually, following the development of the self-consciousness, withdraws itself mainly to the inmost life of man. As we find our voluntary conduct dependent on the moral laws of conscience, which have taken shape partly in us as moral principles, partly outside of us as customs and laws, the moral direction increases.'[2]

[1] *Lehrb. d. Psych.* ii.[4] 368 f., quoted by Eisler, *op. cit.*, p. 648.

[2] *Grundz. der phys. Psych.* ii[3], p. 425 f. Quoted in Eisler, p. 649.

(iii) From the psychological standpoint *Galloway* suggests a tentative definition: 'Man's faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service.'[1] Here he seeks to combine the intellectual, the emotional, and the practical functions of personality with the outward expressions of it.

(2) The students of the history of religions are by no means agreed in their definitions. (i) *Dr. Menzies* defines it as 'the worship of spiritual beings from a sense of need'; (ii) *Tiele* as 'the relation between man and the supersensible power'; (iii) *Pfleiderer* as 'the direction of the will which corresponds to the idea of the Deity'.[2] He finds the core of religion in piety as 'a mixture of fear, reverence, confidence, and sympathy towards the superior divine power'. (iv) *Chantepie de la Saussaye* holds that a definition without a philosophical justification is almost worthless. (v) If these are indefinite, *Max Müller's* phrase 'the perception of the infinite' rests on only one aspect of Vedic religion. (vi) *Tylor*, who may be taken as representing the anthropologists, is content with the phrase 'a belief in spiritual beings'. (vii) A distinct bias against religion appears in *Reinach's* identification of religion with the system of taboo, when he

[1] *Phil. of Rel.*, p. 184.

[2] *Religionsphilosophie*, 3rd ed., p. 329, quoted by Galloway, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

describes it as 'a body of scruples which act as an obstacle to the free exercise of our faculties'.[1]

(3) The description given by *Wundt* passes over from the psychological to the philosophical standpoint, as it indicates not only the psychical functions in religion, but also the object that religion has in view. (i) Not unlike is *Höffding's* phrase 'faith in the conservation of values', which exhibits the significance of religion for the thought and life of man rather than describes what religion is. (ii) Chantepie de la Saussaye refers his readers to Siebeck for a more adequate definition than he himself attempts to give. For *Siebeck* religion is 'the intellectual, emotional, and practically operative conviction of the existence of God and the supramundane, and in combination therewith of the possibilty of a redemption.' 'Religion is *revelation* just in so far as, by its existence and its historical development as a definite co-operating factor in the civilized life, it brings that life to the consciousness that it itself, and especially the world, is not the finally valid and absolute, but is the basis for a higher life, and in so far as, by its existence and the theoretical and practical effects of it, it at the same time declares the fact of the connexion between the intramundane and the supramundane.'[2] In such

[1] *Orpheus: Histoire général edes religions*, p. 4, quoted by Galloway p. 182.

[2] *Lehrb. d. Religionsphilos.*, pp. 442, 447, quoted by Eisler, *op. cit.*, p. 649.

an account there is implied a philosophy of religion, and it certainly would not be applicable to the actual conditions in any religion.

(4) If in seeking to reach a definition, we take seriously the comparative study of religions, and try to find a definition which will cover all the facts, we shall at first be led to the conclusion of *William James* that such a definition is impossible. (i) 'The word "religion" cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name. . . . Let us not fall immediately into a one-sided view of our subject, but let us rather admit freely at the outset that we may very likely find no one essence but many characters which may alternately be equally important in religion.' [1] As regards the religious sentiment, he affirms, 'the moment we are willing to treat the term "religious sentiment" as a collective name for the many sentiments which religious objects may arouse in alternation, we see that it probably contains nothing whatever of a psychologically specific nature. There is religious fear, religious love, religious awe, religious joy, and so forth.' [2] He goes even further in his denial when he says, 'As there thus seems to be no one elementary religious emotion, but only a common storehouse of emotions upon which religious objects may draw, so there might conceivably also prove to be no one specific and essential kind of

[1] *Varieties of Religious Experiences*, p. 26.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

religious object, and no one specific and essential kind of religious act.'[1] This scepticism is overdone, for if there be nothing distinctive in religion, either subjectively or objectively, on what ground do we call any emotion, object, or act religious, rather than anything else? We must, greatly daring after such a warning of the certainty of failure, pursue our quest.

(ii) Although *Ritschl* was not a student of religions, yet he has shown a sense of the difficulty of the task of defining religion which many have ignored. He does not attempt either to describe what is the common element in all religions, nor to determine what is the universal ideal of religion. His definition is not merely the first, for he admits that 'for such a purpose it is not indefinite enough', and he adds 'language does not offer a sufficiently indefinite or neutral expression to convey the desired general idea of religion.' Neither is it altogether the second, as in Christianity the ideal is realized, and his definition falls short of what Christianity is. What he does attempt is to indicate the *tendency* in all religions, more or less explicit, which reaches its full effectiveness in Christianity alone. His definition runs as follows: 'In all religion the endeavour is made, with the help of the exalted spiritual power which man adores, to solve the contradiction in which man finds himself as a part of the natural world, and as a spiritual personality which makes the claim to rule nature.' The object of religion

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

as here described evidently belongs to a late stage of the development of the religious consciousness. And the relation to the world gains an undue prominence in comparison with the relation to God.[1] Yet we owe something to Ritschl for having raised this question of method.

(iii) *Kaftan*, differing from Ritschl, has tried 'to bring to expression an essential and distinctive peculiarity of religion', the common element of all religions, and maintains his method as the alone scientific, despite Ritschl's criticism that religion 'so conceived is too universally and indefinitely described'. For him 'the concern of all religion is life, and not—at once to name the contrary—perfect life, goods or a highest good, and not ethical ideals'. The distinctive religious impulse is that man 'finds no desirable satisfaction in his earthly enjoyment of life in the goods which the world offers him', and so is drawn to seek a supramundane good. Kaftan can hardly claim to have succeeded in his search for what is common to all religions.[2]

(5) Without attempting a definition now, we may indicate the necessary components of a decription aiming at, if not gaining, adequacy. The *subject* of religion is man, not in one, but in all his psychical functions. The *object* to which religion is directed is the divine, the conception of which ranges from

[1] See Garvie's *Ritschlian Theology*, p. 162.
[2] *Op. cit.* pp. 166 f.

animism at the one end to monotheism at the other. The *purpose* for which the subject enters into relation with the object is human good, which may be regarded as consisting of natural goods, moral goodness, or the spiritual good—God Himself. The *acts* by which the relation is maintained are many, but the most distinctive are prayer and sacrifice. The psychical factors, the stages of development, the practical objects, and the distinctive acts must all be noted.

IV

THEORIES OF ORIGIN OF RELIGION

(1) The phrase itself, Theories of Origin, is ambiguous, and needs closer scrutiny. (*a*) It may mean what are the sources, subjective in human personality and objective in the natural and social environment, of man's religion? How is it that he comes to be religious at all? As we are dealing with a conscious being, who thinks and feels and wills, who has motives for, and intentions in, his actions, the question of the *How* becomes the question of the *Why*, for the cause in consciousness becomes the reason. This, it is evident, is an inquiry which may and must begin with the psychology of religion, which describes the conscious process; but it cannot stop there, it must go on to the philosophy of religion, which supplements the causal by the teleological point of view, and, therefore, seeks to discover the purpose of religion, its function in the thought and life of man. In a previous chapter on the history of opinions, theories of origin in this sense have already been mentioned, and will be in the present chapter. Rationalism seeks to get rid of a rival authority in the thought and life of man by explaining religion so as to explain it away, reducing it to some-

thing so unworthy of reasonable and moral manhood as to discredit it altogether. We have now to continue the inquiry, whether the more thorough study of the subject in recent years has led to similar views.

(*b*) We shall be led to our answer, however, by first considering the second sense in which the phrase 'theories of origin' may be used. It has already been indicated how great a difference the scientific hypothesis of evolution has made. In dealing with any subject men at once ask, How did it begin and develop? The earliest form is held to possess the promise and the potency of all that follows, matter of life and life of mind. Applying this method to religion anthropologists incline to regard the oldest phase of religious consciousness, so far as we can trace it, as the explanation of all subsequent phases. Having once shown, or thought that they have shown, that animism, or ghost-worship, or magic, or some other superstition is the earliest discoverable form of religion, some thinkers assume that they have accounted for religion. But, we may ask, is this assumption justified?

(*c*) It has been insisted again and again,—and it does seem that we cannot get rid of the principle,—*ex nihilo nihil fit.* What is evolved must be involved, but we do not know all that is involved until it is evolved. The apparent actuality at any stage may not show, or even give any hint, of the real possibility. Even if we regard evolution as *epigenesis*, the coming

of something new into existence, it can be only into phenomenal actuality; there must be a reality that holds its possibility, although it may be quite beyond our knowledge. We do not in any progressive development limit the fulfilment by the promise, but rather estimate the promise by the fulfilment. We do not see only the acorn in the oak, but rather the oak in the acorn. The man is not merely the babe; nor is the babe's cry the adequate explanation of the eloquent speech of the man. As man becomes more self-conscious, he comes to understand himself and his world better, and the interpretation of religion which the modern thinker gives is much nearer the truth than the explanation which the beliefs and customs of the savage may suggest to the anthropologists.

(*d*) Some men of science apply to religion a method of treatment which they would not apply to any other human activity. In the primitive man, if he did resemble the savage (although this is an assumption we must afterwards examine), there were the beginnings of science and morality as well as of religion, and the crude beginnings of all three must be acknowledged. Magic may be regarded as the savage's applied science, and taboo as having some affinity with morality. We do not use these crude beginnings to discredit science or morality by suggesting that there is nothing truer and better in the last than in the first phase. Why should such an injustice

be done to religion? The modern man of science, by his one-sided development of his human personality, may reason himself out of all religious belief. But he makes an immodest assumption when he concludes that it is right and reasonable that all mankind should follow his example.

(*e*) The fact that religion has developed in correspondence with man's intellectual and moral progress, that it has been able to adapt itself to its ever-changing environment of thought and life, and that not a few of the foremost men of science have also been devout believers, should make us pause before we take for granted that religion alone is going to be superseded, and can be dismissed as only the belated survival of a savage superstition. Whether any particular form of belief or worship is the earliest or not is a question to be considered solely on the evidence. What alone we must enter a *caveat* against is this assumption that we have reached a theory of the origin of religion when we have got back to its earliest form.

(*f*) A general consideration which must be borne in mind in the discussion of recent theories of the origin of religion is this. On the side of religion there has often been an undue emphasis on beliefs, and these have been without good reason opposed to the knowledge science offers. Consequently the man of science in approaching religion is prone to direct his attention almost exclusively to the intellectual content

of religion, to contrast that unfavourably with the conclusions of science, and to assume that when he has offered what seems a probable explanation of the mythology, the ideas about spirits or gods, he has accounted for religion. The mythology is only one aspect of the religious consciousness, and may not even have exclusively religious significance. It may be early science and poetry blended, with only a subordinate importance for religion itself. The feelings and the wishes as well as, if not more than, the thoughts must be taken into account in any attempt to explain religion which will be at all adequate to so complex a reality. Intellectual curiosity is only one of the motives in religion.

(2) We may now look at some of the explanations of religion which have been offered from the standpoint of modern knowledge. (i) Although *Hume*[1] belongs to the eighteenth century, yet in his method of dealing with this question he may be reckoned rather to the nineteenth. He rejects the four explanations previously offered. Religion is not due to any natural endowment of man restored by revelation. It is no deliberate invention of priests or rulers. It is no intellectual explanation of the cause of the world. It is not based on any moral demands or social interests. It is a natural development, of which a psychological account can be given. With Lucretius and Hobbes he holds that its main characteristic

[1] *The Natural History of Religion.*

is fear. It is the sudden, the unexpected, the terrible, the painful in man's experience that leads to religion. Among its motives are the fear of death and the sense of guilt. The imagination, with its tendency to personify, and the laws of the association of ideas, subserve the emotions in providing the intellectual content. Acute as this psychological analysis often is, it remains partial and inadequate, and does not take account of all the data, outer and inner. (ii) It is true that *Herbert Spencer* proposes a reconciliation of religion and science in his *First Principles*. Science is to acknowledge that there is an ultimate reality beyond the phenomena included in the province of the Known, which is its realm; but religion for this concession is to admit that this ultimate reality is unknown and unknowable. As regards positive religious belief, as it has developed in human history, he rejects it altogether, and traces back the belief in God to the belief in ghosts, and religious rites to funeral ceremonies. That the ideas of ghosts and spirits of nature have their roots in the common soil of the primitive philosophy of animism, and that the kinds of homage or service rendered to the one and the other are similar may be conceded; but what has not been proved, and for several reasons is altogether improbable, is that the first is the source of the second. (*a*) Admitting the possibility of a deification of ancestors, and an ascription of ancestorship to deities, this is far too narrow a basis on which to

rear the structure of religion. The direct dependence of man on nature, the potent influence of nature on man, aesthetic no less than intellectual and practical, is here ignored. 'The representation', says Runze, 'of a peculiar mode of existence of a particular group of persons who had once existed is far too one-sided an object for the imagination, emotions, and volitions, that out of it so universal a formation as religion could have grown always and everywhere. Is not man also a natural being? Why should not the assumption of spiritual and personal beings in other natural objects be just as primitive as the assumption of special ghosts of men? Why should not the contemplative adoration of nature be just as primitive as the practical personal worship of *men*?'[1] Even if we combined this naturism with ghost-worship, we should not have exhausted the factors in religion.

(*b*) Dr. Jevons is still more emphatic, and rejects the theory altogether. 'This assumption that the only spirits which the savage originally knew were ghosts is not true; the savage believes the forces and phenomena of nature to be personalities like himself, he does not believe that they are ghosts or worked by ghosts. In fine, the notion that gods were evolved out of ghosts is based on an unproved assumption and the simple fallacy of confusing ancestors human and ancestors divine. The fact is that ancestors known to be human were not worshipped as gods,

[1] *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 80.

and that ancestors worshipped as gods were not believed to have been human. This last remark leads us to a generalization which, though obvious, is important; it is that wherever ancestor-worship exists, it exists side by side with the public worship of the gods of the community. The two systems develop on lines which are parallel, indeed, and therefore never meet; whereas, if they had moved on the same line of development one would have absorbed the other. . . . In the newly evolved organism we should have traced survivals here and there, rudimentary organs inherited from the previous state of things. We should also have found races who had never got beyond the earlier stage, or had relapsed into it. But we should not everywhere have found the two systems alive together: we might as well expect to find the chrysalis still living by the side of the butterfly which has emerged from it.'[1] Even if this argument do not appear in all its parts equally conclusive, these considerations serve our immediate purpose that no one phase of religion, be it the earliest or not, can be taken as supplying us with any adequate theory of its origin, as other phases co-existent or successive must always be taken into account.

(iii) A view much more widely held, and resting on a very much wider basis of relevant evidence may be called *naturism*, which sees the original form of religion in the naïve deification of nature.

[1] *Introduction to the History of Religion*, pp. 197–8.

(*a*) *Reville* attempts to explain the origin of religion entirely in this way. *Max Müller* and *von Hartmann* recognize other factors as well, but give this the first place. Whether the theoretical impulse to explain or the practical impulse to use nature had more to do with this deification of natural forces, this theory does not determine. The recent tendency, however, has been to assign more importance to the practical than to the theoretical impulses; but it would be a mistake to lay the stress on one or other aspect of human activity. Whether the smaller objects of nature, stones, trees, animals, first attracted attention, and secured worship, or the larger, sun, moon, heaven, earth, is also a question on which there is difference of opinion. So again, was it the regular, as the movement of the sun in the heavens, or the extraordinary, as the thunderstorm, that awakened surprise and called for the explanation which religion as naturism offered? These subordinate questions may be held over and the theory in its broad outline alone considered.

(*b*) On the one hand it may be conceded that taking the whole realm of nature as evoking the religious consciousness of man, a very broad basis is afforded, and room is left for the great variety observable in religious development. And yet, on the other, when naturism is put forward as the sole and exclusive theory of the origin of religion, objection may be taken on several grounds. (*a*) The ethical aspect of

religion (legal, moral, or redemptive) is not duly accounted for. Man has an interest in himself as well as his fellows, and not in his relation to nature alone. Even if ancestor-worship be not primitive, we must conceive religion widely enough to allow for its emergence. (β) The objective standpoint is too prominent in these theories: the stress is laid on the *occasions* in the world around for religion, and not enough on the *motives* in man, his emotions, affections, imaginations, ideas, necessities, and aspirations. (γ) When we speak of a naïve deification of nature, we are making a vast assumption, which needs explanation. How does man get the conception of the divine at all (whether as spirits or gods)? That he discovers soul in himself and ascribes soul to objects in the world around is only the first step to explanation. Whence arise the differences between himself and the spirits or gods which he no less recognizes than the resemblances? The ideas of infinitude, absoluteness, immensity, eternity, all in due course emerge and attach themselves to the conception of the divine. Can the process of nature alone lead the mind of man to such ideas? This consideration is recognized in the next theory to which we turn—*symbolism.*

(iv) The most eminent modern representative of this view is *Sabatier*, although it has its beginnings in the Romanticism of the beginning of last century. Man has a longing for the supersensible, the infinite; for

this idea of the intellect the imagination finds symbols in the appearances of nature. Man is always discovering the inadequacy of his symbols, and yet is ever seeking for more adequate symbols. This view does undoubtedly call attention to an aspect of religion that has often been overlooked: but it is too simple to account for religion as a whole.

(v) Religion has also been closely connected with, if not directly derived from, magic. (*a*) *Frazer's* views on this subject have undergone some development. In his first edition of *The Golden Bough* he ascribed to primitive man two views of nature. In the one (the religious) its working is ascribed to personal beings similar to man. In the other (the magical) it is conceived as an impersonal process. In magic by imitation of natural phenomena man seeks for his own purpose to get control over the process. In the second edition (1900) Frazer emphasized the opposition of the two views, and asserted further that 'in the evolution of thought, magic, as representing a lower intellectual stratum, has probably everywhere preceded religion'. It was when men discovered the futility of the attempt 'to force the great powers of nature to do their pleasure' that they turned to offerings and prayers to court their favour.[1] (*b*) *E. S. Hartland* (*Ritual and Belief*) holds a similiar position, deriving magic and religion from a common root, and distinguishing them similarly; but prayer and sacri-

[1] See *H. E. R. E.* viii, article *Magic*, p. 245.

fices may both become magical in so far as a compelling force over the personal object of worship may be assigned to them, whereas reverence and submission are the characteristics of religion.[1] (*c*) 'There are reasons for hesitating to accept this view, and for believing, first that religion and magic had different origins, and were always essentially distinct from one another: next, that the belief in the supernatural was prior to the belief in magic, and that the latter whenever it sprang up, was a degradation or relapse in the evolution of religion.'[2] Whether the word *supernatural* does not suggest too developed a conception for primitive man may properly be asked. But even if we do not use the term, we may with Jevons admit that probably man did very soon distinguish ordinary and extraordinary occurrences, those he was familiar with and expected and those which surprised him because he did not expect them. His inference too we may allow, although probably we should speak of powers rather than power. 'He must therefore from the beginning have been brought to confront a mysterious power which was beyond both his calculation and his control.'[3] In magic on the other hand the savage did not claim that he possessed supernatural power. He believed that he could by imitation of a natural process produce that process in

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 246.
[2] Jevons' *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 25.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

nature.[1] If the recognition of mysterious powers or power is as early as magic, there is no ground for the assumption that it was when magic failed, that man turned to religion.

(*d*) *Marett* rejects Frazer's view of magic as antecedent to religion on a wider ground. 'Anthropological science,' he says, 'however, is becoming increasingly chary of constructing any such scale on lines so simple and so drastic. Human evolution is a tissue of many interlacing strands, and again, the savage of to-day is no older or earlier than the civilized man, so that typological and historical primitiveness cannot be identified offhand. At most, then, it is with the help of psychological and sociological considerations of a general type that a primordial stage of mind and society can be theoretically posited, out of which determinate religion may be shown to have emerged by some sort of subsequent process.'[2] To what he has himself to say about the subject we must afterwards return. For our present purpose it is enough to have shown that magic does not account for religion.

(vi) A theory of the origin of religion under the name of *Adaptationism* has been advanced by *Otto Gruppe*[3] so absurd that it scarcely deserves mention.

[1] What qualification this theory of imitation demands will be afterwards shown.

[2] *H. E. R. E.* viii, p. 247.

[3] See Runze's *Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 88–93.

Contrary to the evidence at our disposal he denies that religion is universal by its very nature. It originated in an accident, the state of intoxication induced by drinking soma. It spread by colonization and intercourse among the nations. It was always adapting itself to the new environment in which it found itself. It was exploited by rulers in their own interests. No refutation is necessary.

(vii) In nearly all modern theories the theory of evolution is applied to religion as to all other human interests. 'Scholars are pretty generally agreed on two points: that the religious development of mankind proceeds in accordance with definite laws, and that this development is on the whole an upward movement from crude ideas and primitive forms of worship to a philosophic conception of the universe accompanied by a ceremonial correspondingly elaborated and refined. It is true that there are still a few scholars, notably Andrew Lang, who in one form or another cling to the belief in a pristine purity of religions and a subsequent degradation, but the evidence on the other side is so overwhelmingly strong that the burden of proof now rests with those who oppose the theory of an evolution from a crude to a refined state.'[1]

(*a*) This last view Galloway dismisses in a note. 'In his *Making of Religion* (p. 163) Mr. Andrew Lang says the gods more often deteriorate than improve with the

[1] Jastrow's *The Study of Religion*, pp. 63–4.

advance of civilization. The evidences do not bear out this sweeping assertion; and it is connected with the untenable idea that, in the beginnings of religion, a relatively pure monotheism prevailed.'[1] (*b*) In answer to a critic, Father Schmidt, Marett states his position in regard to this theory, thus: 'Let me assure him that I have complete faith in Mr. Lang's "high gods"—or in a great many of them, at all events. On the other hand, I am not at present prepared to admit (as apparently Father Schmidt would do) the postulate of a world-wide degeneration from the belief in such beings, as accounting for pre-animistic phenomena in general. On the contrary, I assume for working purposes that Mr. Lang's "high gods" must have had a psychological pre-history of some kind which, if known, would connect them with vaguer and ever vaguer shapes—phantoms teeming in the penumbra of the primitive mind, and dancing about the darkling rim of the tribal fire-circle.'[2] Not content with this general assumption, he offers a positive explanation of these 'high gods'. 'I have to confess to the opinion with regard to *Daramulun*, *Mungan-ngaur*, *Tundun*, and *Baiamai*, those divinities whom the Kurnai, Murrings, Kamilaroi, and other Australian groups address severally as "Our Father", recognizing in them the supernatural headmen and lawgivers of their respective tribes, that their prototype is nothing

[1] *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 123.

[2] *The Threshold of Religion.* Preface, p. xvii.

more or less than that well-known material and inanimate object, the bull-roarer. Its thunderous booming must have been enimently awe-inspiring to the first inventors, or rather discoverers, of the instrument and would not unnaturally provoke the "animistic" attribution of life and power to it. Then Mythology seems to have stepped in to explain why and how the bull-roarer enforces those tribal ceremonies with which its use is associated, and, after the manner of Myth, to have invented schemes and genealogies of bull-roarers whose wonderful history and dreadful powers it proceeded to chronicle.'[1]

This explanation has not, however, remained unchallenged. 'Against this view,' says Mr. James, 'Mr. Lang has brought the objection that the bull-roarer is found where such beings are apparently unheard of. . . . Furthermore it is the thunderous voice of the god rather than the bull-roarer that inspires awe. It is true, however, that the bull-roarer and the All-Father are closely associated in initiation rites, and there may be some very vital connexion between the god and the instrument. In fact among the Kaitish the bull-roarer is actually supposed to have dropped down from heaven. But there are a few cases in which All-Fathers are found in places where the bull-roarer is unknown.' James further adds: 'Howitt thinks that Supreme Beings are idealized chiefs, but the connexion between

[1] *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 17–18.

an ideal head-man and an immortal Creator is not very apparent. It seems more probable that High Gods are the results of a psychological process whereby the mind of man tried to reach out to the Infinite and conceived a supreme, immortal, everlasting Creator—the prototype of Yahweh of the Hebrews.' Such a psychological process is obviously not primitive; and we cannot find the origin of religion in any such belief. James recognizes that this belief is not identical with monotheism. 'Even if a primitive revelation could be found to have taken place in Australia, the present All-Father belief could only be explained by a process of devolution because the conception of a Supreme Being in primitive cult is not monotheism in the sense understood by the Israelites.'[1]

(viii) It was not uncommon for missionaries to adduce evidence of, as they believed, a primitive monotheism, from which polytheism could be condemned as a relapse. It is true that this corresponds with Paul's interpretation of the paganism around him in the Roman Empire; but in our view of inspiration to-day even that of an apostle did not endow him miraculously with an infallible knowledge and judgement of the history of the past. On the other hand modern scholarship from the Old Testament record itself draws the conclusion that the 'ethical monotheism' of the Hebrew prophets was a slow growth, and had as its background Semitic

[1] *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, by E. O. James, pp. 207–8.

heathenism. It must be urged against this assumption of a primitive monotheism (*a*) that the inquirers started on their quest with a certain theological bias in favour of such a conclusion; (*b*) that the evidence adduced is not conclusive, since we cannot identify the savage with the primitive man, and what appears belief in a supreme god has doubtless an earlier development behind it; and (*c*) that from the psychological standpoint such a starting-point of man's religious consciousness, no less than the subsequent course, would be an inexplicable miracle.

(ix) In N. Söderblom's book, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*, which, owing to war conditions, I have been unable to obtain, but of which an account was given in the *Theologische Rundschau* for July 1916, pp. 179–96, Andrew Lang's theory is rejected, and yet animism is criticized as an inadequate theory of the origin of religion, and the necessity of recognizing alongside of it the conception of *mana* (to which we shall return in the next chapter) and of the *Authors* (*Urheber*) as elements in the formation of the conception of God is insisted on. He does not maintain, however, that the second conception is primitive, although he seems to regard it as original, and not derived from other ideas. Its place in the evolution of the religious consciousness will claim our attention in the next chapter.

(x) Dr. Jevons rightly insists that 'though evolution is universal, progress is exceptional', and from

this general principle he deduces that in the history of religion there has been retrogression. 'Totemism, which is at least the worship of one god, declines into the worship of many gods.'[1] The union of tribes in a nation involved either the fusion of their gods or the multiplication of them. 'In early times polytheism is the price which must be paid for political development.'[2] However early totemism is, it cannot be regarded as primitive, for 'totemism, animal worship, presupposes a stage in which man had not yet found, as he supposed, in the external world the source of his inner consciousness of the divine, and had not yet identified it, by a process of vain reasoning, with an animal species. The historical evidence of this stage can only be matter of conjecture, and must rest mainly on the difficulty of supposing that man, the moment he was man, invented the idea of animal sacrifice—an idea which, whatever its origin, can hardly be regarded as innate or even as obvious.'[3] Jevons admits that 'the nature of religious belief in the pre-totemistic stage is also entirely matter of conjecture', but from totemism itself he draws two inferences regarding that earlier belief. 'The fact that in the totemistic stage he selected now one and now another of the personal agents, which made up the world for him, as the embodiment of the Being after whom his heart instinctively sought,

[1] *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 395.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 241. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 413.

peradventure it might find Him, is itself a presumption that he did not regard everything external with fear. In the same way, the fact that in the stage of totemism the clan has but one totem, one tribal god, constitutes some presumption that man was conscious of but one God before he identified Him with one or other of the forces of nature. So far belief in this stage may be termed monotheism; for, as already said, there is reason to believe that polytheism was developed out of totemism, and does not occur until a relatively late period in the evolution of society.'[1] But what he gives with one hand he seems to withdraw with the other, for he continues, 'man's consciousness of God must in this early stage have been so rudimentary, *ex hypothesi*, as to permit of His coming to be conceived, by a process of vain reasoning, as manifesting Himself in animal form. And this is in accordance with all that science teaches as to early man's undeveloped condition, material and mental, social and moral.'[2]

(xi) This theory demands a more minute criticism than any of the others, and such criticism will form a suitable close to this chapter and transition to the discussion in the next. (*a*) As regards Dr. Jevons' view of the universal diffusion and relatively primitive character of totemism itself, there is ground for objection. There is by no means the same evidence that

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 413.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 413–14.

every religion has passed through a totemistic stage of development, as through an animistic, and other motives for the universal practice of sacrifice than totemism can be traced. 'As to whether we may regard as primitive the totemistic conception of the Divine-human affinity of animals, and of the assimilation of the Divine life through eating the totem, there is grave reason for doubt. The totemistic theory of the origin of worship has been widely propagated through the brilliant and learned monograph of W. R. Smith (*Journ. Philol.* ix. 75 ff.) and its fascinating exposition by Jevons; but the main body of English anthropologists refuse to regard it as primitive, while in France the hypothesis has been subjected to close and learned criticism (Marillier, 'La place du Totemisme dans l'évolution religieuse' in *Rev. de l'Hist. des Religions*, 1897–8). Totemism seems most intelligible when viewed as formed under the play of savage thought or misconception, and as intruding upon and overrunning earlier forms of worship which found a god in nature or the spirits of men.'[1] To this may be added the consideration that totemism presupposes a closeness of tribal unity, and a strength of the feeling of its obligations which cannot be regarded as very early, and a power of generalization, since the totem is not an individual but a class, which must have been the result of a period of development. To the

[1] *H. B. D.* iv, article 'Sacrifice', p. 331. Dr. Jevons now himself recognizes that it is not primitive.

place of totemism in the development of the religious consciousness we shall return in the next chapter.

(*b*) In treating polytheism as a degeneration from totemism, Jevons seems to confuse two distinct things, monotheism and monolatry,—the belief in, as well as worship of, one god as alone God and the worship of one tribal or national god along with a belief in the existence of other gods to be worshipped by other tribes or nations. Even among the Hebrews the belief in other gods was not excluded. It is not to be excluded from totemism, which cannot therefore be regarded as superior to polytheism.

(*c*) As regards the primitive monotheism, which Jevons conjectures as the beginning of the religious consciousness, the account he gives of it must, from a consistently psychological standpoint seem altogether unsatisfactory. On the one hand it is assumed that man, independent of experience, has an innate idea of God as one, which is only degraded as in his development he brings that idea into relation to the world in which his experience is formed ; and that it is definite enough in content to be described as monotheism. On the other hand this idea is admitted to be so rudimentary that its modifi ation by that experience is regarded as probable. Has not the term monotheism far too definite a meaning to be used at all in this connexion? Is there not even an unintentional *suggestio falsi* in its use? Even Descartes, the champion of an innate idea of God, was forced by Locke's

criticism to substitute a *disposition* or *capacity* to form such ideas in the course of experience for an initial possession of them. We may admit that it belongs to the very nature of man to believe in, and worship God, and that, therefore, religion is no arbitrary or artificial device or invention, and yet hold that it is only by a long and slow development that monotheism has been reached. Experience of self and of the world, while it has at times adversely affected this development, has nevertheless been the necessary condition of it. It seems in the highest degree improbable that such an idea as that of one supreme God could have been formed or even received by the mind of primitive man.

(*d*) In affirming this conclusion, I do not challenge Jevons' general principle that all evolution has not been progress. In the next chapter reasons will be given against assuming that the savage of to-day represents primitive man, and in support of the view that in primitive man was the promise and potency of the culture, civilization, morality, art, science, religion, which progressive mankind has reached. Admitting man's animal ancestry on the physical side, that does not involve that man as man began as mere animal. A new stage of evolution, involving a fresh divine initiative in the process of creation, began with man; and yet we must not ascribe to man at his beginning endowments, which can with greater probability be explained as attainments in the course of his develop-

ment. It does not make monotheism any less that for which man was destined, and of which he was capable, to regard it not as an initial gift but as a final gain.

(xii) In a more recent publication Jevons modifies his position. Rejecting both the traditional view of a relapse from a primitive monotheism, and the scientific view of an advance, 'through Fetishism to Polydaemonism and Polytheism, and finally to Monotheism,'[1] he offers a third view of Fetishism, Polytheism, and Monotheism as independent radiations from a common centre. A biological analogy leads him to the conclusion that 'each of the three forms of religion is a terminal form, incapable of further evolution'.[2] 'Fetishism is terminal in the sense that it is a blind alley.'[3] Polytheism is a labyrinth, from which there is no escape. Monotheism alone leads to the goal. The assertion that polytheism is not evolved from fetishism, nor monotheism from polytheism, does not seem warranted by the relevant facts, and has not psychological probability. In a subsequent chapter the endeavour will be made to justify the scientific view which Jevons rejects in the interests of a theory, in which one cannot but detect a certain dogmatic bias.

[1] *Non-Christian Religions. Polytheism*, p. 27.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 30. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

V

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHOD OF INQUIRY

(1) Instead of attempting an abstract definition of religion and indulging in arbitrary theories of its origin, it is very much more profitable to turn to the psychology of religion, and to test whether it can give us such a description of the psychic factors in the religious activity of man, as will reveal its nature to us, and such an account of the historical development of man as will indicate to us what the beginning and the course of religion have been. As has already been suggested in the previous discussion, no special organ of religion is to be assumed except the whole human personality. Nor is there anything so peculiar in the functions of that personality as exercised in religion, as to demand a special method of study. The psychology of religion is not a science distinct from psychology generally; it is psychology dealing with the psychic phenomena which religion presents to us. How are we to use this method?

(2) In recent years growing importance has been assigned to anthropology in the study of religions on the assumption that the savage represents the primitive man, and that from what his religion now is we

may learn what religion in its beginning was. We may admit on the one hand that the savage has retained characteristics of a previous stage of human evolution which the civilized man has outgrown, or at least shows distinctly what in the other case can be only dimly discerned. We must maintain, on the other hand, that the savage is no more primitive than the civilized man; for he has as many generations behind him, and in evolution retrogression is no less possible than progression. Further, the difficulty of getting at the mind of the savage, of 'thinking black', or 'brown', or 'yellow', has to be recognized.

(*a*) The religion of savages does show beliefs, customs, ideas, standards, of which only traces survive in the religions of the civilized man. This thought is often described by the term *animism*, and there is evidence in the historical religions of an animistic stage and even of animistic survivals alongside of the higher features. In civilization and culture changes are more frequent and rapid than in barbarism. As old in point of time as both, barbarism, even if it has developed, has developed more slowly than civilization and culture, and thus the savage is a little nearer the primitive man than is the civilized. We must study the savage in order that we may trace the origin and development of religion in mankind.

(*b*) We must not assume, however, that the condition of the savage is due only to stagnation, and that there has been no retrogression.

(α) 'John Stuart Mill had already pointed out that the life of the savage carries more the mark of degeneration than of primitiveness, that especially the moral life of these peoples reveals m re the vices of laziness, cowardice, falsity, impurity, cruelty, sensuousness, and self-assertion than those qualities which we regard as the characteristics of original childlikeness and strength.'[1] The defects of the savage are not merely animal traits, which, unchanged, he has inherited from an animal ancestry. There is an aggravation of what is, from the standpoint of human morals, bad in the animal appetites and passions inherited, due to the difference of natural endowment between man at his lowest and the lower animals at their highest. Man's distinctive nature, if perverted, brutalizes him more than the brutes. It is true that there are uncivilized peoples whose condition cannot be justly described as savage; but contact with civilization unfortunately so soon deprives them of their relative innocence, that we cannot hope to recover from them the primitive conditions.

(β) We are not confined to an inference from the general principle that change there is, and if not progress, deterioration. There are survivals in belief and rite among savage peoples, which indicate a previous higher stage. The now almost otiose belief in the higher gods, from which Andrew Lang drew his unwarranted conclusion about the primitive form of

[1] Runtze, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

religion, does justify the more moderate and balanced judgement that the previous condition of a people may have been better than is its present.

(γ) So great is the difference between what man has become and what his nearest animal kindred still is, between all the resources of the man of to-day and the ape, which has learned nothing and achieved nothing in all the centuries since the period when man and ape started on their diverging paths, that we are driven to the conclusion that it was not by a slow and age-long accumulation of only slight accidental variations that man became different from ape; but that, as Wallace from the first maintained, natural selection does not account for man, and we must assume that he started on his career as man with an endowment which held the promise and potency of all that he has since become. The primitive man was the ancestor of the civilized man as well as of the savage, and must have had at least the possibility of the one as of the other, upwards in the one case, downwards in the other. We cannot accept as justified by an adequately wide survey of the facts, Mr. Edward Clodd's dogmatism in applying the theory of evolution. 'The doctrine of evolution has no "favoured-nation clause" for man. It admits no break in the psychical chain which links him to the lowest life forms, be these plant or animal. It finds no arrest of continuity between the bark of the dog and the orations of Demosthenes, or between the pulsations

of an amoeba and the ecstasies of a saint. "Great is the mystery of heredity"; of the origin and transmission, through numberless generations, of tendencies traceable to remote pre-human ancestors, tendencies which, potent against fundamental changes, are a key to constant elements in human nature.'[1] If mind in man and animal are so entirely the same, how account for the difference in the results of its exercise? But to this question we shall return.

(*c*) When we come to the savage in order that we may learn all we can about religion, we must recognize the difficulty of our quest.

(*α*) Much has been reported about savages by travellers, sailors, and traders that has very little value, as it comes from altogether untrained observers, who get wrong answers because they do not know how to put right questions.

(*β*) Even the anthropologist, who is better qualified for his task, must be very cautious. The savage is suspicious of any stranger. About his religion, which is to him an awful mystery, he is specially secretive. He will be ready to deceive, or to oblige by giving the sort of answer which he thinks will be acceptable to the inquirer. The mentality of the anthropologist and of the savage are so different, that there is the danger of misunderstanding even when there is mutual confidence.

(*γ*) The missionary, after a number of years of

[1] *Animism: the Soul of Religion*, by Edward Clodd, p. 14.

loving labour among a tribe, might appear to be in a better position, and yet for him too there are drawbacks. His very presence and work, if at all effective, is bringing about a change. What is worst will fall into the background, what is best come to the forefront. The convert has already ceased to think as he thought, and he has not the skill to reproduce accurately his own past beliefs, unmodified by his present faith. He may quite unconsciously blacken his own record, and that of his own people. It has been noted by missionaries that converts are often more intolerant than themselves to the religion which has been abandoned. In the past, at least, missionaries often brought with them theological presuppositions which hindered their becoming unprejudiced inquirers. The instruction that is now being given to them in anthropology and the comparative study of religions should equip them for their task as they have not hitherto been. These difficulties are not advanced as excuses for not attempting the study of the savage, but as reasons why conclusions which have been in the past hastily and carelessly reached should not be allowed to become prejudices, and why inquiries that are still being made should be pursued with all possible precautions against deception and mistake.

(3) With the study of the savage must be combined the study of the child. (*a*) The child in its embryonic development is said to recapitulate the history of life on the globe. That its mental, moral, and religious

development is in the same way a recapitulation of the evolution of the race cannot without qualification be affirmed. Nurture is probably more potent than nature; the social inheritance counts for more than the physical heredity; the environment suppresses some possibilities and stimulates others; the surroundings make the growth slower or quicker; the child in the Christian home does not start on its individual development as the racial evolution in the primitive man began. While it is a sound principle of education that the distinctive capacities at each stage of development should be recognized, and no attempts be made to force the pace of progress; yet it is an absurd application of the principle to assume, as do some educational theorists, that the boy, for instance, must be allowed to pass through the savage phase; the instruction and influence of parents and teachers are legitimate factors in the development, to enable the child to acquire in a few years mentally, morally, and religiously what the race took centuries to achieve.

(*b*) It is by no means as easy as might at first sight appear for the adult to know and understand the mind of the child. What has been experienced is not remembered as if it were being even now experienced. The lapse of time and the growth of soul hinder a complete recapture of the early years even by the most sympathetic adults. Parents and teachers must often appear to children very stupid in not being able to see

in the world just what the child sees. A child may offer the excuse to our dullness that he is only 'pretending' when what is pretended is very real to him. While the standpoint of the observer and the experient, the psychological and the psychical, are not identical, and the child is not capable of presenting for our observation the totality of his experience, yet observation and discernment can in some measure disclose to us the secret of the child; and we have here also a means of learning much about the nature, the origin, and the development of religion. 'The analysis', says Runtze, 'of the soul-life of the child offers the clearest insight into the character of the origin of religion. Partly side by side, partly after one another, there develop out of the soul of the child manifold expressions of life, for which complete parallels can be found in the life of primitive races, as in the spontaneous expressions of the soul-functions of the adult civilized man. These simultaneous and successive functions of the soul serve not only as analogies for the origin of religion, they are themselves the germs, out of which the religious sense and hope, the religious belief and the religious world-view, develop. That the childlike in man is the source and the completion of religion, not Christianity alone teaches, when it represents Jesus as the friend of children, pictures the relation between man and God as that of the child to the father, and makes entrance into the Kingdom of God dependent on conversion, "becom-

ing as children". Other religions also show approaches to this view.'[1] We can in the development of the child observe the succession of emotion, desire, imagination, association of ideas, understanding, and conscience, which we are warranted in regarding as characteristic of the evolution of the human race, and which must afterwards be studied in detail.

(4) It is the reflective adult consciousness that must observe and interpret the consciousness of the child. It must endeavour to become as objective as it can, to place itself at the standpoint of the child. This effort at objectivity involves no less strenuous an endeavour of subjectivity. Without self-knowledge there can be no knowledge of others. The adult consciousness must in reflection turn itself inward, it must analyse its own images and ideas, emotions and sentiments, impulses and desires, so as to reduce them to their simplest elements, and to recover as far as possible their earliest forms. Observation of the savage and the child alike need constantly the correction against error which the truth of self-knowledge can give. Recognizing fully the drawback and the danger of the personal equation in all such inquiries, we must resist the tendency among some psychologists to treat the self only as an object to be observed, and not also as a subject that can on reflection observe itself. If self-consciousness is consciousness at its highest stage of development, we shall see the lower stages most

[1] *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 99.

clearly in its light. In religion especially, which is at its fullest realization an inner experience, there must be this reflection by the adult self-consciousness. But when we advance this claim, two difficulties at once suggest themselves. (α) If it is a religious experiment on which the reflection has to be directed, it would appear that the irreligious man cannot use this means of understanding religion.

(α) On the one hand it must be maintained that in religion, as in morals and art, the impartial objectivity of science is impossible. He will not be much use as a moralist who is indifferent to morality, or as an artist or even art-critic who has no aesthetic sense and has not cultivated it. In religion also knowledge of fact without judgement of value is inadequate for full appreciation. The study of religions has suffered because it has been pursued by scholars to whom religion was but a superstition, and who would have suspected and despised in themselves what they were trying to expound as a function of the race.

(β) On the other hand it must be conceded, however, that there are men who, although intellectually unbelieving, have in themselves the tendency towards religion on its emotional and practical sides sufficiently developed to enable them to appreciate the religion of others who do not suffer from their intellectual difficulties. If a man would be religious, if he could, he is capable of understanding religion in some measure at least. However illiberal it may appear, it must,

however, be said that the secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him. Faith is a condition of understanding fully.

(*b*) It has in the previous section been stated that the religious attitude is a childlike attitude. That may appear a hindrance to understanding for the adult consciousness. But further reflection shows that it is not. For it is the highest spiritual achievement for the grown-up to become as little children. Dr. Fairbairn told one of his students, who had preached a sermon void of thought, that he was yet at the stage of the simplicity of ignorance, and that what he must strive to reach was the simplicity of culture. It may be questioned whether that noted scholar and thinker was altogether successful in maintaining that highest stage of development at all times himself, but his saying is true. A man may think himself through difficulty and perplexity to the faith of a child.

(5) There are three subsidiary studies which should be here mentioned. (*a*) There is no such sharp separation between the savage and the civilized man as the previous discussion might suggest. Within the cultured man there do survive elements of belief and custom inconsistent with his culture—reversions to an earlier type of manhood. Among 'the common people' in a civilized community there continue superstitions which the religion generally professed has altogether abandoned, and even, when it becomes aware of them, condemns. In an essay, *On the Permanence of Racial*

Mental Differences, Dr. Myers offers four propositions for consideration, the first of which is this: 'that the mental characters of the majority of the peasant class throughout Europe are essentially the same as those of primitive communities.'[1] After indicating a number of resemblances, he denies that there is any difference in 'the capacity for logical and abstract thought. . . . Study our country folklore, study the actual practices in regard to healing and religion which prevail in every peasant community to-day, and what essential differences are discoverable? Of course, it will be urged that these practices are continued unthinkingly, that they are merely vestiges of a period when once they were believed and were full of meaning. But this, I am convinced, is far from being generally true, and it also certainly applies to many of the ceremonies and customs of primitive peoples.'[2] The study of *folklore* must, therefore, be regarded as a very important auxiliary, since, as has been indicated, the mentality of the peasant and the savage have so much in common, and in both what may be regarded as primitive traits are observable. A confirmation of this view may be found in an acknowledged fact, to which Davenport has devoted special study in his book on *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*. In the mental disturbance produced by such movements much comes to expression that at other times is

[1] *Inter-Racial Problems*, edited by G. Spiller, p. 73.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

repressed, and psychical conditions, of an abnormal kind for the civilized man but much more common in the savage, prevail. From this source we are not to expect any entirely new contribution to our study, but, rather, only illustrations and confirmation of the conclusions to which we are led by the three methods of inquiry which have been more fully discussed.

(*b*) Another auxiliary study is that of language. Language in expressing and conveying thought reacts upon it. The name for God in manifold ways affects the idea of God. Max Müller has affirmed the identity of language and thought. 'If there is no such thing as a mere name, neither is there such a thing as a mere thought or a mere concept. The two are one and inseparable. We may distinguish them as we distinguish the obverse from the reverse of a coin; but to try to separate them would be like trying to separate the convex from the concave surface of a lens. We think in names and in names only.'[1] Even if this should be regarded as an over-statement, there can be no doubt that the language of religion not only shows what it is, but shapes it to be what it is. In mythology especially is this influence seen. 'In order to make my meaning quite clear', says Max Müller, 'and to provoke, if possible, contradiction, that is independent thought, I called mythology a disease of language, though adding at the same time that it was to be considered as an infantine disease, as

[1] *The Science of Thought*, p. 50.

a natural crisis through which our intellectual constitution must pass in order to maintain its health and vigour.'[1]

(*a*) Without attempting to go into the question of the origin of language, and the earliest roots of words, there are some characteristics of language which may be mentioned as bearing on the influence of language in the development of religious thought. The name of a thing or person can never express the whole nature; it seizes on only one attribute out of many which belong to the total reality. One object would need many names to describe it, although in current use only one name is employed, and as the original one-sided meaning of the word is forgotten, it carries the whole meaning that the mind has accustomed itself to give to the object. Nevertheless, in poetry, especially where completeness of presentation is aimed at, a number of words may be used of the same object to present its manifold aspects to the imagination. This use of many words for one object is called *synonymy* or *polyonymy*. How many words can be applied to religion to present its varied aspects, piety, spirituality, reverence, godliness, consecration, &c.! Now each of these words brings its own associations with it, and so the conception of religion is enlarged.

(*β*) The converse of this process is this, that the aspect of an object which the name expresses is not peculiar to it, but may belong to many other objects,

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

and so the same word might be applicable to a large number of things. This is *homonymy*. The word religion may be applied to things so diverse as fetishism and the faith of Jesus in His Father in heaven. In poetry the same figure of speech may be applied to a great many things. It can easily be seen what scope is given to the play of fancy as well as the movement of thought in these two contrasted characteristics of language.

(γ) When we turn to the etymology of words, the meaning of the roots of words, we discover still more of what is characteristic of human thought. Man confronting nature saw himself in nature, and nature in himself: he anthropomorphized nature in ascribing its movement and change to spirits or souls like himself, and he physiomorphized himself in thinking of his own powers as similar to nature's forces. If he spiritualized natural objects he materialized his own self. *Anima*, ψυχή, πνεῦμα, all show that the soul was thought of as breath or wind. The words for moral and spiritual reality are almost all metaphors drawn from natural phenomena; and it is inevitable that it should be so, for perception depends on apperception, the assimilation of the new to the old. There is an economy in the making of new sounds for new thoughts; and so the new thought is named by the same sound as the old thought to which it has some likeness. The analogy between nature and man which runs through all human speech had

a potent influence on the development of religious ideas. In popularizing religious thought by the use of this figurative language, it also often vulgarized it by bringing gods into situations that ill befitted their dignity. What now appears to us as the gross immorality of mythology was due to the description of natural phenomena as personal activities of the gods, especially in sexual relations. To describe the fertilization of the earth by the sky as the sexual intercourse of a sky-god and an earth-goddess is the first downward step. To conceive gods and goddesses as dominated by sexuality is the next. To assume that the gods and goddesses are to be imitated in this respect, and human lust may be divine worship, is the lowest step of all. If religion be derived from *religare*, and be thought of as a bond binding man to God, a legalist conception of it may be encouraged.

(δ) The influence of language on religion is not, however, necessarily degrading. When the lowly origin of a word that has sacred associations has been forgotten, the sound itself may be invested with the sanctity and mystery of the divine reality of which it is the name. Neither the Chinese word *Tao* nor the Israelite word *Yahve* has encouraged any mythological development, and yet both have exercised a profound influence on religious thought, just because the origin of each word had been left in obscurity. A word of which the meaning is not known may thus suggest mystery, infinitude. It is a well-known fact

that even in reading the Scriptures the sacred name Yahve was not pronounced, but Adonai, Lord, was substituted for it. Thus may man come to think of his own creation as coming to him as a revelation from God, because it has become to him the vehicle by which such a revelation has come. Much more might be written in illustration of this theme, the importance to religion of the language it uses, since its servant has not seldom become its master; but this statement must suffice to direct attention to a fruitful study.

(*c*) A third auxiliary study may be mentioned, although its value in the psychology of religion is very much less than in general psychology, viz. the study of animal behaviour. (*α*) Leuba, in his book on *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion*,[1] thinks it worth while to discuss the question whether animals do or do not personalize, as does man, the unexpected objects that frighten them. While he does not regard such personalization as necessary to explain the terror the animal feels, he condemns as dogmatism the denial of the possibility of such personalization by an animal. As in his conclusion he confirms what has just been said about the importance of language, his words may be quoted: 'The most significant difference between men and animals is not found in the fact that animals may be unable to interpret animistically certain striking natural phenomena—an opinion open to question—but in their

[1] Compare Clodd's *Animism*, pp. 14–23.

inability to *fix* by means of communicable signs any fleeting animistic interpretation which might chance to cross their mind. Without the advantage conferred by speech upon even the lowest savages, to hold, classify, keep alive, and bring to fruition impressions of this evanescent nature, I do not see how a stable belief in animism could have been established. The decisive rôle played by language appears forcibly when one considers the part it takes in introducing dream experiences into waking life. The baffling evanescence of dreams caught sight of on awakening is familiar to every one. Unless one succeeds in putting them in linguistic form they are soon completely lost; verbal expression makes them part and parcel of our mental possession.'[1] If, however, the connexion between thought and speech be as close as Max Müller claims it to be, is it not a legitimate inference that, did animals think conceptually as men do, they would have discovered speech as man has done, and conversely that, as they have no speech, they do not think as man does?

(β) If this be sound reasoning, and to me it does commend itself, then the conclusion that Leuba adds will fall to the ground. 'The mental differences between man and the higher animals, to which the presence of Magic and Religion is to be referred, are not in themselves startling, however considerable their consequences may have been.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

Psychological analysis leaves absolutely no standing ground to those who insist upon interpreting the advent of Religion as the manifestation of essentially new kind of powers, of the birth of a "spiritual life" for instance.'[1] If, on the one hand, psychological analysis conjectures that animals have powers of which they give no convincing evidence, and on the other interprets the nature of religion from its earliest stages, its lowest phases rationally, morally, and spiritually, it may make out a plausible case for minimizing the differences between men and animals. But the considerable consequences of the differences which must be acknowledged challenge this procedure as altogether illegitimate. Whatever in actuality man might appear at the beginning of his development, what he really was in promise and potency, as his subsequent history has shown, does separate him from the animals by a far greater difference than this school of psychologists will allow. Agrippa of Nettesheim was nearer the truth when he fixed on religion as that which more than reason distinguishes man from the lower animals, since it is reason exercised in the highest relation. Such a conclusion as that which Leuba puts forward shows the necessity, for the study of religion, of the reflections of the fully adult self-conscious civilized man, who can observe religion in himself as the experient of it, in addition to the study of the savage or the child, and those auxiliary studies that have just been discussed.

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 37–8.

VI

THE PSYCHICAL FACTORS IN RELIGION

(1) Having indicated the lines of inquiry to be followed in seeking to determine the nature, origin, and development of religion, we are now in a position to describe its actuality by an analysis of the psychical motives to which it is due. (*a*) It has already been insisted that the whole personality is exercised in religion, and that many definitions suffer from laying stress on only one of the functions, especially thought alone, or feeling alone, whereas the tendency of all recent psychology has been to subordinate the cognitive and affective aspect to the conative. 'This', says Leuba, 'is the double teaching of psychology in this matter:—(1) Will, feeling, and thought enter in some degree into every moment of consciousness which can be looked upon as an actuality, and not merely as an abstraction; they are necessary constituents of consciousness. The unit of conscious life is neither thought, nor feeling, nor will, but all three in movement towards an object. (2) The will is primal; or, in other words, conscious life is always oriented towards something to be secured or avoided immediately or ultimately.'[1] He guards himself

[1] *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion*, p. 8.

'against a possible misinterpretation' in the following qualification: 'In speaking of Religion as an activity, or as a type of behaviour, I would not be understood to exclude from it whatever does not express itself in overt acts, in rites of propitiation, submission, or adoration. The adjectives *passive* and *active* might be used to separate amorphous from organized Religion, i. e. the feeling attitude from the behaviour.'[1] Before dealing with the behaviour which is characteristic of religion, we must deal with the feeling attitude which determines what that behaviour will be.

(*b*) Man feels either pleasure or pain. He hopes for pleasure; he fears pain. He loves what brings him pleasure, and hates what causes him pain. Pleasure, hope, love—this is the order of attraction to objects or persons. Pain, fear, hate—this is the order of repulsion. Fear and hope are primary motives in religion. Man fears death, the dead, the injury which the dead or the spirits who control nature may inflict. At the lower stages of religion fear predominates over hope, evil spirits are more dreaded than good spirits trusted. Man is at greater pains to propitiate the evil spirits than to maintain friendship with the good. Nevertheless the belief that the evil spirits can be propitiated, that their displeasure can be averted even if their favour cannot be secured, shows that the sentiment of fear is not so absolutely dominant as to exclude hope altogether. By the act of propitiation

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

the worshipper hopes to avert the evil that he fears. The religion in which fear predominates may be called *kakodaemonism*. A great deal of useless discussion has taken place as regards the place that fear holds in religion, since the predominance of fear or hope must be due to circumstances. When man's life is full of hardship, want, peril, when nature seems to him unkind, and he is himself helpless to secure the good he desires, he will most of all fear. When his position is more favourable, either because nature is more beneficent or he has acquired the knowledge and the skill to make the best of nature, hope will prevail over fear. It may not be at once, as religious feeling is very conservative, and emotions will survive long after the occasions for them have ceased.

(*c*) To ignore the large place that hope has in religion is to allow theory to override fact. According to the Epistle to the Hebrews, 'faith is the substance of things hoped for'; according to Paul, 'we are saved by hope'; according to John, 'perfect love casteth out fear'. While it is the Christian Gospel that banishes fear and establishes hope in the heart of the believer, yet even in paganism the gods are thought of as not only themselves blessed, because all that man wishes to be, but as willing to share their good with men. It is characteristic of religion generally to recognize that good cannot be fully possessed in this earthly life, and that hope must therefore reach out beyond the present to the future. The 'blessed'

are also the 'immortal' gods, and man can attain blessedness only as immortality is his. In so far as happiness is attained in this life, hope will predominate over fear in the attitude to the gods. But fear need not disappear altogether. In penitence and reverence there is some fear; the sense of unworthiness and the dread of judgement are not altogether absent even from Christian piety. If we call this attitude of predominant hope *eudaemonism*, we may say that *eudaemonism* is at least as prevalent in religion as *kakodaemonism*, if not much more.

(2) Intense emotion issues in action, generally without any interposition of reflection. Although it is not the usual order in the discussion of the psychical factors in religion, we should next deal with behaviour. (*a*) Leuba distinguishes three types of behaviour, 'the mechanical, the coercitive behaviour, or Magic, and the anthropopathic behaviour, which includes Religion',[1] but there is behaviour antecedent to this differentiation, of which Marett gives an account. It is impossible to summarize his statement, which must, therefore, be given in full. 'In the sphere of nascent religion there must have been a stage of cult or ritual (if so it may be termed), the product of sheer unreflective habit, which preceded the growth of ideas concerning the how and the why of what was being done. Certain recurrent situations in the social life—and, as for the individual life, it is wholly subordinate

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

to the social so long as mere gregariousness prevails—induce states of emotional intensity. The emotions must find a vent somehow. This they do either through activities directed to practical ends, such as hunting, fighting, and love-making; or else through secondary activities such as are not immediately practical in their object but serve simply as outlets of superfluous energy, such as the dances that simply play at hunting, fighting or love-making. In either case habit entwines with the activities in question all sorts of more or less functionless accidents; and the presence of these unaccountable details helps to make the whole performance seem mysterious to the performers and still more so to the civilized onlooker. When the activity is of the directly practical kind, say hunting, whereas the tracking, the killing of the game, and so on, explain themselves, the accompanying observances enjoined by custom which do not explain themselves so readily—for instance, wearing such and such a garb, uttering certain words, and the like—may well seem to call for justification even to the unthinking savage, who will at least translate his sense of the value of custom into the vague doctrine that there is "power" in these things, that they "work". When, on the other hand, the activities belong to those of the secondary type which are not immediately practical, constituting "protreptic" rites, as they might be termed, which, while affording emotional relief, act likewise on the whole as preparations for the business

of life—very much as play does in the case of the young—then accretions in the way of accidental features due to custom are likely to be more pronounced, inasmuch as there is no discipline of hard fact to impose bounds on the action. Meanwhile, in proportion as these secondary activities conform to the same stimuli as the primary activities of which they are the by-product, as, for instance, when the hunting interest overflows into a pantomimic rehearsal of the chase, they will wear an imitative appearance, though in reality being "repercussions" rather than imitations. When, however, an *ex post facto* justification of them becomes necessary, it is quite natural that the doctrine that they have "power" should implicate the belief that their seemingly imitative character has something to do with their efficacy.' The criticism of Frazer's view of 'sympathetic magic' which follows may be at present passed over; the question remains 'whether "magic" is a suitable word for the designation of the most rudimentary type of cult. On the whole it would seem a pity for the evolutionist to apply a term redolent of disparagement to what on his view is a genuine phase of the serious life as lived under certain conditions of culture. It is far less question-begging to predicate religion throughout.'[1] Marett would call all rites which are assumed to have 'mysterious power' because their practical utility is not evident, religious.

[1] *H. E. R. E.* viii, pp. 247–8.

(*b*) We may now recur to the distinction made by Leuba. The primary activities directed to practical ends are what he calls 'mechanical behaviour', which 'differs from the anthropopathic by the absence of any reference to personal beings', and is simply the use of the means known from experience to produce the ends. It is by the explanation given of the secondary activities respectively that Leuba distinguishes magic from religion. When the power is not assigned to a personal agent, over whom personal influence has to be used, we have magic. 'Magic separates itself, on the one hand, from the mechanical behaviour by the absence of implied quantitative relations, and, on the other hand, from anthropopathic behaviour by the failure to use means of personal influence,' such as characterize religion. 'As to the anthropopathic type of activity, it includes the ordinary relations of men with men, as well as those with gods.'[1] Whether we should at the earliest stage of human development so sharply distinguish magic and religion may be questioned. But there can be no doubt that it is an advantage at the later stage, when the sense of personal relationship to the supersensible and superhuman has emerged, to confine the term religion to those activities in which such a relationship is recognized; and to distinguish it from all such practices, which we may call *magic*, as imply coercion by word or deed (even when directed towards

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 12–13.

personal spirits or gods), instead of the personal influence by gifts or prayers to avert displeasure or to secure favour. For it is evident that to believe in a mysterious power which can be brought into exercise by rite or formula is a lower phase of human thought than to believe in personal beings whose activity can be secured by personal appeal.

(*c*) If rites existed, as Marett maintains, before beliefs, yet very soon an explanation would be sought, as man's spontaneous action soon becomes reflective. But we must not assume that religious beliefs originated solely as the explanations of religious rites; they had other sources in the mind of man. He wanted to understand himself and the world in which he found himself, and the same explanation would serve to account for the mysterious power of the rites, and in turn these rites would be modified to bring them more into accord with the explanation that was given of them. We must throughout assume a reflex action of thought and deed. Having considered feeling and behaviour as psychic factors in religion, we may now turn to the third personal function, thought.

(3) It is not with the ordered intellect that we first of all must be concerned, but with the free imagination. The *percept*, which is presented to the mind through the senses, is retained in the *image*, which has still the individuality and particularity of the percept. The object is re-presented by the ima-

gination ; and combined in that re-presentation with other objects, with which it may have had no connexion in actuality, in ways that often seem quite arbitrary, but which are largely explicable by the association of ideas, of which laws can be formulated.

(*a*) In dreams, more even than in the waking hours, is the imagination freely and fruitfully active. In dreams a man lives a life similar to that of his waking hours, and yet free of many of the limitations actuality imposes. He has intercourse with the dead ; he finds himself transported to distant lands ; he can achieve the impossible. Another world seems open to him. *Peschel* asserts that ' probably it has ever been the experiences in dreams which have awakened the first thought of immortality ', and, we may add, the belief in another world in which the immortal now dwell. *Bastian* and *Tylor* have offered many proofs of this conclusion from the habits and customs of uncivilized men. In dreams the soul leaves the body, and follows pursuits and enjoys pleasures by itself, while the body lies inert. It is dangerous to turn a sleeping man in case the soul should miss its way back, or to waken him suddenly lest the soul do not get time to return. The moment of waking seems thus like a return from another world to this. As often there is a sense of refreshment, a recovery of lost memories, a discovery of what had hitherto been vainly sought, the dream comes to be regarded as an oracle, a revelation of the unseen and the future.

Pindar says: 'The body follows death, the all-powerful; but the copy of the living remains alive, for this alone comes from the gods: it sleeps, when the limbs are active, but it often shows the future in dreams to the sleeper.'[1] The modern theory of the subliminal consciousness, asserting a wider extension and activity of the self than in consciousness, leaves open the possibility of a connexion of the self with an environment beyond that to which consciousness is confined; and we are not compelled to assume that the contents of dreams must be limited to the reproduction only of what has already entered into consciousness.

(*b*) It is possible that it was in the experience of dreams that man first came to distinguish soul and body; the soul awake and active while the body slept and lay motionless. In sleep a temporary absence of the soul from the body was assumed. When man first began to think about death, he would probably think of it as a sleep, in which, however, the separation of the soul from the body had become permanent. There is evidence in savage custom that it was only reluctantly that man assented to the permanence of the separation, the endlessness of the sleep of the dead.

(*c*) This need not be regarded, however, as the only source of this distinction between the soul and the body. The difference between the percept and the image might also suggest it. For instance, I see my

[1] Quoted by Runtze, *Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 133–4.

friend before me very distinctly and vividly; I hear his voice; I feel his touch. After a time I recall him; he appears to me in the image I have retained; but I cannot hear his voice, nor feel his touch. I have learned to distinguish the present experience and the past memory; but man at the beginning of his mental development would be incapable of doing this; and so the image would appear to him to be real even as the percept, although with an attenuated reality. Even when the soul was distinguished from the body, it was thought of as a doublet, a less substantial copy of the body. The wounded lost blood and strength therewith; the dead breathed not. It is easy to understand how life or soul was identified with blood or breath. Conscious of producing the movements of his own body, aware in dreams of an activity of his soul apart from his body, he would naturally be led to think of all change in nature around him as effected in the same way by the activity of souls related to natural objects as his soul was to his body.

(4) It is doubtful whether this *animism* can be regarded as the earliest mode of thought. (*a*) It is not improbable that man was aware of himself as alive before these experiences in dreams led him to distinguish soul and body, and to think of himself as in a world alive even as he himself was. We may call this pre-animistic stage *animatism*. 'When a thunderstorm is seen approaching in South Africa, a Kaffir village, led by its medicine man, will rush to

the nearest hill and yell at the hurricane to divert it from its course. There we have Awe finding vent in what, on the face of it, may be no more than a simple straightforward act of personification. It is *Animism* in the loose sense of some writers, or, as I propose to call it, *Animatism*, but it is not Animism in the strict scientific sense that implies the attribution, not merely of personality and will, but of "soul" or "spirit" to the storm.'[1] It may be questioned, however, whether in this instance Marett does not put into this consciousness a content that need not belong to it. To attribute personality and will, to personify, is surely as advanced a stage of thinking as the belief in souls or spirits. In another passage he expresses himself with what appears to me to be greater accuracy. 'It makes no difference whether we take animism in the vaguer Spencerian sense of the attribution of life and animation—an attitude of mind to which I prefer to give the distinguishing name of "animatism"—or in the more exact Tylorian sense of the attribution of soul, ghost, or ghost-like spirit.'[2] We must keep our psychological analysis out of the description of these rudimentary modes of thought. Alive in a world alive—that was man's first thought. This is not religion, but only the beginnings of thought that may become religious when it is more fully developed.

[1] Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 14–15.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 135.

(*b*) It is in this connexion that we may take our first glance at a conception, which has attracted very considerable attention, and to which, at a later stage of the discussion, it will be necessary for us to return, viz. *mana*.[1] While the term itself is used in the Pacific regions, of Melanesian usage, but Polynesian origin, it serves 'as a category of world-wide application' in the comparative study of religions. In the wider use it might be regarded as the earliest phase of *supernaturalism*, which Marett thus describes. 'To put the matter as broadly as possible, whether we hold with one extreme school that there exists a specific religious instinct, or whether we prefer to say with the other that man's religious creeds are a by-product of his intellectual development, we must, I think, in any case admit the fact that in response to, or at any rate in connexion with, the emotions of Awe, Wonder, and the like, wherein feeling would seem for the time being to have outstripped the power of "natural", that is reasonable, explanation, there arises in the region of human thought a powerful impulse to objectify and even personify the mysterious as "supernatural", something felt, and in the region of will a corresponding impulse to render it innocuous, or better still, propitious, by force of constraint, communion, or conciliation. *Supernaturalism*, then, as this universal

[1] Söderblom, in his *The Origin of the Belief in God*, discusses very fully this conception.

feeling, taken at its widest and barest, may be called, might, as such, be expected to prove not only logically, but also in some sense chronologically prior to Animism, constituting as the latter does but a particular ideal embodiment of the former.'[1] As regards this statement, it must be insisted that if the term 'personify' is to be used at all, it must be understood in a very vague sense. Consciousness of personality in self, or attribution of personality to others, with the definite meaning we now attach to the term, would not be either logically or chronologically antecedent to animism; but a vague sense of being alive in a world alive might very well be afterwards defined in animism as a distinct conception of soul. What in the conception of *mana* is added to this vague sense of life (animatism) is the feeling of wonder or awe, the dread of mystery in the presence of power other and greater than one's own, and not under one's control, or within one's understanding. Accordingly, Marett's suggestion is to be welcomed: 'Perhaps "Teratism" (from Greek word *Τέρας*) may be preferred as a designation for that attitude of mind which I have termed "supernaturalism".'[2] The latter term has in theological discussion received too definite a content to be used in this connexion without the risk of suggesting a great deal more than is intended. This conception stands intermediate between animatism

[1] *The Threshold of Religion*, pp. 10–11.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 13. note.

and animism. To the former it adds this sense of wonder, awe, dread, at mysterious power; in the latter the power is explained by the assumption of a soul or spirit in the object to which this power is ascribed.

(*c*) A question may be raised as to the priority and dominance of the sense of mystery, or of potency in the complex conception. In reply to the criticism of Mr. Lovejoy, who had objected that Marett 'put the emphasis on the wrong side', viz. the supernormal rather than the efficacious, Marett states, 'Now I do not know that, for the purposes of general theory, I would care to emphasize either aspect at the expense of the other. It seems to me, however, that in certain instances, at all events, say, in the case of a corpse, the awfulness is what strikes home first, the potency primarily consisting in the very fact that the dead body is able to cause such a shock to the feelings.'[1] We must beware of expecting in, and therefore ascribing to, such thought the definiteness which we aim at in our own thinking. It is not necessary at the present stage of the discussion to give illustrations of the wide spread of this conception, or conceptions very closely akin to it, in which, while power is attached to persons or things, that power is not yet definitely explained by 'souls' or 'spirits'. 'Now, ghosts and spirits,' says Marett, 'are undoubtedly Powers, but it does not follow that all Powers are ghosts and spirits, even if they tend to become so.

[1] *Op. cit.*, Preface, pp. xv–xvi.

In what follows I propose that we examine a few typical cases of Powers which, beneath the animistic colour that in the course of time has more or less completely overlaid them, show traces of having once of their own right possessed pre-animistic validity as objects and occasions of man's religious feelings.'[1] Apart from the conviction that these instances are fitted to produce in our minds, there is an antecedent psychological probability that such a vaguer phase of thought should have preceded the more definite phase of animism.

(5) We may now return to consider further the function of the imagination in religious development, although the apparent digression in dealing with *animism*, *animatism*, and *mana* may be justified on the ground of the close connexion of ideas. It is not only the spontaneous imagination, especially as exercised in dream, which has had an influence in religion, but still more the artist's exercise of his imagination.

(*a*) As we have seen, language is very largely metaphor, the invisible being named in words drawn from the visible. Poetry lives, and moves, and has its being in figures of speech; for it nature is a parable of soul. Even in description or narrative, besides the use of such figures, the poet is seeking to body forth the world and life as he ex eriences and conceives it. On the highest themes especially must thought use symbols; the intellect must be clothed by the imagina-

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 13–14.

tion. Man explains himself on the analogy of nature, and nature on the analogy of himself. Goethe says: 'Man never understands how anthropomorphic he is,' and Rückert, 'Only himself man sees in the mirror of nature, and what he questions her she only repeats.'[1]

(*b*) How large a place is filled in the religions of the world by mythology needs no proof. Even if we may not agree with Hegel that religion necessarily apprehends as image what philosophy comprehends as idea, and may maintain that it is the business of theology to get beyond image to idea, yet we may admit that even in theology symbol cannot be altogether left behind, as in the Christian conception of God as Father. A great deal in religious belief would appear less perplexing to us if we always remembered that much of its content is due to the free play of imagination rather than the ordered work of the intellect. At the same time we must not make the fatal mistake of assuming that the whole content of religious belief can be dismissed as 'the baseless fabric' of the imagination, unrelated to any reality. It is reality that is apprehended in images before it is comprehended in ideas. The intellect may criticize and correct the imagination, but it does not disprove that reality. We can now turn to the intellectual factors in religion.

(6) If, as the conception of *mana* just discussed shows, man very soon seeks to explain the world

[1] Quoted by Runtze, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 135.

around him by discovering its cause, and if also he is so far baffled in his quest that he can conceive that cause only as mysterious power, we here already find fixed the directions in which the thought of man has moved. He has ever striven to explain, and yet ever been confronted with, the inexplicable.

(*a*) He starts from particular changes in the world around him, and tries to find out their cause. Step by step he advances until he envisages the world as a whole, and asks himself what is its cause, and that one question unfolds itself into three: what is the ultimate cause, what therefore the essential nature, and hence what is the final purpose of all reality? In an old Vedic hymn we find the following inquiry, the hint of scepticism in which adds to its interest: 'Whence this creation has come, whether created or uncreated, He who looks upon us in the highest heavenly throne, He alone knows it—or does He also not know it?' Söderblom, in his important book on the origin of the belief in God, deals very fully with, as he attaches great importance to, the widely-spread conception in the religions of the world of the *Authors* (*Urheber*). These divine figures are met with especially among the aborigines of Australia, in the south-east in a more refined elevated representation, as we move to the centre and north of the Continent in a more primitive and crude form. By these divine figures the tribes explain everything in their surroundings that seems to them wonderful, and needing

explanation. They are the ancestors of the tribe. These are Andrew Lang's 'high gods'. It is not necessary to insist that this is not at all a primitive conception, but indicates a more advanced phase of thought. It is not a solitary tendency in these religions, as cosmology has a place in the thought of all religions. We must, however, be careful to remember that this intellectual curiosity is not the primary motive in religion, but only a secondary. The primary motive is a practical 'Who will show us any good?' and its satisfaction also practical, 'Lord, lift Thou up the light of Thy countenance upon us.' While the rationalism which, in so far as it is theistic, thinks of God as only Creator, has no vital connexion with actual religion, yet in the religions of the world the intellect has been a factor; and a solution of the world-riddle has been sought in the belief in God as Creator.

(*b*) It is no less important to lay stress on th contribution of the intellect to religion in the conception of the infinite, the roots of which are already found in the idea of *mana* as mysterious power. There is in the mind no less than the soul of man an inherent necessity to reach beyond and above himself, and the world he knows and uses for his ends. Even if the lowest phase of *supernaturalism* is *teratism*, it is not to be dismissed as an illusion. Man's mind must move from the phenomenal to the noumenal, the appearance to the reality, the finite to the infinite, the temporal to the eternal, the relative to the absolute,

the multiplicity to the unity. All these contrasts, which seem for human thought inescapable, belong to one tendency to recognize that neither the self nor the world explains itself nor is sufficient unto itself. Negatively it is expressed in Spinoza's principle, *Omnis Determinatio est negatio*, and positively in a conception of God, in which such attributes as infinity, eternity, and absoluteness are given a positive content of thought. This tendency can be illustrated in the religions of the world, in the Chinese idea of the *Tao*, in the Brahmanic *Brahma*, in the Egyptian *nutar*. Max Müller traced religion to the sense of the infinite. There are religions where these kindred conceptions have not yet become explicit and potent; but there can be no doubt that this tendency not to rest in, but to move beyond self and the world to find what is above and beyond both is at the very core of religion. The intellect provides the form, but the substance is in the practical motive of religion to seek the good, and the progress of religion lies in the discovery that no finite good can satisfy.

(7) From Kant's pure reason we may pass to his practical reason, from man's inquiry, What is truth? to his quest, What is duty? (*a*) Morality is not religion, although some thinkers, such as Kant himself, have tried to identify both. In their earliest phases they seem to have no relation to one another. Again and again in human history have they appeared opposed to one another, the dictates of morality dis-

regarded in the demands of religion. Even within Christendom the religion of the Church has appeared to lag behind the morality of the best thought of the age. Nevertheless, they have mutually influenced one another, and stood in vital relation to one another. When morality is conceived as the custom of the tribe or the law of the nation, the tribal or national deities are regarded as its custodians and vindicators. The basis of society at this stage is theocratic. When morality becomes more inward, and its source is sought in the individual conscience, then its dictates are conceived as the commands of God, and its judgement as His condemnation. When morality is seen to be one element in the larger conception of the common good, that good is regarded as His purpose. (*b*) In dealing with the philosophy of religion, it will be necessary to show the value of religion to morality; what we are now alone concerned with is the influence of the moral consciousness as a factor in the development of religion. If in the lowest moral stage religion is valued as a means of obtaining natural goods, at a higher stage it increases its hold on man as a means of directing and sustaining him in the path of goodness; in the mutual action and reaction of morality and religion each is developed.

(8) Another factor to which hitherto little attention has been given is the aesthetic, the sense of beauty. It may be only at an advanced stage of culture that nature affects the soul of man as it did in Wordsworth,

that beauty as well as truth and goodness lead the spirit of man to God; and yet we may assume that even at what seem to us very low stages, nature has moved man to an admiration, which blended with and so enriched the awe and the reverence that he came to feel for the divine. We must not altogether ignore the crude beginnings of any of the factors that have affected man's religious development.

(9) Man's environment, by which he is affected, and to which he responds in manifold ways, consists not only of nature, but also of his fellow-men. His human affections fill a large place in his life. It would be strange indeed if these had not been a potent factor in his religion.

(*a*) To the subject of ancestor-worship we shall return at a later stage of our discussion, but meanwhile we may show the direct influence of his relation to his fellow-men in the kind of relation which he sought to establish with the spirits or gods whom he worshipped. 'The idea of alliance at all, like most other ideas,' says Jevons, 'is more likely to have been suggested to man by some fact in his experience than to have been manufactured by him either *à priori* or *ex nihilo*.'[1] 'As regards the family affections', even among savages, 'there can be no possibility of doubt.'[2] When a relative dies, not only is there a reluctance to believe that the loved one has gone for ever, but an

[1] *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 43.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

invitation to the spirit to return is given, and means are taken to facilitate that return. Food is offered as regularly to the spirit as to the living, and especially blood. While other ghosts are feared, the spirits of their loved ones are not. To what do these facts point? 'The conjecture offered', says Jevons, 'is that the savage was ordinarily and naturally engaged in maintaining such relations with the spirits of his deceased clansmen; that he was necessarily led to such relations by the operation of those natural affections which, owing to the prolonged, helpless infancy of the human being, were indispensable to the survival of the human race; and that the relations of the living clansman with the dead offered the type and pattern in part, though only in part, of the relations to be established with other, more powerful, spirits.'[1]

(*b*) It was not only in establishing such relations with the spirits that the family affections influenced religion. The nature of deity was often conceived on the analogy of human father- or motherhood. Max Müller's well-known illustration of the common inheritance of the Aryan family of peoples in the idea of the Heaven-Father, Dyaus pitar, *Ζεὺς πατήρ*, Jupiter, may be recalled. In the Scriptures we have the two statements: 'As one whom his mother comforteth, so will I comfort you,' 'As a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him.' Christ has taught men to address in prayer 'Our Father

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 54–5.

which art in heaven', and in the doctrine of the Trinity the analogue of fatherhood and sonship is asserted even in the godhead. While the conception of marriage might be applied with morally harmful results in some of the pagan cults, yet in Hosea it is pure and tender affection for an unworthy wife that is used to describe the love of God for sinful Israel; and in St. Paul the marriage relationship, of which in other passages he does not present the loftiest idea, is taken as illustrating the mystery of the relation of Christ to His Church, which in the Apocalypse also is described as the Bride of the Lamb.

(10) We do not seem as yet to have got to the very holy of holies of religion in dealing with all these psychic factors. (*a*) Without assuming, as has sometimes been done, a distinct organ of religion separated from the other functions of human personality, thought, feeling, will, we may yet insist that it is not only with himself and his world that man is in immediate contact and intimate communion; and that God is not merely an inference which he is led to draw from self and the world, a reality which he can represent to himself only in the forms his knowledge of self and the world affords him. The conceptions which we have already considered—infinite, eternal, absolute, show that man's mind reaches beyond and rises above the limitations of self and world.

(*b*) Without accepting the negation in which mysticism has sometimes indulged in rejecting for the

knowledge of God all mediation of self in the ordinary personal activities, and the world in its present actuality, we may seek further to discover and define the truth that lies in its affirmation that the soul can have an experience of God as real in immediate contact and intimate communion. Such an immediacy of intuition or vision of God need not exclude mediation, but may be the necessary result of it. To believe the record of the historical revelation of God and the historical redemption of man in Christ Jesus may be the first step towards such a union with Christ as Paul claimed to possess. (*c*) Such a possibility we must not limit, however, to the heights of religious development; if in the religious revivals of Christendom primitive traits of religious emotion have reappeared, may we not discover anticipations of such an experience as Paul's in the inspiration of even the medicine-man? There may be falsehood and fraud in many of these performances; but who would dare to assert that the soul has never in any of these phenomena of religion reached God and been moved by Him? If in Him we live and move and have our being, it is surely not only metaphysically in abstract theory, but also religiously in concrete experience.

(*d*) A. Meyer, after a very thorough review of recent contributions to the discussion of the subject of the nature of religion, concludes that a further inquiry is necessary: Can it not be proved that the religious consciousness is never a product merely of

need, the need of a good, but rests on facts, sometimes misunderstood, sometimes from the Christian standpoint seemingly false, but nevertheless facts? Is not the transcendent reality over man and things manifest even apart from religion? Does it in religion alone assume the form of a will fulfilling ends, a personal existence?[1]

(*e*) The ultimate source of religion would be subjectively man's necessity of, and capacity for the experience of the reality of God, and objectively the presence and operation of God in nature, history, and the soul itself in making Himself known and imparting Himself to men. Religion, if it is not to be a self-projection of man into the void, but an apprehension of reality, involves necessarily revelation. The divine revelation is progressive, conditioned at every stage by the religious development of man, and hence its form and content depends on man's entire evolution, which in turn conditions his religious development. Why God chose this slow process of evolution in the making of man as natural, moral, and religious personality is one of the questions which it is idle to ask, for it is vain even to attempt to answer. But that we cannot show *why* is not a reason for denying *that* it is thus that God has sought man, and man has found God.

(11) This view is not in contradiction of what has already been stated as to the practical end of religion

[1] See *Die Theologische Rundschau*, 1910, pp. 1 ff. and 45 ff.

that it is the search for a good. Man has sought natural goods by the aid of the spirits and the gods. He has striven for moral goodness, and claimed the divine grace in his struggle. In his search for truth and his pursuit of beauty he has, if less consciously, depended upon God. But he cannot stop there. God cannot be merely a means towards man's ends. He must Himself be the end; and thus, when religion reaches the full understanding of itself, God Himself becomes the good. To natural goods the saint becomes indifferent, and leaves it to God to grant or to withhold as may be best for his highest good. Truth, beauty, and goodness he still seeks as ends in themselves; but as these ideals are recognized by him to be eternal and infinite reality in God, he realizes them as he finds God and their reality in God. Thus does the psychology of religion lead us over to the philosophy. But before we leave the psychology we must, having tried to define the psychic factors in religion, endeavour to describe the religious development of man, even if in only the provisional and tentative fashion which our knowledge allows.

VII

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

(1) In this attempt to trace man's religious development, we shall be concerned primarily with the conception of the divine as determinative of the other elements in religion, and we shall endeavour to connect the various forms that that conception has assumed with one another as a living movement of the mind of man. Conjecture here there must be, but we shall be guided by the principle of psychological probability. We have already necessarily anticipated part of this discussion in the previous section. (α) We must first of all set aside altogether the common assumption that there was a primitive monotheism for the following reasons:—(α) We cannot identify any savage with primitive man, or assume that a belief cherished by any tribe is necessarily primitive. (β) The evidence of belief in a Creator is not conclusive as regards a monotheistic conception being held at any previous period of development, as it coexists with other beliefs inconsistent with monotheism. (γ) Such a belief in advance of the other beliefs held along with it may prove that the upward

tendency in religion, which we shall afterwards refer to, did at one time assert itself, but as it is now generally otiose, did not secure any permanent dominance. (*b*) We must, secondly, recognize that a very good case has been made out for a reconsideration of the question whether animism is the earliest phase of human thought. Association of ideas has already led us to discuss the view that there was a pre-animistic stage of human thought which may be described as *animatism*, a sense of being alive in a world alive. It is best to retain this name for so vague a consciousness, and not put into it the definiteness of content which in some of his references to it Dr. Marett puts. But in neither of these forms of thought have we as yet got religion. We do get on to the threshold of religion in the conception of *mana* which has already been discussed. The feeling of wonder and awe at the sense of power, incalculable and uncontrolled, Marett proposes to call *Teratism*; and that is certainly a more appropriate descriptive term than *supernaturalism*, which carries far too definite a content of meaning. For this reason we may hesitate in accepting Dr. Jevons' use of the term *supernatural* in relation to the consciousness of primitive man, although we may believe that it was in some such way as he describes that a conception essential to religion was reached, the process having possibly been much slower than his account of it suggests.

(2) Animism, or the belief in spirits, has already been described, and it is the first constituent element in the religious consciousness; but is not distinctively religious until this sense of awe or wonder, or this conception of what is beyond man's knowledge and above his power attaches itself to it. It is relevant to our present purpose to look more closely at what Dr. Jevons has to say about the conception of the supernatural. (*a*) 'If, then, we suppose a time when no natural laws had as yet been discovered, all things then must have appeared to happen at haphazard; and primitive man's experience must have consisted of a stream of events as disjointed and disconnected as the successive incidents in a dream.' 'It was often at the actual cost and always at the danger of his life that primitive man purchased the working knowledge of the laws of nature and the properties of matter, without which modern man could never have acquired either the theoretic science or the material comfort which he now enjoys.' In this quest he was guided by 'faith in the uniformity of nature, the belief that what has once happened will in similar circumstances happen again'. That man had this belief, in however elementary a form, may be maintained for two reasons. (1) 'The very animals have, for instance, their lairs and their customary drinking-places to which they resort in full confidence that they will find them where they were before; and we cannot rate the intelligence of primitive man so far below

that of the animals as to imagine that he was ever in doubt whether, for instance, water would slake his thirst or food appease his appetite.' (2) 'It is a fact of psychology that the native tendency of the human mind to believe that what has once happened will happen again is so strong that, until experience has corrected it, a single occurrence is sufficient to create an expectation of recurrence: a child to whom you have given sweetmeats once fully expects sweetmeats from you at your next meeting.' (*b*) When the machinery of nature worked as he expected it, there was no problem for the primitive mind; it was when the expected results did not follow that he not only felt baffled in effort, but bewildered in mind. The solution that suggested itself was that some power he did not know and could not control was working against him. 'Laws on which man could count and sequences which he habitually initiated and controlled were natural. It was the violation of these sequences and the frustration of his expectations by which the belief in supernatural power was not created, but was first called forth.' 'In fine, to be convinced of the existence of the supernatural, it is sufficient that man should realize his helplessness.' This experience may not always be unpleasant or hurtful; benefits may be bestowed as well as injuries inflicted by mysterious power. (*c*) How did man conceive that power? 'All changes in the universe may be divided into two classes, those which are initiated by

man and those which are not; and it was inevitable from the first that man should believe the source and cause of the one class to be Will, as he knew it to be the cause and source of the other class of changes.'[1] With the qualification already indicated, that language of too definite intellectual content is sometimes used to describe what must have been a vague consciousness, we may suppose it was in some such way man's mind developed.

(3) What has now been stated as regards the way in which man has acquired his sense of mysterious power in nature must be supplemented by recalling what was stated in the previous chapter in a quotation from Dr. Marett regarding the way in which the sense of mysterious power in man's own activities also emerged. Here we may see the common roots of *magic* and religion. Leuba's distinction of the three kinds of action may in this connexion also be recalled. (*a*) The explanation which Frazer gives of sympathetic magic, and which Jevons accepts, needs to be modified. (*a*) 'Before an important function is entered upon, emotion is discharged by anticipatory rites. A pantomimic rehearsal of that which is likely to take place in the chase will be gone through, imaginary game will be caught and all the detail of hunting enacted by way of "pre-presentation". It is hardly surprising that the savage should read into these anticipatory rites a magical efficacy, not because

[1] *Introduction to the History of Religion*, pp. 15–22.

"like produces like", but because a ritual that involves a more or less realistic reproduction of some practical activity tends to establish the *ex post facto* idea of "sympathetic" causation. This, however, is an entirely different thing from saying with Frazer that symbolic and sympathetic rites belong to "an age of magic". Such a conclusion can only be arrived at by extracting the abstract element of imitativeness, and ignoring the primary function and purpose of primitive ritual. As a matter of fact the savage is not concerned with how ceremonies "work"; all he knows is that they do work.' (*β*) 'It will be therefore readily seen that to the primitive mind there is no clear distinction between magic and religion. No doubt there is a nascent consciousness of some contrast between the exercise of evil magic, which tends to be anti-social, and those rites which are for the betterment of society. . . Since the savage is essentially a "ritualist", it would avoid much confusion of terms if *ritual* in association with *mana* were made the basis of primitive magico-religious cult.'[1] (*b*) Without pursuing the subject of the relation of magic and religion, which has already been touched upon, we may note that the third constituent of religion in addition to animism and the sense of mysterious power is ritual, human activity which is supposed to secure that the mysterious power of the spirits will be used not for man's hurt but for his good. In the previous chapter, p. 98,

[1] James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, pp. 218–19.

by way of illustrating how human affection has influenced religion, the explanation Jevons gives of how men were led to worship the spirits in the same way as they were helpful to their dead relatives was reproduced. We need not seek to minimize that influence, but we must supplement his explanation by recognizing the influence on religious worship of the *ritual* of which Marett and James give so probable an explanation.

(4) Archbishop Söderblom has published a book already noted dealing with *The Origin and Development of the Belief in God*,[1] of such importance that at this stage of the discussion it deserves a further discussion: (*a*) While he does not deny its proper place to Tylor's theory of Animism, he does deny that it is the key to open every lock in primitive religion. He starts with the conception of *mana*, which as a conception is by no means confined to the region where the term itself is in use, but under other names has almost world-wide distribution. It has nothing to do with soul or spirit; but it must not be thought of as a diffused divine substance, as it is always the property of an individual person or thing. A permanent personal relation to this *mana* or mysterious power emerges in the rites of initiation practised in different parts of the world. Birth, Disease, Death, and War are also occasions of contact with it. The

[1] *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens. Untersuchungen über d. Anfänge d. Religion.* Deutsche Bearbeitung, 1916.

worship of the dead is probably due to the transfer to them of the mysterious power that causes death. Whatever possesses *mana* becomes *tabu*, withdrawn from profane uses. In this conception there is not, however, any explanation offered. It is awe and dread before a mystery.

(*b*) The inquiry is pushed further. There then arises a wonderful type of divine figures—the Authors (*Urheber*). We meet them especially among the aborigines of Australia. By these Authors these tribes explain everything that seems wonderful, and so needing to be explained, in their surroundings. They are thought of as animal in form, the ancestors of the tribes and their totems. When conceived as human, the Author becomes a mighty magician. While the existence of heaven and earth is usually taken for granted, it is the origin of the tribe, with its customs and rites, that excites special interest. The initiators (*Einweiher*) stand alongside of the ancestors (*Urväter*), and it would seem as if the two represent different stages in this inquiry. Curious fables are told about the human origins. After fulfilling their task these divine figures have disappeared. They receive no worship, although in the holy rites they approach the soul. As this conception appears all over the world, we have here to deal with a universal primitive appearance. These Authors may ascend to heaven, and be there identified with one of the great natural forces. But the development often stops at the very beginnings. (*c*) This

belief does not justify any assumption of a primitive monotheism. Andrew Lang's theory is rejected. Yet Söderblom insists that these two conceptions must not be set aside in any theory of the origin of religion. Traces of both he finds in higher religions, as, for instance, the 'Author' in the Chinese *Tien*, and *mana* in Indian pantheism.

(5) That a conception of mysterious power preceded the conception of spirits as wielding such power may be conceded as probable, and in *mana* we may be as near a primitive conception as we can get. It is not likely, however, that the conception of Authors is primitive; the birth of such an idea presupposes a long mental development. While the question of the immediate cause of a particular event would soon be asked to begin with, the problem of the ultimate source of all things would not be faced. We are warranted, then, in beginning the historical development of religion with the conception of a multitude of spirits wielding mysterious power, who could be influenced by certain rites duly performed. (*a*) Animism asserts the existence of ghosts as well as of spirits in natural objects, and we might call the phase of it with which we are immediately concerned *spiritism*, did not the word spiritualism, because of its association with the dead, rather threaten confusion. As the spirits were many, we may call this phase of thought *polydaemonism*. In distinguishing objects from one another, attention was directed by the selec-

tive interest. Objects that caused pleasure or pain would first of all excite interest. Unexpected pleasure or pain especially would provoke inquiry. While we cannot suppose that the primitive man altogether ignored the ordinary course of nature as it affected his own welfare, yet we must concede the probability of what Jevons contends for, that it was what baffled his effort and bewildered his intelligence that made him first cast about for some explanation. The explanation found, however, would soon be extended to all occurrences not immediately under human control. That men pay more attention to their pains than to their pleasures may be the reason why fear is often more prominent in the lower religions than hope, as well as the fact that the conditions of savage life give more frequent occasion for fear than those of a civilized society. (*b*) The relation between the spirits and natural objects might be conceived in two ways. The spirit might be conceived as taking up its abode in the object, and as necessarily confined to it, so that its activities could not be detached from it. This way of thinking may be called *fetishism*, although this is a word of ambiguous meaning. (*a*) The feather, the stone, or the block of wood might be supposed to possess power because of the spirit localized in it. To secure the presence of the spirit in such an object among certain savage tribes a fixed ritual must be observed. The object selected is usually some trifle which has been invested casually with significance.

A feather blown across the path, a stone on which the foot stumbles, a bit of wood of curious shape, may thus attract attention. If its appearance coincides with some painful or pleasurable experience, it is the more likely to be endowed with mysterious power. (β) What fetishism has now become may be seen from the account Dr. Jevons gives of how an individual acquires for himself a deity among the negroes of West Africa, in distinction from the mode in which the local, tribal, or family deities are worshipped. 'First, the spot from which the wood, or stone, or earth is taken is not a spot frequented by a local deity, but one haunted by a Sasabonsum (a spirit with whom no body of worshippers has established permanent friendly relations, and not, therefore, a god at all). Next, no priest is employed or consulted by the man who wants such a *suhman*, as its name is. Third, though offerings are made to the *suhman* by its owner, they are made in private—public opinion does not approve of them. Fourth, whereas the function of the tutelary deity of a family or town-company, &c., is to protect the members of that section, "one of the special attributes of a *suhman* is to procure the death of any person whom its worshipper may wish to have removed"; indeed, "the most important function of the *suhman* appears to be to work evil against those who have injured or offended its worshipper; its influence in other matters is very secondary". Fifth, a *suhman* can communicate its

own powers to other objects, and the owner of a *suhman* sells such charms. Finally, if a *suhman* does not prove efficacious, the man concludes that either a spirit does not dwell in the object or that, if it does, it is indisposed to serve him; "in either case he throws away the receptacle he had prepared for the spirit, and recommences *de novo*. But, so great is the fear of giving possible offence to any superhuman agent, that before discarding it he invariably makes some offering to it to avert its anger." '[1]

(γ) There is no ground for assuming that fetishism as thus developed is the earliest form of religion. 'For this error we have principally to thank De Brosses, who thought he had discovered in fetishism the origin of religion, and was led to define a fetish (in his *Du Culte des Dieux Fétiches*, 1760) in this misleading manner: "Anything which people like to select for adoration", for examples, "a tree, a mountain, the sea, a piece of wood, the tail of a lion, a pebble, shell, salt, a fish, a plant, a flower, certain animals, such as cows, goats, elephants, sheep, or anything like these." Hence the mistaken belief, widespread once in the learned world, that the negro worships an inanimate object, a stock or a stone, knowing it inanimate.'[2] Even as the belief in a spirit localized in and confined to some trivial object,

[1] Jevons' *Introduction to the History of Religion*, pp. 165–6. The quotations are from Ellis' *The Tshi-speaking Peoples*.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 107.

fetishism is to be regarded as a by-path, and not even on the main-road of the development of religion.

(*c*) The other way of thinking of the relation of the spirit to the object with which it was associated naturally followed the course of thinking about the relation of soul and body. As the soul could in dreams leave the body, so the spirit was thought of as controlling the natural object without being confined to it. It is for this mode of thinking that we may reserve the term *polydaemonism*.

(*a*) While the tone of the passage is needlessly offensive, Mr. Clodd's account may be quoted, with one reservation to be afterwards mentioned, as describing this phase of development. Man 'would of course locate them wherever he found them active; whether in animal, tree, cloud, or stone; and would seek for ways of entering into some sort of relations with them, whereby they might be squared and he might be advantaged. The invisible ones, l ng the objects of fear, as many remain to this day, became, in some cases, objects of reverence, but there persisted the sense of dependence which is expressed in the highest as in the lowest faiths. In the instinctive cry for help, there was the primitive prayer; in the magic and spell, a body of practices by which man sought to outwit, or compel to furtherance of his own ends, the dreaded powers; and in the sacrifice the bribe to appease, or the offering to flatter them, or the attempt to enter into commensal relations with them. Some-

times man would use physical force, as did the Guaycurus of Paraguay, who believed that unusually heavy storms were attacks on them by the evil spirits, and who sallied forth brandishing their clubs and shouting the war-cry for the purpose of repelling them '.[1]

(β) The reservation to be made is this. The passage is written not in the spirit of disinterested science, but with an evident bias against religion. The savage is identified with the primitive man. The lower aspects of the religion of the savage are emphasized. Fear is given too prominent a place in religious emotion. Magic is made a necessary part of religion. While it is true that rites may sometimes be conceived as having a coercive force over the personal spirits, even the Christian sacraments may be thought of 'magically', yet magic is to be distinguished from religion, as has already been urged. It is not prior to religion; it is not a factor in religion; it is not a rival to religion. The boy tries to imitate his father without any conscious intention of rivalling him. Magic was not originally a substitute for religion, or an attempt to get such power over spirits as to compel them to do man's will. It was his first applied science. It was an experiment to do what he believed himself quite capable of doing until he discovered the limits of his powers. With the modification already indicated, Frazer's and Jevons' view of sympathetic magic

[1] *Animism*, pp. 50–1.

may be adopted. The relations which man sought with the spirits, who were capable of doing what he could not do, and whose help he desired, were probably more friendly than Mr. Clodd's language allows. If, as Jevons maintains, his worship was suggested, at least in part, by his intercourse with his dead, the primitive man realized his kinship with the spirits around him, and hoped for their kindness.

(6) It is probable that the more remote objects of nature, sun, moon, and stars, the sky, the earth, attracted attention at a later stage of development than the objects with which man's conscious contact was more immediate, plants, trees, animals, streams, springs, &c. But no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down. (*a*) 'The well-nigh uniform behaviour of the mind in the presence of similar phenomena has become a canon of anthropology, strengthened by the fact that, at the same level of civilization, man everywhere devises and makes shifts with the same kind of tools and weapons. But phenomena vary, and different physical and local conditions determine the prominence given to this or that power or spirit.' 'But there is a large body of evidence which proves the precedence of moon-worship before man had reached the agricultural stage when the more potent influences of the sun, and consequently his high place in the pantheon were recognized.' 'Whilst it is at the agricultural stage that impetus was given to sun and earth worship, no period can even be roughly assigned to the choice

of mere abstract phenomena, such as the sky, air, light, and thunder, as separate objects of worship.'[1] (*b*) The perils that beset his path, and the evils that were his lot led primitive man to think of some of these spirits as malevolent. 'In the tree or stone that crushed him; in the water that drowned him; in the diseases that smote him; still more in death itself; he saw the foul works of spirits.'[2] As has already been noted, among some savage tribes there is the belief in Authors or High Gods whose activity was beneficent, but who have now retired from immediate intercourse with men unless such contact as mystic rites may afford. 'Savage theology,' says Risley,[3] 'expressing doubtless the experience of primitive man as to the distribution of good and evil in the world, teaches that the good gods abide in their own place and take no heed of mankind while the malevolent deities are in a constant state of jealous and mischievous activity. Hence the former drop out of notice, fall into the background, while the others survive changes of religion.' It is curious that Mr. Clodd does not draw the inference which this statement not only suggests, but demands. (*c*) How was the conception of good gods formed at all, if nature was found to be mainly unkind? Does not the formation even of such ideas indicate a period when conditions were better, and the belief in the withdrawal of these gods a change in conditions for

[1] Clodd's *Animism*, pp. 51–3. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 59.
[3] *Census of India*, 1901, p. 410, quoted by Clodd, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

the worse? The survival of such ideas among savage tribes surely points back to a period of greater advancement in human development, from which their present state may be regarded as a relapse. Be this as it may be, man's circumstances led him to think of beneficent as well as malevolent spirits.

(7) This quotation has led us to anticipate the course of the development, for at this stage it is better not to speak of gods, but only of spirits. We may now concentrate attention on the animals around man, for it is obvious that in the hunting and the pastoral stage of evolution these would be for him of primary interest. The distinction between the animal and the human was only gradually recognized. Man thought himself akin to all living creatures, and, therefore, conceived the spirits in animal as well as human form, rather we may say owing to the importance at this stage of animals to him, in animal rather than in human form. This we may call the *zoomorphic* stage, and the transition from this to the *anthropomorphic* stage, when the human form alone was thought of, the *therianthropic*, as the representation was partly animal, partly human. All these stages may be observed in Egyptian religion. In certain towns an animal was revered; then a god was represented with a human body, 'wearing the head of the same animal'. 'The last stage is reached when the god casts aside his animal garb altogether, and the animal is thought and spoken of as being sacred to him, but has no

other or more intimate relation with him.'[1] (*a*) It is at this point that the subject of *totemism* may be most fitly discussed. Reason has already been shown why we cannot regard this as a primitive form of religion, as Jevons seems to represent it as being, for it involves two features which point to a later stage of human development. First of all, it is not an individual animal (or in its secondary form, plant) which is chosen as the tribal god; but a class. This implies not only observation, but some powers of generalization. Secondly, the sense of tribal unity is strong, and we cannot assume that this involved no gradual development. Jevons derives the first feature from the second, man conceived animals and plants as tribes even as he himself belonged to a tribe. One objection to this derivation, however, suggests itself: how did he then not rise to the conception of all men as one tribe? But even if Jevons' view is right, what has been said about the mental process involved still holds good. Other spirits were still recognized, but the totem was exalted to be the tribal deity. Not only is totemism not primitive, but it is doubtful whether it can be regarded to the same extent as animism as a stage through which all religions have passed. There is a tendency in advocates of the totemistic theory to explain totemistically features of belief and rite, which are capable of other explanations, derivation from other motives, such as the institutions of

[1] Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

sacrifice. Further, there does not seem to be at all the same psychological necessity that everywhere the human mind should respond in just this way, even in the hunting and pastoral stage, to the influences brought to bear on it, as might be pleaded for animism. There is so much arbitrary in the choice of the totem. (*b*) The totem animal was regarded as so closely akin to his human worshipper that stories were told of the descent of the tribe from the animal. 'As the totem animal becomes a member of the human clan, so the human clansman becomes a member of the animal's clan.'[1] He puts on the animal's skin, and tries to make himself look as like his totem as he can, when at the crises of life he seeks specially to put himself under the protection of the totem. 'At death he was supposed to join his totem and to assume the totem animal's form.'[2] The totem 'became a permanently friendly 'power; in a word, it became a god, whereas all other spirits remained evil, or at any rate hostile powers, by whom a man could only expect to be treated as he was treated by—and indeed as he himself treated—members of a strange clan.'[3] The tribe in this common worship became a religious community. The tribe and the whole class of animals shared a common life, and the life of the tribe could be renewed, the supernatural power of the totem could be appropriated, by the sharing by all the tribesmen in the common blood. The sacrifice of an

[1] Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 102. [2] p. 103. [3] pp. 104, 105.

individual animal of the totem class was for this purpose necessary, even although in ordinary circumstances the killing of a totem animal would have been regarded in the same way as the slaughter of a kinsman, and it never was used as ordinary food. From this sacrificial meal in which at first the whole animal had to be consumed, Jevons derives the whole institution of sacrifice. As the taboo blood must not be spilled upon the ground, it was applied to a pile of stones, a pillar or a pole. 'But as it takes more labour to dress and set up a pole, or to erect a monolithic pillar, than to heap together a pile of stones, we may regard the heap of stones as the earliest object to which the blood was applied.'[1] This was the primitive altar. 'The primitive unhewn stone or pillar continued, when it remained in use, to be a baetylion, a beth-el, the object in which the god manifested himself when the blood was sprinkled or dashed upon it.'[2] When 'a rough likeness to the human face' was 'given to the monolith or pole'... 'the transition from the altar to the idol' was made.[3] 'The idea of offering a sacrifice "to" a god is a notion which can only be developed in a later stage of totemism when, on the one hand, the monolith has come to be identified with the god, and on the other, the god is no longer in the animal.'[4] From totemism Jevons derives the domestication of animals, and later when plants came to be regarded as totems, the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 131. [2] p. 133. [3] p. 139. [4] p. 141.

cultivation of plants. The individualization of totemism is seen in animal and tree worship, when one animal or plant takes the place of the class. Stone worship can also be connected through the altar or pillar with totemism. (*c*) By totemism also Jevons accounts for the transition from the worship of spirits to the worship of a god, for the totem stands to the tribe that worships it in far more intimate relations than any spirit did. He even calls this belief *monotheism*. 'The essence of monotheism is that in it the worshipper worships only one god. What then shall we say of the worshipper who worships one god alone, but believes that the gods worshipped by other tribes exist, and are really gods, though his own attitude towards them is one of hostility? It is obvious that his is a lower form of faith than that of the man who worships only one god, and believes that, as for the gods of the heathen, they are but idols. Yet though this is not the highest form of monotheism, to call it polytheism would be an abuse of language.'[1] It seems on the contrary an abuse of language to call this monotheism, and can only lead to confusion. We may reserve the term *henotheism* for another phase of worship, but the exclusive worship of one god compared with the belief in the existence of other gods may be called *monolatry*. But we may go farther, and challenge the assumption that totemism was monolatry. Did

[1] Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

the totemist not worship any other object save his tribal deity? Did he suppose that the whole course of nature depended on his totem, and so abandon the worship of all other spirits? Jevons has not proved that all religions have passed through the totemistic stage; his derivation of sacrifice, altar, and idol from totemism exclusively is not conclusive, as other factors than those he notices came into play in the development, as, for instance, the idea of pleasing the spirit or god by a gift. Last of all, is he justified in representing totemism as monotheistic?

(8) We may now return to the main line of our discussion, and follow out Jevons' suggestion that it was totemism that served as a transition from poly-daemonism to polytheism. (*a*) What distinguishes the god from the spirit? The god was less closely connected with the natural object with which the spirit had been at an earlier stage connected. With the growing capacity for generalization the class took the place of the individual; the god of vegetation took the place of the spirit in a plant or tree; he directed a department, and did not merely inhabit and control an object. Here is a more probable derivation of the idol. The presence of the god, now no longer confined to an object, had to be symbolized. A god had a wider realm, and so wielded a greater power than a spirit. The spirit was not conceived apart from the object, and was not named. The god distinguished from the object was more distinctly conceived, and received a name.

With the god, now more anthropomorphically represented, the worshipper entered into a closer alliance than was possible with the multitude of spirits so vaguely conceived. The adoption of a tribal deity, as in totemism, tended, but only tended, to monolatry in practice, and to monotheism in doctrine. But this tendency, never exclusive or dominant, was countered by the union of tribes in a nation.

(*b*) It is only on the assumption that the worship of a tribal deity can be called monotheism, that we are warranted in regarding polytheism, with Jevons, as the price paid for the political fusion of tribes in a nation. The tribal deities were either placed side by side in a national pantheon, each receiving its own separate worship, or, when the resemblance between the tribal deities was close enough, there was *syncretism*, the fusion of the conception and of the worship in one deity, sometimes indicated by a double name, as Amon-Ra in Egypt. In the popular worship of Israel, denounced by the prophets, there was this tendency to syncretism, the fusion of Yahweh, the national god, and Baal, the god of the land, and the supposed source of its fertility. In the book of Hosea especially this development is denounced. 'Polytheism is the consequence of *synoikismos*, of political growth. But polytheism is not the consequence in all cases; syncretism is at first the more common consequence, because it is only by a slow process of development that gods acquire an indi-

viduality sufficiently well marked, and characteristics sufficiently specific, to prevent their being confused with other gods having a similar origin and the same ritual as themselves.'[1] It may be regarded as an advance rather than a retrogression that polydaemonism develops into polytheism. What steps were taken towards monotheism can be told only after considering two parallel, though connected, developments.

(*c*) It is at this stage that we must say a few words about mythology. Only when the gods were definitely conceived, and named, when their relations to one another were determined, when their worship assumed distinct forms, would mythology emerge in any luxuriance. Probably tales were told about the spirits, as imagination is vigorous before intellect becomes active, and story-telling is a gift man delights in. But the transition just described would encourage this tendency. The history of the gods, their names, functions, and connexions with one another, had to be told to satisfy curiosity. The rites in their worship had to be accounted for, as well as the phenomena of nature under their control. But belief and worship come before mythology, and there are developments in mythology that are not of religious, but of literary and artistic interest. But the myths offered reasons for the beliefs and the modes of worship, when the need for explanation came to be felt.

[1] Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

(*d*) It was also when man began to distinguish himself more definitely from animals, and so an animal ancestry as first thought of fell into the background, and when the tribal unity was resolved into the family unity, that we may suppose ancestor-worship emerged. Man from the beginning believed in the survival of the dead, and sought to hold intercourse with them, and to minister to their needs, assumed to be the same as they had been on earth. 'But,' says Clodd,[1] 'the worship of ancestors is not primal. The comparatively late recognition of kinship by savages, among whom some rude form of religion existed, tells against it as the earliest mode of worship.' 'We are brought,' says Jevons, 'to the period of settled, agricultural life, as the earliest time at which the "worship" of ancestors begins.'[2] 'When the assimilation of the rites for the dead to the ritual of the gods has proceeded thus far, it naturally happens that in many cases some superhuman powers are ascribed to the spirits of the dead. But it never happens that the spirits of the dead are conceived to be gods,'[3] although, we must add, deification of heroes, great men, and rulers does take place. We cannot derive the worship of the gods from the worship of ghosts. 'The organized worship of ancestors is bound up with the patriarchate and the *patria potestas*.'[4] Human sacrifice is probably associated at an earlier date with

[1] *Myths and Dreams*, p. 113, quoted by Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 195 note.
[2] p. 195. [3] p. 196. [4] p. 199.

the worship of ancestors than with the worship of the gods. Attendants were slaughtered that they might continue their service of their dead master. One motive of cannibalism is 'the belief in the possibility of acquiring the courage or other attributes of an animal or man by consuming his or its flesh' [1]; but eating aged relatives was simply one of the savage's attempts 'to make sure that the corpse is properly disposed of and can no longer be a source of danger to the living, but rather of blessing'.[2] Even although in the earliest stages the service rendered to the dead may in part have been due to fear, yet the tokens of grief shown at death warrant the assertion that affection was a motive. And when the family was securely established in its own separate home, there can be no doubt that family affection was the motive of the worship of ancestors.

(9) We must now trace the tendencies of religious belief to reach beyond and rise above polytheism. (*a*) Although Jevons takes a very harsh, and to the writer a very unjust, view of the tendency to exalt one god over other gods in the pantheon, as of Zeus in Greek and Jupiter in Latin mythology, it may first of all be mentioned. When in a movement towards national unity one city or district took a lead, the god of the predominant partner enjoyed a supremacy over

[1] p. 201.

[2] Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 370, quoted *op. cit.*, p. 203.

the other gods, as Murduk in Babylon and Ashur in Assyria. To *monarchy* on earth it was assumed that there corresponded monarchy in heaven, although the heavenly was by no means a perfect pattern for the earthly, as the gods were often as unruly as men. Of this tendency Jevons says: 'It is scarcely a religious idea at all; it is not drawn from the spiritual depths of man's nature, it is a conception borrowed from politics, for the purpose not of unifying the multiplicity of gods, but of putting their multiplicity on an intelligible and permanent basis.'[1] Whatever the occasion, the result of this tendency was, as Greek thought shows, to produce the belief in one God over all.

(*b*) Max Müller called attention to a feature of Vedic thought to which he gave the name of *Kathenotheism* or *henotheism*. The worshipper so concentrated his attention on, and was so absorbed by interest in the deity whom at the time he was addressing, that for the time at least he thought of no other god; and endowed the god worshipped with all the attributes and functions of deity. This temporary mood is significant as an indication that when piety is intense it cannot dissipate itself over a number of objects of worship.

(*c*) The third tendency we have to notice was not due to piety, but to speculation. In the speculation of the priests in Egypt the gods were conceived as

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 389.

manifestations of deity regarded as unity. In India Brahma b came the only reality, and the actuality of a world apart from it was *maya*, illusion; but this speculation was tolerant of polytheism, as the gods could be regarded as manifestations of that one ultimate reality, necessary, and so justified, for common belief and worship. Although truly devout souls, such as was Spinoza, have found a satisfaction in pantheism, secured by some sacrifice of consistency in speculative thought to meet religious and moral needs, yet for the mass of mankind, pantheism can have no value as a religion.

(*d*) While there have been these tendencies towards monotheism, yet it is true that 'the monotheism of the Jews is a unique and solitary phenomenon in the history of religion. Nowhere else in the world has the development of religion culminated in monotheism.'[1] We need not, however, assume with Jevons that 'monotheism is not to be reached by the route that leads to polytheism.'[2] The argument for such a development from polytheism to monotheism which he offers in the first part of this chapter can claim greater probability than can the argument which follows, by which he seeks to show the impossibility of such a development. We need not and do not maintain that polytheism of itself would by a natural evolution have passed into monotheism. We may accept the account that the Hebrew religion gives of

[1] Jevons, *op. cit.*, p. 388. [2] Ibid.

itself. This nation had, as no other nation, a succession of prophets who, when they spoke, could declare their authority for speech, 'Thus saith the Lord'. It was not due to any Semitic genius for monotheism, for their Semitic kinsmen remained polytheists, that ethical monotheism was the issue of the religious history of the Israelites. It was despite a constant tendency in the nation to relapse into polytheism that, by the discipline of the divine providence and the divine inspiration of its prophets, this people alone reached the highest stage of religious development. It is to be observed that it was first of all a moral supremacy which was claimed for Jehovah, and only afterwards was the metaphysical inference of the solity of the divine existence drawn. Hence this ethical monotheism is the culmination of a moral no less than a religious development.

(*e*) This spiritual treasure has been inherited by the Christian Church, and has been further developed in the doctrine of the Trinity into the conception of a concrete unity—manifoldness in oneness—and not an abstract unit, as apart from such development monotheism tends towards conceiving the divine. It is still the possession of Judaism, although here the tendency just mentioned has shown itself. This modification of monotheism has been named deism. Islam also has adopted monotheism, but has lowered it in two ways, (1) it is deistic, and (2) it is less ethical in its conception of God than either the Christian or the Jewish.

It is certain that if the belief in the divine is to survive at all in modern times, it must be conceived as unity. The issue of the future seems to lie between the monotheistic and the pantheistic conception. What past history warrants us in affirming is that while pantheism commends itself to the speculative intellect, it is monotheism, the belief in a personal God with whom man can have personal relations, which alone satisfies the moral conscience and religious consciousness.

(*f*) This attempt to reconstruct the historical development of religion is only tentative; the most that can be claimed for it is a high degree of probability. That development has not been uniform throughout the world: some religions have been arrested at one of the lower stages, in some the process has been more rapid than in others; and yet in all there has been some movement, and so we are warranted in trying to trace the path of progress for religion.

VIII

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS

(1) In the previous discussions the results of the comparative study of religions have been assumed. We can attempt to define what religion is, and to describe how it grows only after we have compared the religions, and have discovered what we can claim to be common to them all. While there are anthropological works which are almost entirely descriptive of the religion of one tribe or group of tribes, much anthropological work is comparative, bringing together the resemblances of belief and custom from all parts of the world. Similarities in the religions of civilized nations who are known to have had actual contact with one another, or who may have had such intercourse although we have no present evidence of it, are not so impressive as the resemblances in beliefs, rites, and customs among savage peoples all over the earth, between whom any connexion is in the highest degree improbable. Mankind is one: its manhood the same; and in the religions of the world there are many common features. These are much more easily discovered in the savage than in the civilized man, in

whom the process of differentiation has gone further; and yet even in the most developed historical religions the common elements of religion can be discovered. And when we speak of the comparative study of religions we are as a rule thinking rather of the comparison of the historical religions than of the comparison of the beliefs, rites, and customs of savages, with which anthropology is concerned.

(2) In this method of comparison there is a danger which must be carefully guarded against. (*a*) It is what in Biblical Study would be censured, as the use of the Concordance with neglect of the context. If we take so common a conception as faith, for instance, we shall greatly err if we assume that the word has exactly the same meaning in every passage in which the Concordance shows us that the word occurs. Paul in Rom. i. 17 quotes Habbakuk ii. 4, 'the just shall live by faith'; and yet a study of the context will show us that the prophet means fidelity and the apostle confidence. The Epistle to the Hebrews, in the description of faith's functions in xi. 1, gives it a wider range than Paul, who usually relates it to the grace of God in Christ. James is not thinking of the same kind of faith as is Paul, when he insists that works must be added unto faith (Jas. ii. 4). (*b*) Returning from this illustration of the danger to our present subject, it must be recognized that similar beliefs and customs may have an entirely different significance and value owing to their different associations. Circumcision

means something very different to the Jew and to the Kaffir. The sacrifice in a totemistic religion means a great deal more to the worshipper than it does in a religion where it is but a gift offered to please a god. How unlike were the meanings of *sacrifice* to the common people (Micah vi), the psalmist (Psalm li), and the prophet (Isaiah liii). Generalizations based on data gathered together from the ends of the earth may be premature and precarious, unless the resemblance is essential and not apparent only. When one reads some modern books on the subject one seems to get dizzy from being transported hither and thither from one continent to another with headlong flight. In dealing with the complexity of human life uniformities are often deceptive, for the variety of human development is no less a fact than the unity of human nature. While fully recognizing the value of this comparative study of religion, we must remember that human beings are not atoms, electrons, elements, the behaviour of which may be so exactly compared. It is a true German saying, 'when two say the same thing it is no longer the same'.

(3) This danger is not avoided in the work of Sir James Frazer, and a remedy is suggested by Mr. E. O. James. 'Sir James arrives at his conclusions by the universalistic form of the comparative method. This same scheme of collecting examples of savage beliefs and rites from all parts of the world, and deducing "laws" of primitive logic from them, had already been

used by Sir Edward Tylor with considerable success. But the procedure lacks the precision of intensive study, and is liable to classify together superficially similar, but really incommensurable facts, with the result that false conclusions are bound to follow.' What is needed is intensive study of the religions of one region or race. 'Resort will be had to the universal comparative method only so far as there is need to supply examples not to be found in this particular region, and to support the general argument. Thus an attempt will be made to avoid both extremes, namely, too narrow and too sweeping a method of induction.'[1] The distinction between what is here called the universalistic and the intensive method corresponds to the difference between the use of a Concordance without and with the study of the context. Illustrations for generalizations should be drawn only from the writings of the scholars who have made an intensive study of one religion or group of religions.

(4) There is another caution in the use of the comparative method which must be given. The religions which have no literature can be studied only as they are found in life. (*a*) But the religions that have a literature demand a twofold study. We must not assume that the life corresponds to the literature of the religion: in the literature we may have the ideal that the religion sets before itself, in the life there is

[1] James, *Primitive Ritual and Belief*, pp. 2–3.

put before us the actuality which it has attained. Intention and performance do not always correspond. It would be a mistake to assume that the practice of Christendom generally corresponds to the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount, or that the common Hindu piety is as profound as is the Brahmanic speculation, or that every Chinaman rules his life entirely by the teaching of Confucius, or that every Buddhist monk is an exact copy of Gautama the Buddha. (*b*) When we compare two religions we must compare literature and literature, life and life, not the ideal of the one with the actuality of the other. We must constantly recognize the fact of human inconsistency, the difference between profession and practice. (*c*) Although generalizations are dangerous, yet it does seem a safe statement that the larger and the loftier the ideal intended by any religion the more will its adherents fall short in the actuality of their attainment. It is very much easier to be a good Mohammedan, meeting the few demands made by that religion, than to be a good Christian fulfilling the claim of holiness that Christ makes. The greater inconsistency of its adherents is not necessarily a proof of the inferiority of a religion; it may be evidence of the superiority of the standard that it sets up. This is a field of fruitful comparative study. Does a religion ask little, and so get all it asks? Does it ask much, and so get only a little of all it asks? Does it, or does it not, supply motives adequate

to its demands? Are defects in its confessors due to what it imposes, or to their failure to be what it requires? (*d*) The account given by European scholars of the historical religions, derived largely from their Sacred Scriptures, must be supplemented by the testimony not only of travellers, who see the religion as it appears, but also of missionaries who in more living contact with the people can gain a deeper insight into what it actually is and does than the observer who is outside of the life. Most valuable from this point of view is what converts to Christianity have written about the religion which they have left behind, although the caution already given of the less tolerance that sometimes marks them must not be forgotten.

(5) We cannot pursue this line of inquiry, however, without being forced to face the question, What is the purpose of our comparison? Is it only to observe differences and resemblances, to gather the data of generalizations or classifications? Or is it to reach a judgement of value regarding the religions of the world? The comparative study of religions can claim to be a science in the strict sense of the word only as long as it avoids any judgement of value; for science observes facts, and formulates laws, but does not offer any such judgements. That a comparative study of religions within such limits is of great interest and importance must be conceded. If nothing that is human should be alien to us, least of all should any-

thing in religion, in which man expresses himself most intimately, be indifferent to us. Mr. Jordan, who has spent many years and much labour in advocating and promoting the science of Comparative Religion, as he still calls the subject, is very insistent on the necessity of this entirely neutral scientific study of the religions of the world, and is very vehement in his condemnation of those who do not bring to this study the attitude which he considers to be alone proper to it.[1]

[1] *Comparative Religion: its Adjuncts and Allies*, by Louis Henry Jordan. London, Oxford University Press, 1915. I may here transcribe a few sentences from a review of this book I wrote in the *International Review of Missions*. 'While the tone generally (to foreign missions) does not seem unfriendly, yet there are a few less guarded utterances which cannot but be read with deep regret. "It may be a despicable thing to sneer at another man's faith ; but it is equally bad form, and it exhibits equally bad judgement, to overpraise one's own." This is written in reference to apologetic treatises, which seek to show the superiority of Christianity to other religions, an attempt which he regards as a "forlorn hope". "Which religion is 'the best' absolutely considered is a problem which no man need ever hope to solve ; the solution lies far beyond his reach" (p. 369). All apologetic interest must be banished from comparative religion. "For a serious expositor of Comparative Religion to attempt to play this rôle is a veritable anachronism" (p. 378). To be an orthodox "comparativist" a man must have no decided religious convictions of his own. "To place all religions save Christianity in one group, and to aver that the religion of Jesus is the answer made to the world's cry for a supernatural revelation is very seriously to misinterpret the function and significance of those faiths by which Christianity was preceded, and by which it may yet be followed" (p. 385). Christianity must not be regarded as the unique and the final faith for mankind : "for comparative religion has no warrant to forestall or foreclose the future" (p. 396). This position can be justified only on the assumption that all judgements of value must be excluded from the comparative study of religions, even the

(*a*) We must assuredly bring to the study, as to every other, an unprejudiced mind, nay, even something more positive, a sympathetic heart and an appreciative judgement. We want to think the best and not the worst possible of another religion than our own. We must not regard our own religion as alone and altogether true, and all other religions as wholly false. We must recognize on the one hand that God has nowhere left Himself without witness; and that in all religions we may find man not only searching after God, but being in wondrous ways found of God. On the other hand, we must recognize, however, that this treasure is always in earthen vessels, that man ever fails to apprehend fully that for which he has been apprehended of God. That if the religions testify a universal presence of God they no less testify a universal failure of man to behold God even as He is. There has been a welcome change in the attitude of Christian thinkers and scholars, and no less of Christian missionaries in recent years. What is being constantly insisted on is sympathy and appreciation. Hence agreements between Christianity and other religions are being expected, and not differences alone asserted. For the missionary it is of the utmost importance to discover *the points of contact* for his message, *the lines of least resistance* for his influence, as well as the antagonisms to be overcome. Needs

judgements of value that the facts so studied force upon us' (1916, pp. 497–9).

unmet and aspirations unfulfilled in any religion are being welcomed as offering an opportunity to show the sufficiency of Christ.

(*b*) But the demand seems to be for something more, for an entire neutrality. Now it is difficult to see how a man can have sufficient living interest in religion in general to study it as sympathetically and appreciatively as it needs to be studied, and yet have no personal attachment to any particular religion, from the standpoint of which he must inevitably frame some judgements of value. In all the studies relating to the inner life of man, his higher interests of art, literature, morality, religion, it seems to be impossible to expect, and undesirable to demand, such neutrality. He must have aesthetic taste who would write on art, or a feeling for style who would discuss literature. A moralist cannot be indifferent to morality. It does seem to be assumed, however, that religion is an exception, and that the man who regards religion as a savage superstition will give a more scientific account of it than the man who regards religion as his own most precious possession. In a previous chapter attention was called to the needlessly offensive tone in which Mr. Clodd writes about religion; and yet many books are being written claiming to be objective which no less show subjective bias. It may be said even that this proves that it is impossible for men to be neutral. If man is by natural necessity religious, as the absolute universality of religion

shows, the man who rejects religion is likely to prove anti-religious. Scientific impartiality is much less probable in the anti-religious than in the religious scholar. If religion then is not a disqualification for the comparative study of religions, but rather an advantage, it is impossible to expect this neutrality as regards the different particular religions. The deists of the seventeenth century, who thought that they had discovered a religion of nature as old as creation when they had simply denuded Christianity of all those features that gave it living power for the souls of men, were not distinguished for their impartiality. The man who is most attached to his own religion is much more likely, if he be a just and kind man, to deal fairly with the religion of others. There is a saying of George Macdonald's to this effect, that the woman who cares only for the children she has herself borne is not one of God's mothers, as is the woman who loves every child as a child. And so we may say the man is a sectarian, and not a saint, who finds God only in his own faith and in no other.

(*c*) If then neutrality is impossible and undesirable, can we demand that there shall be no judgement of value? What may be required is that we do not claim that that judgement is a scientific conclusion, based only on the data before us; but frankly acknowledge that our personal convictions have affected our judgement. We may very usefully carry the comparative study of religions on to generalizations in

which no judgement of value is expressed, and there is need and room for much more of this kind of inquiry. All we need now insist on is that we must not be forbidden to go any further. To have a disinterested scientific interest is good, but in such a subject as religion can we really stop short at that, and not ask ourselves the further questions of truth or error, good or evil, worth or unworth? In trying to answer we may turn to other branches of human knowledge.

(6) Ethics, aesthetics, and logic were at one time regarded as branches of philosophy; and as dealing with mental interests and activities of man they do stand much nearer to philosophy than does physics or mathematics. (*a*) It is claimed, and it is recognized now generally that these subjects can be treated by the methods of science; and yet a difference is recognized when they are described as *normative* sciences, for they are concerned not only with *what is*, but also with *what ought to be*. They not only describe facts and laws, but prescribe *norms*, as to how men shall do duty, feel beauty, and think truth. If in this respect they are to be denied the title of science, and to be still regarded as branches of philosophy, so be it with regard to the comparative study of religions. If the difference in the descriptive epithet *normative* be admitted, so may it be also for the subject that now specially concerns us. (*b*) It, however, is a question of more than terminology; and it

is well to discuss it in the widest reference. Can man reach *norms*, standards by which he tests his own actuality? If the ideals of beauty, duty, and truth are to be pursued, and can in some measure be apprehended, it is no less imperative for a man to ask himself, not only what his belief and worship is, but also what it ought to be; and if he can discover the ideal of religion he is bound to test his own religion and other religions by that standard, and so determine their relative value. If this is to be called philosophy rather than science, so be it. Indeed, on the whole it would seem better to draw the frontier between science and philosophy here in all spheres; that science is concerned only with the *phenomena*, what appears, and philosophy with the *noumena*, what reality ultimately is, and what therefore must be the supreme ideals for man as rational, aesthetic, moral, and religious. To this theme we must return in the last chapters of this book; but meanwhile what is important to assert at the present stage of our discussion is that, while in the comparative study of religions as *science* we must abstain from judgements of value, yet we may and should carry that study to the philosophical stage, where such judgements are necessary and legitimate.

(7) As it is important for the effective use of the philosophical method that we should discipline ourselves in the scientific, and as, further, the comparison of the beliefs, rites, codes, &c., of the religions of the

world has an interest of its own apart from preparing us for the further inquiry as to value, a few subjects may be dealt with by way of illustration in order to show the uniformities and the differences which can be observed.

(*a*) Animism is a stage through which all religions seem to have passed. The same universality cannot be claimed for totemism, and there may be animal worship in a religion which has not the distinctive features of totemism. Polytheism does appear universal, but 'the development of polytheism in each religion was determined by so many varied and varying factors that no simple uniformity, but a bewildering variety appeared. Physical conditions, racial characteristics, political circumstances, historical occurrences—all affected the forms assumed by the belief and worship of the many gods. The personification of natural processes, the endowment of these gods with human qualities, passions, relations, and activities, the free play of the imagination with this varied material, the reflex influence of language on thought, metaphor begetting myth, the absence of any control of this development by scientific knowledge, moral sense, and religious reverence—all these factors combined explain the luxuriant, extravagant, and sometimes grotesque and even offensive mythology which connects itself with polytheism in the religions of mankind' (Hastings, *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, x, p. 113). Between China and Japan we have

a contrast in respect of mythology similar to that of Rome and Greece. Bald prose is found on the one hand, and rich poetry on the other. Greece represents the gods in the likeness of man, Japan by a symbolical object. Greece makes its gods beautiful, India hideous; for the first the gods are comprehensible, finite, for the second incomprehensible, infinite. A fusion of tribes or nations produces sometimes syncretism, as in Amon-Ra in Egypt, and sometimes the exaltation of the god of the predominant partner, as Marduk in Babylon. One order of gods may be suppressed in favour of another, as the *asuras* by the *devas* in India. Where the ritual dominates the religion, the means of worship become deified, as Agni, Soma, Brahman in India also. While Heaven is usually the father, and Earth is the mother, by an accident of grammatical gender in Egypt the earth (Geb) is masculine and the heaven or sky (Nut) is feminine, and the myths have to be modified accordingly. While in most languages the gender of the sun is masculine, and of the moon feminine, in German it is the reverse. These are but a few of the instances which might be given to show the differences as well as resemblances in the mythology about the gods.

(*b*) A speculative development of polytheism is pantheism, but only a comparatively few polytheisms reach this stage. Brahmanism is the 'most imposing of all the systems of pantheism which can claim a religious origin'. Brahman is the only reality, and

the world as distinct from it is *Maya*, illusion. In Egypt syncretism leads towards pantheism, as the fusion of one deity with another prepares for the conception of all the deities as manifestations of Ra. In Persia one school of Zoroastrian thinkers, the Zervanites, tried to get beyond the dualism of Ormuzd and Ahriman to space or time as a first principle, but the religion remained unaffected by their speculation. According to the Stoics, the universe was the σῶμα, or body, and God the πνεῦμα, or soul; the one reality is seen in the aspect of multiplicity or of unity.

(*c*) In different religions there is a cosmic principle affirmed. In China, the *Tao* is Heaven's Way, the course and order of nature, and also the guide for man. This conception is common to Confucianism and Taoism, although it has been more practically developed in the one, and more speculatively in the other. Common to Hinduism and Buddhism is the conception of *Karma*, the law of the permanent result of action in perpetuating existence. In Greece 'sometimes there rises, behind and above Zeus, the vague and but faintly personified power of fate (Μοῖρα, Αἶσα) or of the moral and social order (Θέμις, Δίκη), something like the Vedic Rita and the Avestan Asha' (Moore's *History of Religions*, i, p. 431). In Greek thought there is the idea of the λόγος, the rational principle of the Universe. Borrowed by Philo, the Jewish philosopher, through the Fourth Gospel it gained an assured place in Christian thought, and exercised a dominating influence on the development

of Christology. This was the more easily effected as in Hebrew literature itself there are the personifications of the Word and the Wisdom of God. 'What is said of Vohu Mano ("Good Mind") in the Gathas is sometimes strikingly similar to what Philo says about the Logos. . . . The conception in the Gathas is, however, vastly simpler than Philo's. Ahura Mazda is no transcendental absolute, but a living god, and his Good Mind is not a metaphysical link between unchanging being and the manifold and changing world of becoming, but an hypostasis of the intelligence and goodness with which God created the world' (*op. cit.*, pp. 381–2). This quotation calls attention to a necessary caution in such comparisons; superficial resemblances may cover essential differences.

(*d*) An illustration of this is afforded by the Hindu Trimūrti and the Christian Trinity. 'Beside Vishnu and Çiva stands Brahma, the All-Father—the personal god whom theistic religion made out of the metaphysical absolute Brahman (neuter)—and forms with them a triad (trimūrti). In what may be called the orthodox, that is, the Brahmanical, form of this triad, Brahman, the Absolute, manifests himself in three persons of equal rank—Brahma, the creator, Vishnu, the preserver, and Çiva, the destroyer. Kalidasa sings:

"In these Three Persons the one God was shown,
Each first in place, each last—not one alone;
Of Çiva, Vishnu, Brahma, each may be
First, second, third, among the Blessed Three."'

(Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 344). Here the starting-point is the popular polytheism. Vishnu and Çiva were the objects worshipped by rival sects. Brahma was the personal god whom the theistic sects substituted for the impersonal Brahman. The end is the speculative pantheism by which the thinkers tried to justify their toleration of polytheism; a device, too, by which Brahmanism regained its hold over popular cults. How entirely unlike in origin, in character, and value is the Christian doctrine of the Trinity!

(*e*) As superficial is the resemblance and as essential the difference between the Hindu myths of incarnation and the Christian fact. 'On the Vishnuite side, Vishnu is not so much worshipped in his own person as some of his incarnations (*avatāras*, descents), foremost among which are Krishna and Rama. The doctrine of incarnation is specifically Vishnuite. "Every time that religion is in danger and that iniquity triumphs," says the god in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, "I issue forth. For the defence of the good and the suppression of the wicked, for the establishment of justice, I manifest myself from age to age." A complete Avatāra is not a mere self-manifestation of God in a human form nor the production of an intermediate being, but a real incarnation of the supreme God in a human being, who is at the same time truly God and truly man; and this union of two natures is not dissolved by death, but continues to eternity. The importance of this theory is obvious; it gave men gods who were truly and

completely human, who contended and suffered in men's behalf; gods who could be touched with the feeling of our infirmities because they were tried in all points as we are; gods whom men could not only revere across the awful distance between finite and infinite, but love, as they loved their fellows, and be assured of God's responsive love. On the other hand, the theory made it possible to transform all the native religions of India into orthodox Vishnuism by merely declaring the old gods incarnations of Vishnu; even animal worship created no difficulty, for Vishnu had repeatedly been embodied in an animal' (*op. cit.*, pp. 329–30). This quotation has been given at such length as it states the theory in the most appreciative way possible, and probably reads into it more Christian meaning than it really holds. But even in this statement the difference from the Christian doctrine is manifest. (α) Here again is an artificial creation to reconcile popular polytheism and speculative pantheism. (β) The incarnations are manifold, and so polytheism is not transcended. (γ) The incarnations are not necessarily in human nature or form. Vishnu is incarnated as fish, tortoise, boar, man-lion, dwarf, Rama with the axe, Rama, Krishna, Buddha, Kalki or Kalkin. (δ) Krishna is the most popular of these incarnations, and some writers have discovered that there is a connexion between his name and Christ. That Christian legends may have had some influence on the development of the Krishna cult is held by

some scholars. The moral character of Krishna is so defective that Holtzmann has properly remarked: 'What fatality impelled the Indians to elevate such a man into an incarnation of the Supreme Deity is an, as yet, unsolved enigma' (quoted by Slater, *The Higher Hinduism*, p. 129). It is another instance of the lack of moral insight which characterizes Hindu religion.

(*f*) When the Mahayana Buddhism developed the conception 'of a supreme being endowed with all perfections', called Dharmakaya, 'Body of the Law', man might be regarded pantheistically as an incarnation of that supreme being. 'In an eminent sense the Buddhas are manifestations or incarnations of the Dharmakaya' (*Note* 'incarnation' in a docetic sense); 'in a later time even the word *avatāra* is used, as of the incarnations of Vishnu, and doubtless under the influence of Vishnuite notions. . . . Sakyamuni, whom we call the historical Buddha, was such a manifestation' (Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 309). 'Legend surrounded Buddha's birth and enlightenment with miracles significant of the fact that the whole universe, gods, devils, and inanimate nature, were not merely spectators, but impassioned actors in the drama of salvation; he descended from the Tusita heaven to become incarnate in the womb of Maya' (*op. cit.*, p. 302). 'After seven days of fasting and seclusion the pure and holy Maya dreams that she is carried by archangels to heaven, and that there the future Buddha enters her

right side in the form of a superb white elephant.' (*Note*: 'In the *Lalita Vistara* this dream so far becomes reality that the Buddha actually descends from heaven in the form referred to.') 'During the ten months of his life in the womb the child is distinctly visible, sitting cross-legged, unsoiled, and dignified; and he preaches to the angels who guard him, stretching out his hands to do so without wounding his mother' (Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 183–5). These details have been quoted to cast into bolder relief the contrast between these extravagant myths and the beautiful and simple story of the birth of Jesus. There are scholars with so little judgement or taste that they would derive the one from the other, although the probabilities are all entirely against their assumption. These legends are late in date, and there is no evidence that they were or could be known in Palestine, or, if known, that they would or could have been used by the evangelists, or in the traditions, purely Jewish in their spirit and character, which they incorporated into their Gospels. To the Christian story of the Incarnation there are no parallels in moral value or religious significance.

(*g*) That the stories of the Creation, the Fall, and the Flood are derived from Babylonian mythology is now generally agreed among scholars, even although they have been transformed to be congruous with the monotheistic religion by which they have been adopted. The anthropology of the Old Testament has some like-

ness to that found in China. Man is living soul because God has breathed into the dust His Spirit. Flesh and Spirit are the two aspects of man as living soul. In Paul's psychology flesh acquires a moral import as *the seat and vehicle of sin*, and spirit a religious content as *the nature renewed by the spirit of God*. Chinese cosmology recognizes two principles, Yang and Yin. The primal matter 'gyrating through a long period, divided into two parts, one of which being gross and heavy (the Yin) precipitated to form the earth; the other, being finer and lighter (the Yang) remained in suspension to form the heavens.' . . . 'The word Yang has also come to mean the sun, and Yin the moon, but they also mean light and darkness, and in the course of time have come to connote a wide variety of antinomial ideas, such as positive and negative, male and female, and so on' (Soothill, *The Three Religions of China*, p. 186). 'The dualistic doctrine is also carried into the moral world, for virtue is recognized as yang, while vice is yin. In consequence the man who is full of virtue is also full of yang, and this yang influence going out of him is able to overcome every kind of yin, or evil, influence' (p. 192). 'It is at a still later period that we begin to find the individual soul considered as a duality, its yin part being represented by the kuei or anima, and its yang part by the shên or animus. The kuei in this development represents the animal soul, the passions or lower part of the nature, and the shên represents

the higher part of the organism' (p. 203). A similar dualism meets us in Greek thought in the opposition of ὕλη and νοῦς, matter and mind. The religion in which this dualism is the distinctive feature is Zoroastrianism, where Ormuzd and Ahriman, light and darkness, contend for mastery.

(*h*) In many religions there is a tendency to mysticism, which isolates and over-accentuates the emotional element in religion, the intense and even ecstatic experience of immediate contact with the divine. (*α*) Even in China there is this strain. 'Laocius presents us with an impersonal Tao, that is to say, an impersonal Principle or Power, which, viewed in the absolute sense, is inscrutable, indefinable, and impossible to name. Viewed in its relative sense, it appears under many disguises, and in every part of the universe. It cannot be correctly translated as God. Indeed, in one obscure passage he says, "It appears to have been before God." Tao is, however, the source and support of all things. Calmly, without effort, and unceasingly, it works for good; and man by yielding himself to it unresisting, unstriving, may reach his highest well-being. Suffering is the result of man's departure from the Tao state of pristine innocence and simplicity. It would be well to give up all study and the pursuit of knowledge, and to return to the absolutely simple life of Tao. War, striving, suffering would then all cease, and, floating along the placid river of time the individual in due

course would be absorbed in the ocean of Tao' (Soothill, *op. cit.*, pp. –50). (β) India, however, is *par excellence* the land of mysticism. The extreme form of it is in the Upanishads. 'Man was not delivered from passion and unrest by doing but by knowing. His slavery was a slavery to ignorance (*avidyā*); not, indeed, to ignorance in general, but ignorance of this great supreme fact, hidden from him by a thick veil until he becomes illumined, that his own soul, ātman, his real self, is not distinct from, but is identical with the niversal soul, the Brahman. Then is he at rest' (Geden, *op. cit.*, p. 282). 'For this identity of Brahman and Ātman the pregnant formula is found in the "great word" *tat tvam asi*, "That art Thou"' (Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 274). A modified form of this mysticism is found in the popular religion, of which the text-book was the *Bhagavad-gītā*. 'The watchword of the faith was *bhakti*, love or mystical devotion and clinging of the soul to the object of its worship. . . . The human soul that becomes resigned to God in perfect submission and devotion to Him (*bhakti*) is thereby delivered from all evil, and lives henceforth and after death a life of conscious bliss which will have no end' (Geden, *op. cit.*, p. 346). The derivation of the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvana from this circle of thought is evident. (γ) Even in Islam, deistic and legalist as is its orthodox form, there has been a pantheistic-mystical development in Sufiism. 'All souls, all beings, proceed from the one Divine

soul, and to Him they will return. The supreme duty of man, therefore, is to love God, who is himself perfect love, and thus by abstraction and meditation on His nature and unity to hasten the final absorption into the one Divine essence. All religion further is a matter of indifference, except so far as it promotes this great end; Islām is the best religion, because it most assists man to attain union with God . . . . The Sūfi who has reached the goal of oneness with God possesses an "inner Light", an infallible guide, in comparison with which the dictates of reason and sense are misleading, and require to be ignored. Since, moreover, God is the sole reality, all actions, good or evil, are to be ascribed to Him; and moral responsibility, as far as man is concerned, does not exist. In harmony with this teaching, many of the Sūfis have in fact professedly cast off all the restraints of morality and religion' (Geden, *op. cit.*, pp. 855–6). (*δ*) It is not necessary to give an account of Neo-Platonism, the mysticism in which Graeco-Roman paganism tried to stem the flowing tide of the Christian faith, nor of the Christian mysticism which was influenced by it through the Pseudo-Dionysius, and his translator Scotus Erigena, as these are more familiar, but a comparison of all these forms of mysticism is of the greatest possible value.

(*i*) Sacrifice is an institution common to all religions, but regarding its origin and significance there is still much dispute. I have written on this subject

more fully elsewhere,[1] and need only to reproduce a few sentences here. (*α*) 'One of the most obvious explanations is this, that just as the worshipper was pleased to get gifts, so he believed his god would be, and as he tried to please men with offerings, so he endeavoured to please his god' (p. 80. Cf. Mic. vi. 6–7). 'Herbert Spencer connects this view with his own peculiar theory of the origin of religion in ghost-worship, i.e. "the refreshments placed for the dead developed into sacrifices".' According to the *table-bond* theory 'in the sacrificial meal the worshipper and the object of his worship strengthened the bonds of friendship, confirmed the covenant between them.' As, however, animal food is not commonly used, this explanation is not adequate; and it has been 'developed by the late W. Robertson Smith into what may be described as the theory of a *materialistic sacramental communion of the deity and his worshippers.* This view assumes that sacrifice has its roots in *totemism*' (p. 81). Totemism has already been dealt with, and has been shown not to be universal, a stage through which all religions have passed. Accordingly 'it is probable that this account of sacrifice is too exclusive, and that other conceptions and motives must be recognized in its development.' Probably the thank-offering came first, was followed by the gift to win favour, and then when the moral conscience developed, sacrifice was invested with atoning efficacy

[1] *The Christian Certainty*, pp. 72–92, Hodder and Stoughton, 1910.

(p. 84). (*β*) 'As an instance of the first kind of sacrifice may be mentioned the offering of the first-fruits by the Basutos, with the words, "Thank you, gods, give us bread to-morrow also".' The second has its motive frankly revealed in the classic phrases: *Δῶρα θεοὺς πείθει*, 'do ut des', and this is confirmed in the Rig-Veda and the Babylonian hymns. The idea of vicarious sacrifice to atone for sin is expressly stated in the Greek word *ἀντίψυχος*, 'given for a life', and is found in Homer's *Iliad* (ix), in Vergil's *Aeneid*, 'Unum pro multis dabitur caput' (v. 815), Sophocles, the Babylonian Psalms, the Rig-Veda, and even in Chinese literature. Among the Aztecs there were rites, in which by partaking of a broken emblem of the deity, communion with him in the sense of appropriation of his supernatural virtue was sought (Réville's *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 92, 102, 104). In Hindu mythology creation is conceived as a sacrifice of the god Purusha, and from different parts of his divided body the four castes were derived (see Monier Williams, *Hinduism*, p. 31). (*γ*) This subject is of special interest in view of the sacrificial import assigned by Christian faith to the Cross of Christ. Vain, however, is the endeavour to explain that Cross by these sacrifices. Its moral and spiritual significance alone gives them meaning as the imperfect promise of which it is the perfect fulfilment, the human cry to which it is the divine answer.

(*j*) The last illustration of the comparative study of religions which may here be given is the hope

of the future life. A belief in the survival of the soul after death in a world of shades is universal; but as such a survival is rather a doom to be dreaded than a boon to be craved, it cannot be called a hope; but the belief was so modified as to become a hope. 'There are three different paths which the human spirit has followed in its quest for a life worth living after death. One path leads back again to this pleasant world of earthly experience. It is the doctrine of the resurrection. A second finds in the underworld moral values no less real and no less enduring than those met with here. It is the conception of a judgement in the realm of the dead. The third ascends the unscaled peaks where the human spirit had its birth, and finds an unsuspected kinship between the soul and its Maker, which warrants belief in an endless existence. It is the doctrine of the immortality of the soul' (Brown, *The Christian Hope*, pp. 26–7). (*a*) The first doctrine is found in Zoroastrianism, and is connected with the final triumph of Ormuzd (Ahura-Mazda) and Ahriman (Angra-Mainyush). It was not borrowed by the Hebrew religion, as it is an indigenous growth, at least as far as the rising again of the righteous in the Messianic age is concerned, but Persian thought did influence later Jewish thought as seen in the Apocalyptic literature. This view was taken over by the Christian church from Judaism; and its essential truth, but not its accidental form, has been confirmed by Christ's victory

over death. (β) The second doctrine of judgement after death is very prominent in Egyptian religion, especially *The Book of the Dead*, a guide to the unseen world. But it meets us also in Persia and Greece. (γ) The third doctrine of immortality in India assumes the form of belief in the transmigration of the soul from one bodily form to another in a succession of lives, the character of each of which is determined by the resultant of the preceding one. In this form, too, it was held by Pythagoras, if we may trust the satire of Xenophanes. How fully and worthily the belief in immortality as the liberation of the soul from the body was taught by Socrates, Plato, and Sophocles is well known to all who have any acquaintance with the itself immortal literature of Greece. As far as the religious consciousness is concerned, its universal testimony is that death does not end all, although in different religions the conceptions of the hereafter are varied in details; but all can be referred to one or other of the three types which have been mentioned, each of which enters into the Christian hope.

(8) In the preceding pages no attempt has been made at an exhaustive or systematic treatment. A venture of this kind has been made in MacCulloch's *Comparative Theology*, to which the reader who desires to pursue the subject further may be referred. All that is here intended is to illustrate the comparative method so as to awaken an interest in, and afford some

guidance for its use. The more extensive and accurate the study the deeper will become the conviction, as I believe, that wherever there is sincere religion there is genuine revelation, although the communication of divine truth and grace is, and must always be, limited and conditioned by the stage of human development which has been reached. The Christian revelation will not be depreciated; it will be more fully appreciated not in isolation from, but in the context of this wider revelation of God to mankind. The best does not condemn the good and the better, but rather discloses the promise they hold of advance, or the peril that threatens them of stagnation or even retrogression. To yield its full benefit this study must be pursued without prejudice or partiality; but this does not involve either indifference or neutrality. So pursued it may prepare the student for the more difficult and yet inevitable task of the judgement of value as the issue of the comparative study of religions.

IX

THE METHOD OF JUDGEMENT

(1) If we are entitled to reach judgements of value in the comparative study of religions, we must beware of letting them sink into merely subjective taste, about which there can be no general agreement. We must lay down certain principles. (*a*) The primary test must be this: how far does the religion give religious satisfaction? In answering this question we must, however, distinguish between an actual and an ideal, a local and a universal, a temporary and a permanent satisfaction. The etsfihist may be altogether satisfied with his worship, but this does not prove the worth of fetishism. Ought he to be satisfied? Would he be satisfied if a satisfaction were offered to him in another religion which answered the questions of his reason, met the aspirations of his heart, and fulfilled the demands of his conscience more thoroughly and enduringly than can his fetishism? There is being worked out in human history an ideal of manhood, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral, which with the increasing contact of nations is becoming more and more a world-wide possession, and does not remain fixed, but advances in man's conception of it even as

it is being realized. It is this ideal manhood for which religious satisfaction must be found, and it is this of which we must always be thinking as we judge any religion, not merely whether it gives local and temporary satisfaction to individuals, nations, and races at a low stage of development. Contact with a new religion may discover to a man hitherto satisfied new needs and aspirations which it alone can satisfy. Christ discovers the soul to itself as no other master yet has done. There may be little sense of sin in a religion, and thus no need of atonement may be felt. Will that need not be felt, however, when that sense is awakened? We cannot acquiesce in the idea that each nation or race is to be left at the stage of development it has now reached. We must desire the progress of all peoples towards the realization of a common human ideal, and to this and nothing less must correspond the standard of religious satisfaction which we apply in our judgement of value. (*b*) Accordingly we must take each of the forms which the ideal for man assumes and apply that as a test. Man seeks for truth; he can feel beauty and try to produce it; he strives for holiness. A religion which will satisfy the fully developed man intellectually, aesthetically, and morally must possess mental adequacy, aesthetic attraction, and, most of all, moral efficacy. We may pass over aesthetic attractiveness as of less importance. Not all men feel the need of beauty; and however desirable it is that good taste should be as

widely diffused as possible, we must admit that the welfare of mankind depends less on beauty than on truth and holiness. A true and holy religion will tend to become a beautiful religion also, as there is a correspondence in the development of varied human functions. More needs to be said, however, about *mental adequacy*. Science and philosophy are not the peculiar possession of a few nations, but are being diffused throughout the whole world, and no religion can hope to hold the whole human race that cannot justify itself to the reason which is becoming common to all mankind. Polytheism is necessarily condemned by thought on the Universe, for *pluralism* must be regarded as only a 'freak' philosophy; and, in spite of the extravagances of some types of *monism*, belief in the ultimate unity of all reality is an imperative necessity of the mind. The cosmologies of polytheism must go with it also; and only the religions that can detach themselves from polytheism and its cosmology can survive the influence of modern science and philosophy. If the Christian missionary desires to offer to his hearers a theology which will have the necessary mental adequacy, he must be prepared to regard the Bible from the standpoint of modern scholarship, and not lay on Christian faith the burden of the Hebrew cosmology, anthropology, or psychology. The monotheistic doctrine of creation in Genesis is altogether reconcilable with the modern doctrine of evolution, but not so are the details of the process of

creation, or man's constitution and primitive condition, as given in Genesis i–iii. There are other points of contact between religion and science or philosophy; but this is the crux of the relation, and it is for this reason that the question has been raised at all by way of illustration of the general principle under discussion.

(*c*) More important still as a test of the value of a religion is its moral efficacy. But in judging this we must always remember the distinction already discussed between what a religion intends (its ideal) and what it effects (its actuality), for men know and approve the better in their profession, and follow the worse in their practice. As we have no right to hold Christianity as such responsible for the intemperance and the prostitution which are found in Christian lands, so we must be careful not to hold Hinduism responsible for all the moral evils which we discover in India. The relation between the religion and the morality can be regarded from four points of view.

(α) There are moral evils which a religion condemns, and which a devout adherent of it will avoid, such as the use of intoxicating liquors by a Moslem, or sexual indulgence by a Christian.

(β) There are moral evils which a religion condemns, but which it has not an influence general or potent enough to prevent in at least its nominal adherents; e. g. intemperance and impurity are not unknown among professing Christians and the use of intoxicating liquors among Moslems.

(γ) There are moral evils which a religion tolerates, because it lacks the moral insight to recognize that they are evils to be condemned, for instance, the hypocrisy and casuistry of Pharisaic Judaism, the infanticide of China.

(δ) There are moral evils to which a religion may give its sanction, and may even grant a place in its worship, as polygamy and slavery in the social order of Islam, and lust and cruelty in the worship of Hinduism, and caste in its social system.

(ε) Before we form a final judgement regarding the moral efficacy of a religion even in regard to the moral evils that it approves, we must go to the history of the religion, or the people professing it, and this will often offer an answer which will lead us to temper judgement with mercy. At a time when every stranger was a foe, slavery was the milder and more merciful alternative to extermination. Polygamy finds at least a partial explanation in economic conditions. With the abounding prostitution of our great cities, and the sweated toil which we have only in recent years been taking steps to end in some of our industries, we cannot make polygamy and slavery a deadly reproach against a less advanced stage of civilization, however much we may wish and seek to bring all other nations up to the highest ideal of Christian monogamy and liberty.

(ζ) In partial explanation of the discrepancy between the morality associated with a religion and the

moral standard in the community professing it may be noted the stronger tendency towards conservatism in religion than in morality. Customs and rites invested with sacredness are not so easily abandoned as those which possess only a social sanction. It has again and again occurred even in Christendom that creed has needed and for a time resisted the criticism of conscience. The survival of the belief in, and the persecution of, witchcraft even after the Reformation may be taken as an example.

(η) We must not then condemn as deliberate wickedness, although we may deplore as injurious mistake, this persistence of a lower moral stage under the approval of religion. We may certainly criticize a religion for not possessing the motive and spirit of progress; but we must not regard as proof of moral depravity all in another religion that to us appears evil. If the heathens were as bad at heart as their lives seem to us, the attempt to win them for Christ would be very much less hopeful than it really is.

(d) A striking proof of the insufficiency of a religion is its displacement by another, or more often the formation of sects within it. Even before there was any contact with Christianity this judgement of history was shown. Buddhism met a need that Brahmanism had failed to meet; and it was superseded in India only when Brahmanism had been so modified in Hinduism that it made a more effectual popular appeal. Buddhism itself in its original form, the *Hinayana*,

when it spread abroad, soon showed its own limitations, and a wider range of influence was given to it in its modified form, the *Mahayana*, which provided an object for faith such as the rule of life had not done. This contrast is indicated in the name the adherents of the later form claimed for themselves, Mahayana, 'the great vehicle', and the contemptuous term they applied to the older form, Hinayana, 'the little vehicle'.[1] In Hinduism again we have the rise of the *bhakti marga* in contrast to the *jnana marga* and the *karma marga*, personal devotion to a deity taking the place of asceticism and ritualism. In Persia the Shiite or heretical type of Islam offers doctrines of incarnation and atonement, unknown to the Sunnite or orthodox type of Arabia. Even Confucianism cannot satisfy China, but Taoism and Buddhism there supply what it lacks.[2]

[1] 'The Mahayana is the Buddhism which, inspired by a progressive spirit, broadened its original scope, so far as it did not contradict the inner significance of the teaching of the Buddha, and which assimilated other religio-philosophical beliefs within itself, whenever it felt that, by so doing, people of more widely different characters and intellectual endowment could be saved' (D. T. Suzuki, *Outline of Mahayana Buddhism*, p. 10, quoted by Tasuku Harada, *The Faith of Japan*, p. 79).

[2] 'The deficiency of Confucianism in making little or no provision, beyond a calm stoicism, for the spiritual demands of human nature has been supplied by the more spiritual provision of Buddhism, and the indefiniteness of Confucius as to a continued existence after death has been met by the more definite Taoist dogma of immortality. The three are complementary rather than antagonistic to each other, and together they make a fuller provision for human needs than any one of them does separately. Consequently no clear line of demarcation exists between them. For general purposes we may say that the shrines of each are open to all and availed of by all' (W. E. Soothill, *The Three Religions of China*, p. 3).

(*e*) The rise of new religions or of sects within an old religion disproves the assumption often made that each race or nation has the religion best suited to it, and that consequently foreign missions are an unnecessary interference with the best natural order. The characteristics of a religion are determined by geographical, racial, economic, and social conditions; but these are not invariably fixed. Variation rather than permanence is the mark of the religious life of mankind. Contact with another people, an advance in culture and civilization, improvement in economic or social conditions have always affected, and cannot but affect, the religion of a nation. The influence of the hunting, pastoral, and agricultural stages have already been illustrated. The conquests of Alexander the Great and the spread of the Roman Empire promoted the widespread movement of syncretism and mystery religions which confronts us in the early centuries of the Christian era. The contact of Africa and Asia with Europe at the present moment is so altering the total conditions that it would be absurd to maintain that religions which on the whole corresponded with the totality of the conditions of life in a former age will continue to possess even such relative value as might have been before claimed for them. A new religious provision must be made to meet new needs as they emerge.

(2) An experiment in what may be called the laboratory of actuality is being made all over the world,

wherever Christianity, or the culture or civilization of Christendom, comes into contact with any other religion. The Hindu student of physical science cannot continue to hold the Hindu cosmology. Confucianism cannot regulate the intercourse of China with the world. Bushido cannot afford guidance in the new industrial progress of Japan. That evil as well as good goes along with Christendom must be admitted. But apart from this evil, the impact of it on other races must be disturbing to current beliefs and customs. And surely the religion which has been able to maintain its testimony and increase its influence amid the disturbing forces in Christendom is best fitted to replace the ancestral faith in those lands in which these new conditions are coming in as a flood. What is the attitude towards Christianity that this contact produces?

(*a*) There is a vast mass in whom religion is what we may call 'second-hand' tradition and convention, and who may for a long time remain content. The faith they profess has hitherto done so little for them that even the loss of it would affect them very little. Have we not in our midst a mass of indifference? Do not some men and women give up Christianity very easily? It is not here that the interest and the promise of this contact lies.

(*b*) On the other hand there are in heathen lands a few elect souls who, while cherishing their own faith, have never found full satisfaction in it, and who, therefore,

are ready to welcome any new light which may fall on their darkness. The earliest converts in many a mission field have been of this type. The gracious invitation of Jesus in Matthew xi. 28–30 surely has reference to this type, which is not confined to one land or one age. It is possible, however, that the dissatisfaction begins only when the Gospel is heard. Christ may Himself by His Spirit in His Word awaken the needs and aspirations He alone can satisfy. Two illustrations of the way in which such souls are led to Christ may be given from the *Report of the World Missionary Conference*, 1910. (*α*) 'An Indian pastor in South India writes: "Dissatisfied with my ancestral religion, Hinduism, I turned to the New Testament to find whether Christianity would satisfy me. The Sermon on the Mount and some of the parables struck me as unique. What finally helped me to accept Christ as my personal Saviour was the sense of my sins, Christ's claim to save men from their sins, and the testimony of Dr. Pentecost to the fact that Christ had forgiven him his sins and had saved him"' (vol. iv, pp. 211–2). (*β*) 'Very interesting is the story told by the Rev. R. A. Hume of the experience of a Brahmin who is now an instructor in a theological seminary. What led him to Christ was not dissatisfaction with self, nor desire for personal salvation, but pain at the injury to the national life of India through the divisiveness of Hindu caste. His intense love of his country made him long for a religion which would

unite all Indians. At first he thought of Mohammedanism, and studied it, but with it he was dissatisfied because its teaching and much of its history depended on compulsion. Then he thought to develop an eclectic religion. He retired from the world to a mountain to think out the evolution of a new religion for India. Later, on a railway journey, he met a European, who handed him a New Testament, and asked him to study about Christ. The teachings and character of Jesus, which he found in the New Testament, and, later, intercourse with Christians, led him to make the Lord Jesus his Guru. So he became a Christian because he believed that, through the teachings and power of Christ, his beloved India might become purified and united. This patriotism gives him a unique power over educated non-Christians' (p. 213). (γ) Such converts may help us to discover fresh treasures in Christ for ourselves. Asia and Africa may teach Europe to see in Christ much to which hitherto its eyes have been hidden. Missionaries would contribute to the progress of Christian thought if they would gather as they have opportunity such 'human documents'. But a word of caution must be added. To do this properly they must be trained observers; and they must be able also to distinguish the standpoint of the observer (the psychological) from the standpoint of the experient (the psychical), the conversion as it appears to them, and the conversion as the convert is himself aware of

it. Further, even as regards the self-witness of the convert, some allowance must be made for the change of standpoint which his conversion has involved. The Hindu's reminiscences are almost inevitably coloured by the Christian's reflections. How difficult, and yet how delightful, a study this should prove!

(*c*) This state of dissatisfaction, whether prior to or consequent on contact with the Gospel, may not at once lead to acceptance. As in Paul's case, there may be a kicking against the goads. (*α*) The most violent antagonism may be the evidence of growing conviction, and may issue in final submission. A man often fights his hardest when he is nearest giving in. Hostility should be much more welcome than indifference. The man who holds his own faith so lightly that he will easily and quickly give it up is not the convert most to be desired. He who is a firm believer in his own religion is likely, when once won, to be a steadfast Christian. The greatest of the apostles was the most vehement of the persecutors. The antagonism a religion offers is proof not of weakness but of strength; it shows that it has reality and potency for those who profess it.

(*β*) As we are here solely concerned with what the impact of Christianity on other religions can teach us about it and them, other causes, such as the social bondage of caste in Hinduism, which lead to opposition, need not now be mentioned; but one cause of opposition which arises within the distinctive character

of the religion itself, and throws a light also on how Christianity may appear to the adherent of it, may be given. In Japan 'the most determined opposition to Christianity has sprung, strange as it may seem, from distrust of its ethical principles. For Japanese critics assert that neither loyalty nor filial piety finds clear expression in Christianity; and since these two principles are the very central pillars of Japanese morality, a religion that slights them is considered not only unsuited, but a positive menace to the nation' (Tasuku Harada, *The Faith of Japan*, p. 160). There are an individualism and a cosmopolitanism within Christendom that are a misapplication of the Christian principles of the worth of every soul and the love of all mankind which give some ground for such opposition; and the objection calls for careful definition of these principles to show that, properly understood, they are not open to it. The motive of antagonism may be worthy, and the representative of the Gospel must ask himself how far he is responsible for it by himself in life or teaching misrepresenting Christ and His Gospel.

(*d*) Even when opposition can no longer be maintained, acceptance need not at once follow. Racial or national sentiment, or prejudice, in measure justified by the dealings of Europe with other continents, against the bearers of the Gospel rather than the Gospel itself, may issue in the endeavour to revise the inherited faith, and even to assimilate it with

Christianity. Neo-Islam, Neo-Hinduism, and Neo-Buddhism as attempts to set up an obstacle to the advancing tide of the Gospel are full of interest and promise. They prove how deep an impression has been made, and hold out the prospect of final success for Christianity. Neo-Platonism is a token for good; for as it failed to arrest the progress of Christianity, so may we anticipate that its modern counterparts will fail. In what they have abandoned of the old and accepted of the new from the Gospel, they do homage to it. The inconsistency involved in such movements has been very properly pointed out by Mr. Slater, a missionary who for many years laboured among the more highly educated classes in India. 'While the changes desired in the political and social spheres is a change *onward* in the direction of the progressive institutions of the West, the proposed change that holds the ground at present in the field of religion is a change *backward* to the ancient thought and ideals of the East. In political and social matters faith is to be exercised in the principles of evolutionary development and progressive life; while in religious matters, which form the foundation of the other two, a retrogressive step is to be taken. Such guides as the late Swāmi Vivekānanda and Mrs. Annie Besant have affirmed that the future greatness of India must rest, not on going forward with the rest of the world, but on going back to the spiritual teachings of the past. They would recall India to her

ancient knowledge and ancient worship. But the stubborn fact to be noted is that they did not save the country from degenerating. A tree is judged by its fruits. If the ancient spirituality was so lofty, why was it not retained? Why has it not been a mighty conserving power throughout the land?' (*The Higher Hinduism*, p. 287.)

(*e*) The last stage is acceptance when resistance is no longer possible, because the insufficiency of the old religion, even if revived, and the sufficiency which is in Christ alone, have at last been recognized. While this submission to Christ is to be desired, it is also to be desired that there were in some of the converts more independence and originality, less imitativeness of the beliefs and habits of the missionary. In the past history of religion there have been action and reaction; and we should not expect the forms of Christianity to remain altogether unaffected by the type of thought and life which these new converts have inherited. Christianity is adaptable, and while there might be an adaptation which involved surrender of distinctive and essential features, there is an adaptation which, while preserving the Christian type, would enrich the religious development by such contributions as other types of religion might be fitted to impart to it. Christ comes to fulfil, to carry on to completion, and not to destroy, not only the Old Testament religion, but also the ethnic faiths. May not Hindu caste, and Chinese ancestor-worship, and

Japanese bushido die to their present defects, and rise again in what is good in them in Christ? Again I can appeal to the authority of Mr. Slater. 'Vedāntic thought is so thoroughly Indian that the *Indian Christianity* of the future will of necessity take a Vedāntic colouring. Each nation of the world, and each great religion, is the manifestation of a human want; and the demand of the Indian heart is for a fixed, unchangeable foundation on which the soul may rest amid the changes of this fleeting world. The God whom India seeks and must find is a God who is Eternal and Unchangeable, and who abides in the heart, whose true home is the inmost soul of man. The West has to learn from the East, and the East from the West. The questions raised by the Vedānta will have to pass into Christianity if the best minds of India are to embrace it, and the Church of the "farther East" will doubtless contribute something to the thought of Christendom of the science of the soul, and of the omnipenetrativeness and immanence of deity' (*The Higher Hinduism*, pp. 290–1). For the student of religions this contact of Christianity with other religions, and the consequent mutual influence, is a subject of intense interest and supreme importance, as he is witnessing a crucial experiment in the laboratory of human history.

(3) An indiscriminate comparison of the contents of all the religions can lead only to mental confusion. Some religions represent so early a stage in the reli-

gious development that it would be profitless to begin comparing them with religions which have made a very great advance. Some religions are so limited by the conditions under which they exist that they need not be considered even for a moment as rivals of the religions which are fitted to make and do make a much more general appeal. Where there is a marked difference of type in two religions, little would be gained by any comparison of any of their details. The mere fact of being religions is of too general a character to be the basis on which any attempt at a judgement of value can be made; and what is needed as a preliminary inquiry to any such attempt is a classification of religions, even although some scholars have abandoned the effort as not promising any satisfactory result.

(*a*) 'Older classifications,' says Galloway, 'like that of Hegel, are too much biased by speculative ideas, and in the light of modern knowledge are out of date.[1] More recently Siebeck, in his *Religionsphilosophie*, divides religions into Primitive Religion, Morality-Religion, and Redemptive Religion. But the division is bound up with a particular theory of the nature of religion, which is at least arguable, and the line of demarcation between Morality-Religion and Redemptive Religion is by no means clear. (*Note.* The prin-

[1] Hegel's view is that the religions of the East made God all, the religion of Greece put man in the forefront; Christianity as the absolute religion unites both in the idea of the God-Man.

ciple which underlies and determines Siebeck's classification is, that the essence of religion is *Weltverneinung*, world renunciation.) Tiele has contented himself with the broad distinction between Nature Religions and Ethical Religions. In theory the distinction is plain, but in practice the boundary between natural and ethical religion is not readily defined. The two shade into one another; and Tiele's classification involves the grouping together of much material of a somewhat heterogeneous character under the general description of "ethical religion". On the whole it is better to follow a mode of division suggested by the historic evolution of religion itself. There are two critical points in the historic development of the religious consciousness: the transition from tribal to national religion, and the transition from national to universal religion' (*The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 88–9).

(*b*) Although the difficulty may be admitted of arranging the religions according to any strict classification, yet for our present purpose it is worth while throwing into prominence certain distinctive features or dominant tendencies in different religions.

(*a*) Attention may first of all be called to the kind of good that is sought in a religion, if not exclusively, yet predominantly. Some religions are concerned almost wholly with *natural* goods; in others there is a growing interest in *moral* goodness, an ever closer alliance of morality with religion; and in others still,

while the moral interest is not ignored, it is the *spiritual* aspiration after God Himself that is supreme. The religions which put natural goods in the forefront belong to a lower stage of development. As religion advances the other interests become more prominent. But the Christian doctrine of providence, God's fatherly care and bounty, meets the needs expressed in these religions.

(β) Confining ourselves now to the religions in which the moral interest is prominent, without the exclusion of the spiritual, in these we may distinguish two types, the *legal* and the *redemptive*. In some religions God is primarily lawgiver; man must fulfil the demands of the law by his own effort, but he looks to God for the reward. In others man recognizing his own moral insufficiency looks to God as Deliverer, or at least Helper. Islam and Pharisaic Judaism are mainly legal. Christianity is redemptive and so are the later form of Buddhism, some of the Hindu sects, and the Shiite sects in Islam. Paul's discontent with Pharisaism, the modification of Buddhism from the Hinayana to the Mahayana type, the doctrine of redemption in Persia, and the *bhakti* type of Hindu piety all bear witness that man is not sufficient unto himself morally, but needs God's succour and assistance.

(γ) When the spiritual good of communion with, or even absorption into the divine is detached from the moral good, there emerges the *mystical* tendency of

which the classic instances are the *jnana marga*, or speculative pantheism of India, and Neo-Platonism. All spiritual religion is so far mystical as it claims an immediate contact, an intimate communion of God and the soul; but in *mysticism* this element in religion is often detached from historical mediation on the one hand and moral activity on the other, and the emotional factor in religion is over-emphasized. In Christianity there is the abiding of the believer in Christ and of Christ in the believer. Paul's experience of union with Christ has been described as his *faith-mysticism*; but it had not the defects just mentioned.

(δ) The *legal* and *mystical* types of religion are one-sided; so also is the *rationalist*. It cannot be said that any historical religion is dominantly rationalist, unduly emphasizing the element of thought. That artificial product, which called itself natural religion, of the deists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may be described as rationalist; and whenever orthodoxy is emphasized the same tendency may be recognized.

(ε) A broad distinction has already been noted between religions which have no history and no literature and those which have a literature, and so afford historical data. As the former belong to the savage peoples, and represent a very low stage of development, we may leave them out of our comparison in trying to reach a judgement of value.

(ζ) In the literary and historical religions a difference is to be noted. Some of these religions stretch back into the dim background of the nation's life; they are of hoary antiquity, they have had great personalities, but cannot be regarded as founded by any one of them. Others have had a definite historical beginning, and claim a single historical founder, who, dissatisfied with the current faith, aimed at meeting better the soul's needs. Brahmanism and Hinduism are very ancient religions, going back beyond the ken of history. There have been founders of sects, but no one personality dominates the religion. Moses, although there were 'the fathers' before him, may be called the founder of the Hebrew religion. Confucius, even if he aimed at only conserving, yet transformed the ancient faith of China, and put the impress of his personality upon it. Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, Mohammedanism by their very names show the importance attached to the founders.

(η) Some of these founded religions, however, have not detached themselves from their historical environment in any marked degree. They bear so distinctly the limitations of nationality, and have been so closely bound up in the life of a nation that they can be described as *national*. Others claim to have a message of value to all mankind, and have sought to spread beyond the bounds of the land of their birth. They are universal in intention, and missionary in

effort. The three religions which make this claim are Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam.

(*c*) The religions may be regarded as superior in the measure in which they seek the moral and the spiritual rather than the natural goods, offer redemption to man, are literary and historical, look back to a great religious personality as founder, and have shown their universal intention by their missionary effort. Hinduism, venerable as is its history if we regard it as continuing the Vedic and Brahmanic religions, abundant as is its literature, alluring as is its speculative thought, is nevertheless so lacking morally, so hurtful socially in its system of caste, so inadequate in meeting man's need of redemption, that it may at once be set aside. Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, even if it were a living faith, as it is not, and Judaism are too limited by national characteristics to put in a claim to be the faith of mankind. It is very remarkable that Judaism is in no way missionary, but is content to hold without sharing its treasure. The religions which thus remain for our final comparison are Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. Neo-Buddhism is asserting itself in opposition to Christian missions in China and Japan. Islam is opposing its propaganda in many parts of Asia, as well as Africa, to that of Christianity. It is probably the most formidable foe of the Cross; as, contrary to theory, experience shows that so far from being a preparation for Christianity among savage or semi-civilized peoples it is the

greatest obstacle to their conversion. The better is here undoubtedly the enemy of the best.[1]

[1] An inquiry regarding the religions of the world as known to the Christian missionary was made by Commission IV in connexion with the World's Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910. On behalf of the London Missionary Society I drew up a short summary of that Report for popular use, and by the kind consent of the Editor that is reproduced in the Appendix to this volume.

X

CHRISTIANITY AND OTHER FAITHS

(1) For the reasons given in the previous chapter we shall confine our comparison of religions, in order to reach a judgement of value, to the three universal religions, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam. It is evident that we should be involved in confusion only if we attempted to compare them in details. There are certain tests which we may broadly apply so as to bring out clearly their differences in their characteristic features as religions. As religion is a relation between God and man, the first question we may ask is, How is the reality of God represented? and the second, What is the ideal that is presented to man? The third inevitably follows, How is the relation between God and man conceived? In answering the third question we are led on to the fourth, What in this relation is promised for the future life as well as performed for this life by God on behalf of man? Lastly, since the founder is determinative of each religion, How do Buddha, Christ, and Mahommed compare as regards character?

(*a*) The earlier form of Buddhism, the Hinayana, did not deny the existence of the gods, but in its scheme of salvation it had no use for them. It told

men to work out their own salvation, but had no assurance to add that God was working in them His good pleasure. Gautama did not even offer himself as a Saviour. Among his last words were these: 'Therefore, Ananda, with yourselves for islands (of safe retreat from the overwhelming floods of desires and lusts) live ye, with yourselves for refuges, with none else for refuges; with the Teachings for an island, with the Teachings for a refuge, with nought else for a refuge' (quoted by Moore, *History of Religions*, i, p. 290). This defect in Buddhism as a religion the Mahayana sought to correct, and to provide a Saviour as well as a teaching about salvation. 'The end which the Mahayana sets before its adherents is a loftier one—not to become a saint and enter upon Nirvana, but to become in some future existence a universal Buddha, a saviour of all beings. Sakyamuni was not the first Buddha; from age to age in the past, when the truths of salvation had been forgotten among men, a Buddha appeared to set the wheel of the law revolving again; in the future, too, the good religion would fall into decadence, and another Buddha would come to restore it. The name of this next Buddha was known; he will be called Maitreya' (*op. cit.*, p. 305). A further step was taken when polytheism was again given a place in Buddhism. 'The missionary success of Buddhism brought into the church as adherents, or as members of the order, multitudes whose religious needs primitive Buddhism.

without god or worship, did not satisfy; and the void was filled by adoration of the Buddhas and by the introduction, in the guise of Buddhist holy ones, of the popular gods of India or of the regions beyond whither the religion spread' (*op. cit.*, p. 81). The historical Buddha never claimed to be divine; in so far as he was afterwards deified, it was as one of a multitude of Buddhas. This relapse into polytheism shows the defect of the original Buddhism in the absence of a satisfying conception of God.

(*b*) The first article of the creed of Islam is that Allah alone is God. It regards the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as a fall into polytheism. How is Allah conceived? 'The attributes are described as seven in number, viz. Life, Knowledge, Power, Will, Hearing, Vision, Speech. The orthodox view is that these are eternal, and a real part of the essence of God; that they are incapable of explanation or comprehension by human reason, but are to be accepted by faith. The second attribute, that of Knowledge, is far more primary and fundamental, for through it the rest are apprehended; and the Divine knowledge is conveyed through the sacred revelation of the Qur'ān. A further distinction is made between the first four attributes, which are essential; the three last are secondary or derivative, being dependent upon the others, and having no existence apart from them. With regard to all of them, however, inquiry or discussion as to their nature was precluded as of subjects beyond the reach

of the mind of man' (Geden's *Studies in the Religions of the East*, pp. 829–30). Neither Holiness nor Love is included in the attributes; and when we consider on the one hand the character of Mohammed, Allah's prophet, and on the other the contents of the Qur'ān, Allah's book, it becomes evident that He is neither the one nor the other. He is addressed as the All-Merciful; but the doctrine of God empties that epithet of all moral content. 'Where all is pre-destined, there can be no room for the exercise of a moral judgement, or the interference of moral purposes. Allah is supreme Governor or Ruler, but is without right of initiative, and is bound fast by the laws of a predetermined rule, which He is unable to modify or control. His function is executive, but in no sense directive—*non-moral*, and dissociated from any conception of free prerogative or capacity such as appear especially to constitute the *person*. It is therefore asserted that no description of God is possible, or is possible only in negative terms—"whatever idea the mind conceives, God is the opposite of it"' (*op. cit.*, p. 827). Man is thus deprived of all freedom. 'The orthodox Musalmān is a rigid fatalist. All evil, no less than all good, proceeds from the eternal will of God. The decrees of *kismet* or fate rule all; from them there is no appeal, as there is no possibility of offering resistance' (p. 834). The assertion of monotheism against polytheism is the merit of Islam; the character of the sole God it offers to men is its defect.

(*c*) Christianity offers a salvation rooted in an eternal divine purpose congruous with the eternal divine character of holy love. Its agent—the Son revealing the Father in realizing this purpose—is Himself divine. The life of the saved is in the divine Spirit. To Life, Knowledge, and Power are added Holiness and Love. For Christian faith there is only one eternal perfect God, revealed in the fullness or oneness of His being and activity for man as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It is not the purpose of this volume to expound Christian theology, as it is assumed to be familiar to the readers. But two truths must be emphasized. God Himself is the Saviour, and the revelation of Himself as Father, Son, and Spirit in that salvation does not imperil the unity of the Godhead, when the doctrine of the Trinity is properly stated, and not presented as it often is in popular speech as a tritheism. Especially in dealing with Islam must this misconception be avoided. That Christ is the revelation of God gives a knowledge of the character and purpose of God, such as Islam expressly denies as possible and as Buddhism never even attempted to attain.

(2) As is the reality of a God, so must be the ideal for man. (*a*) A religion agnostic about God as was the earlier Buddhism was negative as regards the ideal for man. It is a monastic order which holds first place in Buddhism; and while much of the moral teaching is very good, yet this goodness is commended as the condition of self-deliverance from evil and not

as the basis of a progressive society. Having discovered for himself the secret of salvation from the misery of life, escape from the law of Karma, in the renunciation of desire for life, and consequent cessation of existence, or at least of consciousness of existence, or Nirvana, Gautama made it the task of his life to commend the way to this goal to others. 'The method by which this blessed life is achieved is the religious life as outlined in the Eightfold Path. The first step in the path is right belief; that is, belief in the four fundamental principles as enumerated by Buddha; then follow right resolution, the resolve to renounce all sensual pleasures, to have malice towards none, and to harm no living creature; right speech, abstaining from backbiting, harsh language, falsehood, and frivolous talk; right conduct, not destroying life, not taking what is not given one, not being guilty of unchastity; right means of subsistence, giving up a wrong occupation and getting one's livelihood in a proper way; right effort, the strenuous endeavour to overcome all faults and evil qualities, to attain, preserve, and cultivate all good qualities. These six paths are ways of moral self-discipline, and might be comprehended under one head. The next, right reflection, might be called the intellectual discipline, a higher ascesis by which man rids himself of lust and grief. The highest stage is the mystical discipline, right absorption, or concentration, a series of trances through which man rises to the bliss which is as far

beyond happiness as beyond misery, reaches the intuition of higher and higher ranges of truth, and passes into ecstasies that lie beyond consciousness' (Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 294–5). The subordinate position of morality in this scheme is to be observed: it is a means towards an end, in which morality has ceased altogether, because effort is ended, and an unconscious bliss has been attained. Buddhism has no promise and no motive of progress; it has no power of social regeneration. The morals of the monks in China and Japan have not always commended the code that they profess to accept.

(*b*) In the moral teaching and the social order of Islam the imperfect moral character of the founder and the rudimentary stage of the development of Arab society are reflected. By his legislation Mohammed has entangled the religion he founded in the meshes of Arab custom, especially as regards polygamy and slavery. The five pillars of religion are 'the recital of the *Kalimah* or creed, "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the prophet of God"; the *salat*, the five daily prayers; fasting, especially the thirty days' religious fast of the month Ramadhān; *Zakāt*, or almsgiving, which in Islām is regulated by law; the Hajj, or sacred pilgrimage to Mecca, in the twelfth month of the Muhammadan year.' (Geden, *op. cit.*, pp. 825–6). This includes no moral code, but 'there is a kind of summary of practical duty in Qur. xvi. 92: "Verily God commandeth justice and benefi-

cence and generosity to those who are near of kin; and forbiddeth wickedness and wrong-dealing and oppression' (*Idem*, p. 825). The secret of the rapid spread of Islam, apart altogether from its use of force, lies in the simplicity of its creed. It makes all who profess it 'members as it were of a new and noble caste, where the distinctions of birth and occupation and name went for nothing, and in the acceptance of a common faith theoretically at least all became brethren' (p. 826). In contrast to this principle of brotherhood within Islam stands 'the principle of *Jihād*, or Religious Warfare', which 'is by some authorities exalted into a sixth Pillar of the Faith. Muhammad declared in the Qur'ān the duty of believers to fight against the infidels until these either made their submission or were destroyed' (p. 877). Slavery with its economic evils, polygamy with its degradation of womanhood, and the *jihad* with its oppression, wherever practicable, of non-Mohammedan peoples, all of which can claim the authority of the prophet, condemn Islam as a fit religion for any modern, progressive, civilized society. The condition of countries under Mohammedan rule confirms this judgement. 'The moral teaching of the Qur'ān is far below that of the New Testament. While on some points the regulations introduced by Muhammad are to be praised, for example his prohibition of wine and games of chance; and while as a whole his teaching was undoubtedly above the ordinary level of his day, as it

concerned itself with morality, the encouragement given in the Qur'ān to the indulgence of sensual passion, the sanction of polygamy, the intolerance and vindictive spirit displayed towards opponents, stand in the greatest possible contrast to the mind of the gospels and of Christ. Even to the distinct commands of their prophet Musalmāns generally, as little as Christians, are able to plead that they have been altogether faithful. The lines of the Muhammadan religion, as laid down by Muhammad himself, are rigid and final in a sense in which the Christian system is not, and was never intended to be. It is the boast of Islām that it is always the same, inflexible, neither requiring nor capable of adaptation. The regulations suited for Arabian tribal society in the seventh century must be imposed in the letter on all men of every country and age. No liberty is allowed, no freedom of either thought or action; advance and accommodation is only possible by denying the principles of the faith, as formulated by its recognized exponents and leaders' (Geden, *op. cit.*, p. 880).

(*c*) Christianity presents the social ideal of a kingdom of God, being partially realized now, to be fully realized only hereafter. Within that kingdom it offers to the individual the good of eternal life, and the duty of love, absolute love of God and equal love of self and neighbour. The test of that love is forgiveness and its measure self-sacrifice. All the distinctions that had hitherto separated man from

man are abolished in a spiritual equality before God as His children. The perfection of God Himself is presented to men as the pattern for their imitation, or rather the type to which by God's own Spirit they are to be conformed. The heavenly Fatherhood is the basis of the earthly brotherhood. All who love God as His children must love all whom God as Father loves. Whatever is pure or true, honourable or gracious in any human morality is approved in the divine commandment of love. An adequate motive for such a life of love is supplied in the love of God through the grace of Christ, effecting human salvation by divine sacrifice. The defects of the practice of Christian believers are often glaring; but they are not, as in Buddhism and Islam, inherent in the Christian ideal itself. The complaint against the teaching of Jesus is not that it demands too little, but rather too much; and yet this complaint ignores the fact of the sufficient enabling grace which is ever accessible to faith, the fusion of the moral duty and the religious good in one life in God. The universalism, adaptability, and progressiveness of the Christian ideal hold out the prospect of an ultimate world-wide acceptance and enduring influence such as the limitations of the codes of Buddha and Mohammed forbid to them.

(3) The relation of God and man depends on the conception of God and man.

(*a*) In Buddhism it has already been shown that

the historical founder never claimed to be a Saviour, and that the saviours the later Buddhism offers are speculative constructions. The interest of Buddhism is a redemption from suffering, and not from sin; and the moral life is only a means towards the end of *Nirvana*. While Gautama has taught the way of salvation, it is by going in that way that every man must be his own Saviour. Its later form is itself an evidence of its insufficiency for the needs of man.

(*b*) Mohammed is the prophet of Allah, and the lawgiver for the community united by the confession of Allah as God alone. From the orthodox form of Islam the redemptive element is absent; it is legalism with a background of fatalism, a predestination of evil no less than of good by God. Of this legalism there is a modification in the heretical system of the Shī'ah. 'It has been said more than once that in the death of Husain, Islām, or at least the Shī'ah sect, endeavours to meet and satisfy the longing of the human heart for an example of self-sacrifice, and an atonement for sin. Muhammad is reported to have foretold his martyrdom: "He will die for the sake of my people." Words of Husain also, uttered before he started on his last expedition, are handed down by tradition: "How can I forget my people, seeing that I am about to offer myself for their sakes?"' (Geden, *op. cit.*, p. 777 note [2]).

(*c*) Jesus is teacher, example, and companion. As Son He alone can and does reveal the Father, and in

revealing the Father He redeems men from sin unto God by His sacrifice on the Cross. He came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many ; His death was the sacrifice of the new covenant of the universal knowledge of God and the forgiveness of sin. The salvation He offers to man is as complete as the sacrifice that He endures for man. His death is no accident and no after-thought, but the baptism with which He had to be baptized, and which He was straitened to accomplish, the cup which the Father gave Him to drink, and which He accepted as His Father's will. The death of Buddha was quite prosaic ; the death of Husain was very tragic, as he fell in battle. To the death of Buddha his followers attached no virtue. The Shī'ah sect does regard the death of Husain as a martyrdom, and in some sense as redemptive. The New Testament has one concurrent witness as to the significance and value of the death of Christ as an atonement from sin, redeeming from sin, and reconciling to God. What Christ suffers and does on behalf of man is for the fulfilment of the purpose of God. God as holy love, as righteousness and grace, forgives men that they may be made holy for His likeness and fellowship in love. The two poles of the relation of God and man in Christ Jesus are divine sacrifice and human salvation. God is Creator, Preserver, Ruler, Lawgiver, Judge ; but He is above and beyond all not only Father, but

Saviour, primarily from sin as that which separates man from Him, but also consequently from all the evils which for man result from sin; so that in the restored fellowship with God there is eternal life, perfection, glory, and blessedness.

(4) Religion must hold out some hope for the future life as well as offer a good in the present.

(*a*) Buddhism promises a final deliverance from the painful necessity of transmigration in *Nirvana*, which, if it does not mean entire extinction, does mean an existence void of all positive content. The Mahayana offers something better, the possibility in a future existence of becoming a universal Buddha, a saviour of all beings. This is a prospect held out only for the few; for the many there is none. The later Buddhism in China and Japan has a very definite doctrine of future rewards and punishments. 'The Buddhist teachers described with much detail the state of the departed spirits; the blessedness of the good in heaven and the torments of the bad in hell' (Moore's *History of Religions*, i. p. 83). This is, however, a later accretion to the religion not consistent with its fundamental principles, and may even be borrowed from the type of Christianity which in the early centuries spread into Asia. The religion as such does not offer assurance in the hour of death regarding the hereafter.

(*b*) The eschatology of Islam is borrowed partly from Zoroastrianism, and partly from the corrupted

form of Christianity with which the founder came in contact. 'All Muslims believe in a general Resurrection, both of the good and the wicked, as taught by Muhammad himself in the Qur'ān. Believers will enter Paradise, where they will revel in all manner of sensual delights. All non-Musalmāns or infidels will be tortured in hell. There appears to be a difference of opinion as to the destiny of wicked or unfaithful Muhammadans. Some hold that their belief in the one God and in his prophet outweighs any evil of which they may have been guilty, and that they will at their death equally with their fellow-believers be at once received into Paradise. Others suppose that they will undergo a short period of trial and purification in hell, at the close of which, being set free from all defilement, they will be admitted to their reward' (Geden, *op. cit.*, pp. 835–6). The eschatology of Zoroastrianism, and Jewish and Christian apocalyptic literature is taken literally, and coarsened instead of being in any way refined.

(*c*) When we turn to Christianity we must admit that the popular eschatology has not a little resemblance to the teaching both of Buddhism and Islam, and probably all the doctrines could be traced to a common source. What we are entitled to consider in making a comparison is the transformation which the current Jewish eschatology finds in the New Testament, and the principles of a still further transformation that the New Testament also offers us. The

Apocalyptic conceptions of the Second Advent, the Resurrection, the Judgement, and the Final Destiny of the righteous and the wicked remain; but even in Paul and still more in John all these conceptions are being moralized and spiritualized. It is Christ's Resurrection which is the promise, pledge, and pattern of the resurrection of all who believe in Him. As He now lives in them so will they live in Him. It is the vision of Him, the communion with Him, and the resemblance to Him which is the kernel of the Christian hope, which is casting off, if it has not altogether got rid of, the husk of this Jewish Apocalyptic. In the latest phase of New Testament teaching Christ's constant presence takes the place of the Second Advent. The judgement is present in men's reception or rejection of Him. There is a spiritual resurrection unto eternal life here and now for all who are united to Christ by faith. The future life is but the consummation of the present life. There are even hints of a larger hope, a final victory of the love of God over all sin and unbelief. The dogmatism of the popular eschatology is unwarranted by the varied movements of thought in the New Testament.

(5) The contrast of the three religions is most clearly seen when we compare the three founders. In the Christian faith Christ is very much more to the believer than is Gautama in Buddhism or Mohammed in Islam.

(*a*) Buddha claimed to have discovered the secret

of salvation; in his teaching he imparted that secret to others, and he founded a monastic order in which men might work out their own salvation according to his teaching; but he never offered himself as Saviour. It is later speculation, for which the early history offers no warrant, which assigns to him Saviourhood. His personal character and ministry are morally attractive. He abandoned his home, wife and child, rank and wealth in search of salvation. He continued the quest amid many temptations and trials, doubts and disappointments. When as he believed he had discovered the secret, he did not claim the boon for himself, but unselfishly and ungrudgingly for many years gave himself to the delivery of his message, and to the founding and guidance of the community of his disciples. He was sympathetic, compassionate, humble, and self-sacrificing; and has more charm of personality than any of the other founders of religion save One, whose perfection he never reached.

(*b*) Mohammed claimed to be Allah's prophet, and the lawgiver for his community. It was at one time common to regard him as a vulgar impostor, but such a judgement is not warranted by the facts. 'Perhaps few characters in history have been more complex or have combined stronger conviction and will-power with elastic response in external matters to the influence and leading of environment' (Geden, *op. cit.*, p. 767). Of his sincerity in his earlier period at

Mecca there is no reason to doubt; he did believe that he was receiving revelations from God. In the later years in Medina there was undoubtedly deterioration, for he did invent revelations for his own personal or political ends, although he may not himself have been fully conscious of any falsity. Even in his prosperity he maintained simplicity of life, and did not indulge in the luxury and display which marked his successors. His two most flagrant faults were, on the one hand, his harshness and cruelty to all who stood in his way, and on the other his enslavement to his sensual passions. The loss of his devoted wife Khadijah seems to account in part at least for his moral backsliding. A genuine inspiration was gradually supplanted by a tyrannical ambition. Zealous for the sovereignty of God at first, he came to be afterwards much concerned about the authority and dignity of His prophet. Even adherents of Islam find a stumbling-block in the character of the prophet, and find themselves forced to offer a by no means convincing apology for his defects and failures.

(*c*) Jesus, meek and lowly in heart, making the burden of His own sorrow and trial light, and the yoke of His obedience to God easy by His submission to the will of God, and so finding His own rest of soul in a filial trust, offers Himself to men as the Revealer of God—the Son making the Father known. His own inward certainty of the love of God gives to mankind the assurance of the grace of God even to

the sinful. There is already reconciliation between God and man in His attitude to sinners and His influence over them. It is as Redeemer from sin, death, and judgement that He most potently and permanently casts His spell over the souls of men, so that, drawn to Him, they are brought from sin to God. His character is consistent with both the reality of God He reveals, and the ideal for man He presents, and the relation between God and man He realizes. The Son perfectly knows, trusts, and obeys the Father. As man He is true, holy, loving, gracious in forgiveness and self-sacrifice as He calls men to be. The Saviour from sin is tempted in all points, and yet without sin. The Leader of men unto God learns obedience to the uttermost by His suffering. His death is not merely an event, or even an experience; it is a moral and religious achievement. Even those who do not admit His claim as the Son of God acknowledge that man's moral aspiration has not transcended His moral actuality. Wherever He is known as the New Testament presents Him, He still draws all men unto Himself, not only by the gifts He offers, but most of all and first of all by what He is Himself. Unbelief has tried to find 'spots in the sun', but the artificiality of the charges against Him has ever brought the conscience to His side. The portrait of the Gospels cannot have been invented, for such a moral masterpiece was beyond the moral resources of the writers of these records. No argument for Chris-

tianity remains so convincing, and no appeal so constraining as Christ Himself. Later speculation does not need to transform Him into something other than He was, as the Mahayana had to do with Buddha; nor need any adherent of His faith to-day make an apology for Him, as is now felt to be needful for Mohammed. By this test alone Christianity can be proved superior either to Buddhism or to Islam.

(6) In closing this comparison a few relevant observations may be offered as to the proper attitude of the missionary, both in attack on other religions, and in commendation of Christianity. It must be conciliatory, but not compromising. It must avoid as far as is possible unnecessary offence, but not less shun any too complaisant betrayal of the trust of Christian truth.

(*a*) The missionary must try to discover all in the religion with which he is dealing which can be regarded as a preparation for Christ, in imperfect good He can complete, or urgent need He can relieve, or vague aspiration which He can make more definite, and thus satisfy. The missionary must be prepared so to present Christianity as to make it least repellent and most attractive to those whom he seeks to win for faith in Christ. He must emphasize in it all that is akin to the best in other faiths, and he must throw into the background what is not of its essence, and makes its acceptance need-

lessly difficult, because it only belongs to its Western form.

(*b*) But he must avoid perilous compromises. He must guard as a trust its certainties and verities, even when at first they give offence. He must not carry this adaptation to the point of such a transformation as would destroy its identity, and break the continuity of Christian thought and life. Asia must not bring Christ into captivity to its thought and life as Europe too often has done; but both must be the captives of His truth and grace.

(*c*) Simplification of the Gospel is no less a demand of home than of foreign work. The accretions of centuries must be got rid of. Complex theological systems, many of the presuppositions of which are impossible to the modern mind, must be replaced by a statement of the essentials in the language intelligible to-day. Such a restatement need not reflect the peculiarities of East or West, of to-day or to-morrow; but could surely be put in language which would not lose its meaning, and the worth of which could be everywhere recognized: for the differences of men are on the surface, the unity of mankind is in the depths with which the Gospel is concerned.

(*d*) Any such restatement must against pantheism insist on the personality of God, a belief essential to the fullest and finest moral and religious development of human personality. It must no less against determinism and fatalism insist on the freedom of man as

the essential condition of any moral or religious life. It must assert the reality of sin against the moral indifferentism of many religions. It must put the problem of sin before the problem of evil, and not, as Buddhism does, the reverse; and it must maintain that it is only as the first is solved that there can be any hope of the solution of the second. It must in dealing with sin lay stress on the relation of the Son to God as holy love, as the perfect Father, on the disturbance of man's relation to God due to sin, and on the necessity of the removal of this disturbance. Awakening the conscience to sensitiveness, it must be able to meet its need in the truth of the Atonement. It must show the sufficiency of Christ as the Revealer of God and the Redeemer of man. It must show that the Christian salvation is a salvation from, not only sin's penalty, but the power and love of sin, unto holiness. It must relate the continuance of life hereafter to the quality of life here, and derive the blessedness and glory of the immortal life from its perfection. It must offer a principle of social progress in the kingdom of God as well as a law for individual development. Only such a restatement can meet the needs of the world to-day.

(*e*) As has already been suggested national and racial characteristics cannot but affect the creed, code, polity, and ritual of the Church in other lands; and distinctive types should be welcomed, if they contribute to the variety without destroying the unity of

the Christian faith. An exclusive nationalism or racialism is, however, to be deprecated, because, as the history of religions shows, there is no necessity of nature in the religion of any land, but the operation of man's mind, heart, and will under God's constant activity. The unity of Christian faith is the guarantee of a final unity of the human race, not by the suppression, but by the reconciliation of all the differences which have hitherto divided it.

XI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

(1) With the comparison of *Christianity and other Faiths* the special object of this volume would seem to have been reached, but as it is desirable to make this introduction to the Study of Religions as complete as possible, a very brief indication must be given of the problems with the solution of which the Philosophy of Religion is engaged. It is concerned with religion as one of the mental activities of man in its relation to his other mental activities in science or philosophy, art, or morality. It has to show what religion contributes to each of these, or what is its value to the mind of man, as harmonizing and completing these other activities. Thought cannot stop there, however; whatever value these activities may have subjectively for human life, it is only as there can be claimed for them some correspondence with reality, or an objective validity that their subjective values can be conserved. With this problem religion especially is concerned, and in its solution it can offer a confirmation of the solutions to which these other efforts of man are led. In essaying this

task the philosophy of religion may be said to pass over into the philosophy of theism.

(2) Wherever man is, there is religion. Since it is so universal in mankind it is surely necessary to manhood. This necessity must now be proved.

(*a*) Man, though a part of nature, knows and feels himself to be more than a part of nature, and believes himself to be akin to, and so seeks fellowship with, that which is above and beyond the whole of nature. He reaches out, and rises above the world on which he depends, in belief and worship to the divine, in alliance with and by assistance of which he seeks a guarantee of the fulfilment of the wishes, hopes, and aims which nature denies him, and which he is not capable of carrying out himself. In all his other activities he moves and works within the limits of the visible temporal natural order, although in his higher interests in science or philosophy, art or morality, he stretches himself beyond the measure of actuality into the larger range of the ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness. Here even he adds in his aspiration and endeavour to things which are things which ought to be as the completion of things which are, but still he lacks the assurance that things which ought to be shall be. This assurance religion alone can give, because it evokes and sustains the faith that they already are in the invisible, eternal, supernatural realm. Faith is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen (Heb. xi. 1).

In the highest stage of the development of religion God is believed to be in Himself the reality of all the ideals which man cherishes and strives to realize, and the succour and support of man in all his aspirations and endeavours to make them reality in Himself. Thus it is that religion is the conservation of the values that man recognizes and appreciates in his own thought and life.

(*b*) This meaning and worth of religion is not disclosed at its earlier stages of development, and in the philosophy of religion we must necessarily deal with man's religious consciousness in its most highly developed form. We cannot be content with showing what it has been, or still is, to the devout man in his thinking about it, but we must by reflexion from the standpoint of philosophy which is concerned with giving as rational an interpretation as possible of man's total experience, outer and inner, make explicit what is largely implicit for the experient. As the last chapter was an endeavour to show that it is in Christianity that the religious consciousness reaches its most valuable expression, it is with the Christian consciousness that the philosophy of religion will be mainly concerned, although it will not deal with distinctive Christian doctrine except in so far as its immediate purpose demands, and will endeavour to take account of whatever in other religions may serve its special object.

(*c*) With the value of religion in so far as it assures

the believer regarding the natural goods of the earthly life, of the care and bounty of the gods or God, or in so far as it is the assurance of things hoped for in respect of a future life, we need not now deal; nor with what may be called its *intrinsic value* in the satisfaction which fellowship with God gives: we pass to show its value to the other mental activities of man.

(3) Man tries to understand the world in which he finds himself in order that he may be at home in it, that he may secure its benefits, and avert its injuries. That science has had so practical a motive is now generally conceded. Cognition has its primary impulse in conation; not speculative curiosity, but practical necessity led man to try and explain the world around him.

(*a*) In explaining the world, as has been shown, by animism man did make the world more intelligible to himself; and the assumption that an intelligible effect must have an intelligible cause from this lowly beginning has not only accompanied but warranted the progress of man's knowledge. The modern man of science may despise animism as a superstition; and yet it is probable that only from such a root could have sprung the enduring plant of man's oft baffled yet ever renewed effort to make the world intelligible. Although the man of science usually assumes that the world can be known, and asks no justification of his assumption, yet the reli-

gious belief in God does sustain the expectation that the reality which has its origin in intelligence will prove intelligible. If a man of science can think of himself as thinking God's thoughts after Him, his quest of truth will be more confident, than if he refuses to believe that the ultimate reality of the world is mind.

(*b*) Apart from this very general relation that religion offers an assurance of the intelligibility of the world, science in the strict sense of the word has little contact, and need have no conflict, with religion, so long as both keep themselves within their own proper provinces. It is only when metaphysical speculations slip in under guise of scientific hypotheses that the conclusions of science challenge the assurances of faith. A doctrine of evolution which claims to be *causal*, and not merely *modal*, and refuses to be *teleological* may be anti-religious. Evolution as a representation of the mode of the world-process and not an explanation of the world-production is not anti-theistic. Only if the Bible is regarded as containing authoritative information on the matters with which science deals, can any need arise for trying to reconcile Genesis and geology. But if the object of the inspired Scriptures is to make man wise unto salvation, and not unto any *'ology* which falls into the realm of science, no difference need arise. The Christian Church has always suffered defeat, and only brought discredit on itself, when it tried to arrest the

progress of science within its own proper province of knowledge.

(4) In keeping science within its own province religion can rely on philosophy as an ally.

(*a*) It is the task of philosophy to consider not the content of knowledge, but to examine man's capacity for knowledge. What science assumes (that the world can be known), philosophy must try to verify. The last questions the mind asks itself, the whence, the what, the whither, and the why of the world, which science with its methods of observation, experiment, and generalization cannot answer, philosophy ventures to answer. It deals with the meaning, the aim, and the worth of life, while science deals only with the fact and its laws and causes. Thus philosophy comes into a closer contact with religion than does science, for it is just these problems that religion seeks to solve. While it may be said that philosophy solves them speculatively for thought, and religion practically for life; yet we cannot so sever thought and life as to acquiesce in inconsistent or even contradictory solutions. The assertion of a preacher that he was an Agnostic in the head and a Christian in the heart may be a halt, but it cannot be a resting-place. There must be an intelligible unity in thought and life, the speculative and the practical. The possibility of a conflict then between philosophy and religion must be admitted, but the necessity denied, unless we conceive of man as a house divided against itself.

(*b*) When there is conflict, what seems to be necessary is that philosophy should become more practical and religion more speculative, or that philosophy should recognize the needs of life, and religion the claims of thought. The tendency in philosophy has been to be too intellectualist, to pass from epistemology, the theory of knowledge, directly to ontology, the doctrine of being, without adequate recognition of the contribution of the moral conscience and the religious consciousness to the solution of its problems. The tendency of religion has often been too anti-rational; faith has been opposed to and exalted above reason, whereas what we want is a reasonable faith, a certainty about God that can be harmonized with all other assured knowledge. When philosophy fully recognizes the testimony of morality and religion as well as science in regard to ultimate reality, and when religion freely examines its intuitions of God to make their content an intelligible unity, we have good ground for believing that there need be no conflict between them. Agnosticism, Materialism, Pantheism are bad philosophy, and can be shown to be bad philosophy, and are to be condemned as such, and not merely as contradicting the witness of Christian faith. Theism can be proved both good philosophy and good religion. A philosophy may be tested by its adequacy in meeting the imperatives of the moral conscience and the aspirations of the religious consciousness. A religion may be tested not only by the

satisfaction it gives to the spirit of man, but also by the response it makes to the questions of the intellect. This double test the philosophy of religion must apply in order that it may reconcile intellect and spirit, reason and faith.

(*c*) Philosophy and religion are not, however, identical, although they may converge on the one conception of God.

(*a*) Religion relies on experience, the immediate contact and the intimate communion of the soul with God. The long history of religion would be a miserable illusion if there were not such access of the spirit of man to God, not such habitation of the Spirit of God in man. This experience may for most men be mediated by a great religious personality; the Christian depends on Christ for his knowledge of the Father, and his life in the Father. To elect souls, however, is given an intuitive certainty of God so that God is to them the most real of all beings, in whom they live, and move, and have their own being. When this experience is challenged by denial of its truth, or interrupted by the soul's own despondency, philosophy may in the reasons it can offer for faith relieve the doubt and sustain the faltering belief until assurance is regained. A conviction that is not related to the whole content of the mind, however unhesitating and confident it may for a time be, is much more liable to fluctuation than one that holds its proper place in a consistent view of the world. Faith

gains in constancy when it has reason for its ally.

(β) Philosophy reaches its conclusion by a process of reasoning, if not exclusively a logical demonstration. It tries to think things together, to give to the world an intelligible unity; coherence of thought in the interpretation of reality is what gives it such confidence as it may attain. The data it must harmonize are so numerous, varied, and often even apparently contradictory, that the coherence is rather an ideal for which it strives than an actuality which it gains. Few there are who can have such confidence in their own reasoning as to reach certainty along the path of speculation. If the moral conscience and religious consciousness lend confirmation to the conclusions of the speculative intellect, the probability is made as nearly a certainty as the questioning mind of man is likely to reach, since now we only know in part, and see in a glass darkly.

(5) The moral conscience and the religious consciousness are more closely related to one another, than either of the two is to the speculative intellect. How then is religion related to morality? (α) As the earliest form of morality is probably conformity to tribal custom, so the first form of the relation of religion to morality is that the tribal deity is conceived as the giver, the guardian, and the vindicator of the tribal customs. The early society is theocratic. For Kant religion was still the recognition of our moral

duties as divine commands. When the individual conscience is developed, and the moral standard of judgement is still conceived as a law, God is viewed as the lawgiver, and the authority of conscience is regarded as dependent on His sovereignty. When religion is represented as the *sanction* of morality, this is the relation that is in mind. (*b*) In this phase of development we may distinguish a more mechanical and a more vital view. If God is thought of as rewarding obedience and punishing disobedience, His law may be obeyed to secure reward and to avoid punishment. This is the very imperfect form of morality which is usually described as legalism. The man who lives what he regards as the Christian life because he shuns hell and seeks heaven is still in the bondage of this legalism. If God is thought of, however, as Himself the absolutely moral perfection, and holiness as the condition and the measure of communion with Him, then goodness is no less sought for its own sake because it is sought in God, since God is sought not for any blessings apart from Himself He may bestow but just because He is the moral perfection, and a man can become morally perfect only as he lives in God. Here religion supplies morality not only with its *sanction*, but even with its *standard*, the perfection of God Himself. As God is holy love, the eternal and infinite Father, it is evident how wide, and deep, and enduring a foundation is laid in such a standard for a perfect social order among men; the

realization of this ideal would be the Kingdom of God in the family of men, love being alone the fulfilment of all law.

(*c*) A *standard* such as this seems at first sight to make too great a moral demand on man in three respects. First of all man's moral weakness is insufficient for the struggle against evil and the striving for God, to which he is thus summoned. Secondly, man's moral development, even were his moral strength equal to the task, is too brief if it is cut short by death for the realization of such an ideal. And thirdly, the world in which man now finds himself is a world which is ever challenging such an ideal, and is thus often making it appear as an illusion, a forlorn hope. In regard to each of these difficulties religion can and does bring relief to morality.

(α) For faith God is not merely or mainly a transcendent pattern of perfection, He is an immanent power of perfecting. The struggle and the striving of man have the stimulus and the support of God. His grace is sufficient, and His strength is made perfect in weakness. The Christian character depends on the Christian experience of God by His Spirit working in man, to fulfil His own purpose by man's free assent in his voluntary dependence on God, not in indolence, but in the obedience of faith.

(β) For faith again death does not end all, but is the beginning of a fresh stage in the moral development under new conditions more favourable than the

present are for the progress towards the divine perfection. The clearer vision of God is the condition of the closer resemblance to God. Even in the lower forms of religion belief in continued existence springs from the same root in animism as the belief in spirits or gods; and although for a very long period the one belief was not made to depend on the other, yet when the hope of a blessed and glorious immortality does emerge it is dependent on the faith in God as in so close a fellowship with man that He will not suffer His companions to be death's victims.

(γ) For faith, lastly, there is discoverable even amid the confusions of human conduct a purpose of God as being fulfilled in human history. Despite all appearances the believer knows that all things are working together for good to those who love God. Thus does religion give support, scope, and security to morality.

(6) But besides the intellectual and the practical interest of man there is the aesthetic, embracing in the wider sense the whole emotional life of man, and in the narrower sense the satisfaction that the perception and appreciation of beauty in nature or art brings.

(α) We may first of all look very briefly at beauty in relation to religion. (α) The beauty or still more the sublimity of nature (the beauty, which cannot be completely apprehended, and so suggests infinitude to man in the very contemplation of the finite), moves the soul to adoration which, if not

always purely religious, is so akin to religion that we need not distinguish it. Of this Wordsworth is the typical witness. There may be admiration, but such adoration is possible only if nature becomes so transparent that the glory of God shines through it. As a revelation of God, the beauty and sublimity of nature must bring to the sensitive and responsive spirit a satisfaction deeper than if no 'presence that disturbs us with the joy of elevated thoughts' were discerned in it. Seeley has pleaded that this adoration of beauty is religion even if there be not the explicit consciousness of the Presence. By itself it would certainly be an inadequate religion, but religion is made a more adequate expression of the whole personality when this sense is a factor in its development.

(β) Beauty has often been regarded as separated from, if not opposed to, holiness, and yet (even if the phrase be an incorrect translation, it does express a truth) there is the beauty of holiness. In conduct and character there may be a fitness and completeness, a harmony and proportion, which gives an emotional satisfaction such as the contemplation of nature can give. Still more may there be here the sublime, and the sense of awe, where adoration is conscious of its own inadequacy. Although doubtless there is that in God of which natural beauty is the expression, yet it is the moral perfection of God that has the beauty or sublimity which both satisfies and humbles us. We may even feel that we want another

word, and may prefer to speak of God's glory. Religion can thus lift the sense of beauty out of the sphere of the finite and temporal into the realm of the infinite and eternal.

(γ) In art man strives to express in outward form this inward sense of beauty, and on art religion has exercised an influence. The image, the altar, the temple, afford in connexion with worship itself an opportunity for the artist; and wide and enduring has been the stimulus to art which religion has afforded. The art of Greece does satisfy our sense of beauty, even if with Browning we recognize that its very perfection was due to the limitation of the religion, which made it possible to represent the divine beings as beautiful human forms, and that early Christian art, however defective technically, has a sense of the infinite the Greek lacked. The religious art of Egypt and India do not in the same way appeal to us. The vastness at which Egyptian art aimed was an attempt spatially to suggest the incommensurable. What seems to us even revolting ugliness in some of the Hindu idols is symbolically significant of the Indian conception of the divine. Alluring as the theme is, these few suggestions only need here be offered.

(*b*) We have already discussed the question of the characteristic religious emotion, and have concluded that on the whole pleasure predominates over pain, hope over fear. (α) Religion does bring happiness in the relief it offers from anxiety regarding the natural

goods; something better even than happiness does it offer when it gives the assurance of victory in the struggle against sin for goodness. We may with Carlyle call it blessedness, unless we reserve the term for that satisfaction in God Himself without regard even to His gifts, which is the mystic's goal. (β) God in the lowest phase of religion is thought of as the means towards man's ends. In the next, where the moral conscience and not the natural desires dominate, man thinks himself rather a means towards God's ends. Calvinism is the classical instance of religion as absolute surrender to the sole will of God. Man's chief end is to glorify God in being either damned or saved according to God's sovereign decree. But in the highest phase of religion this contrast of means and ends ceases. Man has a hunger and thirst for God, and religion is the satisfaction of this need. God, desired first of all and most of all as the highest good inclusive of every other good, is possessed in the religious experience. In God's end man finds his own end, his self-fulfilment in his self-surrender, his self-satisfaction in such an absorption in God that self as apart from God is altogether left behind, although conscious voluntary personality continues in personal communion with the personal God. The mystic in an occasional rapture claims to have reached this goal, although in the theory of mysticism there is too prevalent the assumption that man's conscious voluntary personality must be lost in being merged in the

divine, whereas we must find ourselves in thus losing ourselves in God. Can we express the distinction between what we lose and what we find thus? We lose our selfishness, but not our selfness, our individualism, but not our personality. We may be repelled rather than attracted by the jargon in which mysticism has often delighted; on some lips it may even appear to us as cant; we may distrust its mechanical methods of inducing the ecstasy in God. But it stands for this truth, a truth that should not be regarded as the monopoly of any *'ism*, but as the common possession of all spiritual religion, that whatever other uses religion may have, its ideal is only realized as man is possessed by and possesses God, apprehends that for which he has been apprehended. If from popular Christianity this spirituality is often absent, and religion is second-hand tradition or convention and not first-hand experience, yet in the Johannine and the Pauline writings this union and communion with God is presented as the characteristically Christian piety, although God is ever mediated by Christ as the Revealer of God and the Redeemer of men. One of the beneficent effects of foreign missions may be the reaction of Hindu piety at its best to deepen and widen this current of spirituality in the Christian Church. This is the highest value to the thought and life of man religion offers, and in appraising it the philosophy of religion accomplishes its task.

(7) It is only as the existence of a perfect personal God in personal relations with man in all his characteristic personal activities is assumed, that these values of religion in itself and for science or philosophy, morality or art can be claimed. That assumption must be justified, and this is what the philosophy of theism as complementary to the philosophy of religion tries to do. At the end of a volume already grown beyond the intended measure, no attempt can be made to show how this demand is met; but a misconception must be removed, lest this venture should appear as a vaulting ambition that o'erleaps itself. (*a*) It is not a logical demonstration which is or can be offered, fitted to command assent from the man who has no religious experience. Man's ideas of finite and infinite, relative and absolute, temporal and eternal, may be necessary correlatives of his thinking; but the reality to which the one set of epithets can be applied is not adequate to prove that there is a reality to which the alternative set of epithets can be applied. Be it at once admitted that man cannot by searching find out God. To speak of proofs of the divine existence is to put a meaning into the word which in this connexion it does not and cannot bear. It is in religion that man finds God, because he has been found of God; man's discovery of God is God's self-disclosure.

(*b*) In the philosophy of theism we must start with the belief in God as the philosophy of religion which interprets the religious development of mankind and offers

it to us in the monotheistic conception as our datum. What we then try to do is to show that self and world alike, when we reflect on their meaning, worth, and aim, when we try to interpret the total reality we know, and not merely to explain the details of it as science does, leave us problems unsolved, and yet some indications of the direction of their solution. An intelligible universe suggests intelligence as its source. Nature as a system of forces leads us to one force, constant in itself yet variable in manifestation, which we can understand only when we conceive it in the analogy of the will of which we are conscious in ourselves. Nature as an order, and even a progressive order, gives to that will the content of purpose, and so leads us to postulate as the most reasonable interpretation of such progressive order a directive mind as well as active will. The values of which we have already spoken—truth, beauty, holiness—are so intrinsic, and so command our appreciation of them that we cannot but regard them as real in that Mind and Will. Thus the interpretation of the Universe yields us the elements which personality combines, and to all these indications the religious belief in God just gives that confirmation which turns probability into certainty; reason illumines faith; faith assures reason.

(8) Studied in the manifold ways indicated in the preceding pages, religion is not exposed as a superstition, as in many of its forms it may at first sight

appear to be, but is proved to be of all the values which man can appreciate, 'the pearl of great price', for which the sacrifice of all the other precious pearls was not a loss, yet which need not be purchased at the price of any of them, but possessed enhances the value of them all. And among the religions, none of which is to be mocked or scorned, but all of which must be respected and treated with appreciation of their good intent, whatever be their faults and failures, Christianity can be shown to be in the person, teaching, sacrifice, and sovereignty of Christ as Son of God and Saviour of men the perfect fulfilment of their imperfect endeavours. While the study of the religions of the world imposes on the foreign missionary an attitude to other faiths much more sympathetic than was common when the modern enterprise began, it does not in any way weaken the conviction which is the constant motive of this enterprise that Christ alone among all religious masters has the absolute claim to the belief, trust, and surrender of all men, and that accordingly the consummation of the world's history shall be reached only when 'in the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father'.

APPENDIX

THE LESSONS OF EDINBURGH

CHRISTIANITY AND OTHER FAITHS

(1) The attitude of Christians to the other religions of mankind has greatly changed in recent years. They are not now dismissed as altogether false, while Christianity is alone held to be true. It is acknowledged that where men have sought God He has been found of them; and that in no land and no age has He been without His witnesses. Hence agreements between Christianity and other religions are being expected, and not differences alone asserted. To this change of attitude foreign missions have contributed much as well as the recent comparative study of religions. Both these influences were allied in Commission IV of the World's Missionary Conference in Edinburgh.[1] From missionaries in the field the data were gathered for a comparison, sympathetic and appreciative, of the other religions with Christianity. These religions are studied not as they are presented in books, but as they are realized in life. While the points of contact between other faiths and the Christian faith have been fully recognized as indicating the line of least resistance, which it is wise for the missionary to adopt on his approach to those whom he seeks to win for

[1] The references throughout are to the Report of Commission IV, World Missionary Conference, 1910.

Christ, the points of antagonism which increase the difficulty of the work, and so call for greater persistence in it, have also been discovered. The most important result of the inquiry, however, has been to show that there are necessities and aspirations of the soul of man which each of the non-Christian religions fails to satisfy when once by the preaching of the Gospel the spirit of man has been awakened to its full self-consciousness. Many are content with their faith because their moral and religious development has been arrested at a lower stage; and it is only when the upward movement of the soul begins that the insufficiency of the ancestral religion is discovered. Christianity evokes the higher desires and purposes, which it alone can meet. Our present task is to consider the defects which converts have discovered in their own religion when brought into comparison with the Christian—the discovery which has led many to Christ.

(2) We may follow the order adopted in the Report in dealing with the various religions. The Animistic religions are very varied and confused in character: their common feature, however, is the belief in a multitude of spirits, so controlling the world around, as to be able either to inflict injury or to confer benefit on man; but the fear of evil is generally stronger than the hope of good. The animist needs to be constantly propitiating these powers that in so many ways may do him harm. As it is bodily good that he alone seeks, so it is bodily hurt that he shuns. Religion at this stage is generally non-moral, although there are

instances of the tribal morality being enforced by dread of the punishment that the spirit might inflict for any violation of it; but such dread can hardly be regarded as moral. 'The presence of any religious help or consolation in animistic beliefs and rites is absolutely denied by the majority of the missionaries, as well as any sense of practical obligation due to a belief in a supreme God' (p. 10). It is the truth of the Father Almighty that seems to make the strongest appeal to the animist, as it delivers him from his dread of hostile spirits, and assures him of an all-sufficient care and bounty amid the dangers and needs of his life. The Christian hope of a blessed and glorious immortality also has a potent influence; as the animist believes in a continuance of life, but such as to be dreaded rather than desired, and this dread the Christian hope removes. Few will be found who would argue that the Animistic religions are adequate, and we may therefore pass from them to the higher religions for which such a claim is sometimes advanced.

(3) China has three religions, two native, Confucianism and Taoism, and one imported, Buddhism. While there are also Mohammedans in large numbers, Islam can hardly be regarded as distinctively Chinese and may be reserved for later reference. It seems to be the general opinion of the missionaries that while the tenets and rites are for the majority of the people traditional and formal without evoking or satisfying any real deep religious need, the benefits sought are material. 'Some doubt if the Chinese have any con-

ception of spiritual and disinterested worship. They do not seek help to lead good lives so that they may grow in spiritual grace and knowledge' (p. 41). It must be recognized, however, that the ancestor-worship and the teaching of Confucius exercise a considerable influence in securing domestic and social morality. The Chinaman is not as a rule devout, but 'some devout souls no doubt find help and comfort in the later Buddhist doctrine of Amitabha and the Western Paradise, and in the all-pitiful, all-hearing Goddess of Mercy'. This is probably the nearest approach to the Christian faith to be found in Chinese religion. Regarding the converts to Christianity one missionary says: 'One of their chief reasons for dissatisfaction is that their old religion does not help men to get rid of their sins nor give them strength to live a better life.' 'Another source of dissatisfaction is the want of definite, clear teaching regarding the future life' (p. 50). While Confucianism supplies a moral code, it fails to offer an adequate moral motive. One Chinese writer confesses: 'Confucianism only teaches men how to talk about duty; Christianity teaches men how to do it' (p. 51). Buddhism is more religious than Confucianism; and there is in China an advanced Buddhism which offers several points of contact with Christianity as in the belief in God (the deified Buddha), in prayer, in man's need of salvation, in the fact of retribution and reward hereafter, in the possibility of the incarnation of the Divine, in the duty of self-repression and self-examination and of pity to all living things. Nevertheless the insufficiency 'to

give strength for moral living' is seen in the proverbial immorality of its priests (p. 57). The monotheism of Christianity appeals to the reason of the Chinaman; the perfect life of Christ subdues his conscience, but it would seem that there is less appreciation of the Cross: the moral energy the Living Christ imparts is welcomed. 'It is the power of Christianity to enable men to lead a new and higher life which appeals to the Chinese' (p. 60). The Christian morality is also seen to be an advance on the Confucian code. The testimony of a Chinese writer is this: 'The sacredness of the individual life, the great principle of love, the fatherhood of God, and the universal brotherhood of man, are the elements which possess the greatest power of appeal both in the sense that they have appealed to me, and also that they have appealed to those to whom I have been the messenger' (p. 61). It is often confidently asserted that the Chinese religion has the belief in immortality and in the existence of a supreme God; but this is disputed by many good authorities. Even if these beliefs do exist, they are at present practically so impotent that they cannot be regarded as making the religion adequate for the soul of man.

(4) In Japan, Shinto, 'the indigenous cult', is 'the organized expression of Japanese patriotism, and is indeed a system of national ceremonial'. 'It does not claim to be a religion in the sense in which Buddhism is a religion.' It is sometimes said that it offers no moral code, but it is more probable that the Confucian code has now completely superseded 'the older and

simpler Shinto teaching' (p. 74). Neither is Confucianism 'in the full sense of the word a religion', 'but it is essentially a system of moral instruction' which 'does not seek to find any religious basis for its ethical teaching', as 'spiritual things did not concern Confucius'. In contrast to these two religions, Buddhism may claim 'to be a religion in the true sense of the term'. One of the sects of Buddhism, the Shinshu, is 'a real spiritual force in the life of Japan', but it stands apart from orthodox Buddhism, and approaches Christianity. 'The essence of this teaching is the doctrine of the Saving Vow of Amida.' Amida, the one Buddha, 'a Being of infinite life and light, without beginning of life or end of days,' in his mercy countless ages ago became man, and endured much that he might as man return to his former glory. 'But before returning he registered a vow not to accept his glory until he had worked out a way of salvation for mankind—an easy way, which should not depend on man's individual exertions,' but simply on 'faith in his name and vow' (pp. 76–7). The founder of Buddhism is not worshipped, but is regarded simply as a herald of Amida's vow, and the asceticism of original Buddhism has also been abandoned. It is to be observed here that the doctrine has no basis in any historical reality, but only in a theological speculation, and that it completely forsakes the standpoint of the historical founder of the religion. It witnesses, however, on the one hand to the insufficiency of the original Buddhism as a religion, and on the other to the need of the soul for a divine-human Saviour. It

is an aspiration of which Christianity is the fulfilment. Japanese morality is probably a stronger force than is religion. 'The spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the family was, and is, the ruling and guiding principle of the nation' (p. 80). The Japanese do feel a want of spiritual power in their religion, as in the new life forced upon the nation 'the old faiths have faded into shadows' (p. 90). Buddhism has no joyous certainty to offer to them, nothing of confidence or hope. While the people incline to optimism, Buddhism itself is pessimistic. It is so negative that, to develop something like a Gospel, the Shin sect has had to depart from its standpoint. The feeling is growing that morality cannot be divorced from religion, and yet none of the religions of the land offer the moral power that the nation to-day needs.

(5) Islam, as well as Buddhism, claims to be a universal religion, and is even more actively missionary in character. In many parts of the world it is the one formidable rival Christianity has to face. For it is being proved an altogether false assumption that it can serve as a preparation for Christianity. Barbarous tribes which have adopted Islam are much less likely to be converted to Christianity than those who still retain their animistic beliefs. Here the better is the enemy of the best. The emergence of mystical sects in Islam itself is an evidence of the dissatisfaction of Moslems with the orthodox faith. 'The beliefs in incarnation and atonement' (found especially in Persia, where Islam, a Semitic faith, was imposed on an Aryan race),

'the mediation of saints, and the mystic absorption in God are not native to the religion of Mohammed, but they are congenial to the souls of many Moslems. They seem to afford a comfort and a help which the deistic theology, the legalistic piety, and the endaemonistic morality of the orthodox faith do not offer' (p. 129). Moslems, however, do not feel any offence in their religion until brought into contact with Christianity. 'Many Moslems are dissatisfied with Mohammed as an ideal of character' when brought into comparison with the grace and truth of Jesus Christ. 'They are perplexed with the inconsistencies of his life and teaching.' 'His relations to women especially present a moral difficulty.' It is often admitted that Islam does not exercise the moral influence Christianity does. 'A comparison of the moral code of Islam with that of Christianity increases the dissatisfaction. The moral scandals of Islam—polygamy, facility of divorce, and slavery—are keenly felt by some' (p. 130). The ceremonial requirements are felt to be a useless burden. When the consciousness of sin is awakened, the Moslem cannot find in his religion any offer of atoning grace; 'the Shiah belief in incarnation and atonement shows that orthodox Islam does not provide adequately for this deep human need' (p. 131). The deistic conception of God as a unit apart from the world, unless it is modified in the direction of Christian monotheism, tends in thoughtful minds to lapse into a pantheistic identification of God and the world. The legalistic religion, as unsatisfying to the soul's hunger

for God, often is abandoned for a mysticism in which absorption in the divine is sought as the highest good. The history of Mohammedan lands is impressing on the Moslem mind the fact that Christianity and progress go together, Islam and stagnation or decadence. But the strongest appeal in Christianity to the Moslem is Christ Himself, in His teaching, life, and work, so marked a contrast to, and so manifestly better and greater than Mohammed.

(6) Hinduism is not only the living faith of a vast multitude, but it appears in numberless forms, so that any exhaustive survey is quite impossible. The highest doctrine of Hinduism is the possibility in this life of attaining union with deity, or rather loss of individual in the universal existence, as the return of the wave to the ocean. 'The faith that this unity with the Divine can be attained by the way of knowledge is held by comparatively few. It is as it were the esoteric view of the educated classes' (p. 159). On the contrary, 'the doctrine that this redemption is to be attained by the way of *Bhakti*, loving devotion to the Divine Essence or to the Divine Being appeals to very many.' It closely connects itself with the theism characteristic of many of the sects, which substitutes for the impersonal existence a personal God as the object of devotion. Though ancient in origin, yet it has recently, probably owing to the influence of Christian teaching on faith, come into greater prominence. It is a 'living religious force of great moment', and it is to be observed that in the two respects in which it is

influential it is a departure from the characteristically Indian view, both of deity and piety, and an approach to the Christian standpoint. The book that most appeals to devout Hindus is the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, in which 'Krishna is represented both as the absolute divine essence, Brahma, and as a personal Being to whom sacrifices and prayers are to be offered'. 'While the philosophy is essentially pantheistic, the form of worship presented centres round a divine-human helper, and is therefore the best preparation in Hinduism for the Christian Gospel, since it reveals the hidden craving of the human heart to possess a humanized God, which can only be satisfied in Christ' (p. 160). 'The absence of the sin-consciousness is the saddest fact in India,' and this is an inevitable consequence of its pantheism. While there are exceptions, as is shown by the use of expiatory rites, yet in most cases 'it is the knowledge of Christ which creates the sense of sin' (pp. 162–3). The system of caste is a hindrance to a common moral consciousness of mutual social obligations. The concentration of the Indian mind on eternal, essential existence prevents any sense of the value of history for religion as in Christianity, and is a barrier to national progress. A missionary states that he has 'hardly ever met with any whose first realized need was that of salvation from the curse and guilt of sin', but 'in many cases the first dissatisfaction arises because the Hindu faith has not given them the true knowledge of God, and realization of the desired oneness with Him.' The Hindu consciousness is religious

in the desire for union with deity, rather than moral in the purpose of holiness, as the immorality both of its deities and rites shows; and so Christianity has to evoke the moral conscience as well as satisfy the religious aspiration.

(7) In this rapid glance over so wide a field only a few of the outstanding landmarks could be noted, but the total impression of the minute survey of the non-Christian religions given in this Report may be expressed thus. The features of the religions passed in review that have religious vitality and exert moral influence are the features in which the religion approaches more nearly to Christianity; and this is often only found in a heretical sect condemned by the orthodox religion; so it is in Buddhism, Islam, and it would be in Hinduism, if Hinduism were not so tolerant of any and every departure except the breaking of caste. Necessities and aspirations are betrayed in most of the religions which they themselves cannot meet and satisfy, but Christianity can. Yet the sense of dissatisfaction is not common until it is evoked by the presentation of Christianity. It is in comparison with it that the other religions show clearly their defects, even to their own adherents. The Fatherhood of God, the Saviourhood and Lordship of Jesus Christ, the presence and power of the Spirit, the moral code, the spiritual worship, the assurance of immortality—in short, the truth and the grace the Christian Gospel offers are everywhere proving their sufficiency for the soul of man by the growing attraction exercised on men of many races and many climes.

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